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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ESSAYS 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) provide financial services to poor people in order to reduce 
poverty and help the poor to set up income-generating businesses (Hermes, Lensink, & 
Meesters, 2011). These organizations typically have the dual objective of reducing poverty 
(social objectives) and being financially sustainable. Over the last decade, this industry has 
grown and attracted international attention due to, among other things, 2006 being named the 
UN Year of Microcredit, and the Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to Mohammad Yunus and 
Grameen Bank in that year (Galema, Lensink, & Mersland, 2012a; Labie & Mersland, 2011). 
Most people around the world are now aware of microfinance, and thousands of international 
stakeholders, such as NGOs, politicians and celebrities, are advocating its use, motivating 
more actors to become involved (Mersland, Randøy, & Strøm, 2011).  
As the industry comes of age with so many stakeholders being involved, claims that MFIs 
need to improve their boards of directors (boards) as part of corporate governance* – have 
proliferated (Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation [CSFI], 2011; Hartarska & 
Mersland, 2012). However, apart from policy papers that suggest how MFI boards should be 
set up, there is little scientific knowledge about what constitutes an effective board and how 
influential boards are. The essays in this dissertation respond to this gap by investigating the 
structure, role and influence of the boards of MFIs.  
The first essay examines the determinants of board structure in MFIs. The essay is based 
on the literature that suggests that boards should be structured in response to organizational 
characteristics (Adams & Mehran, 2005; Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008). It identifies the 
unique characteristics of MFIs and examines whether these characteristics determine the 
structure of their boards. Building on the first, the second essay examines the influence of 
board structure/composition on the performance of MFIs. The high involvement of different 
stakeholders in the microfinance industry (Labie & Mersland, 2011; Mersland, 2011) 
motivated the third and fourth essays, which examine the extent to which stakeholders are 
represented on MFI boards and their influence on strategic decision making, board structure 
and the performance of MFIs.  
Overall, the four essays show that board structure is important for adherence to MFI board 
roles and the performance of MFIs. The dissertation shows that enhancing MFI board 
                                                 
*
 I borrow the definition of corporate governance from Thomsen & Canyon (2012), who defines it as the control 
and direction of organizations by boards, ownership, incentives and other mechanisms.  
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diversity is a means of enhancing the board’s understanding of diverse customer needs 
(including the desperately poor) and providing strong linkages to resource providers such as 
international donors, national opinion leaders, fund providers and decision makers. The 
dissertation gives further evidence of the strong influence on MFIs of CEO founders and local 
and international stakeholders. The content and format of the essays are summarized in Figure 
1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why are boards an interesting subject for this dissertation and why the boards of MFIs in 
particular? MFI boards are important because they are the strategic decision control systems 
(CSFI, 2011; Galema, Lensink & Mersland, 2012b). They are also instruments for dealing 
with the MFIs’ external environment and enable MFIs to minimize their dependence on others 
and gain resources (Council of Microfinance Equity Funds [CMEF], 2005; Dorado & Molz, 
2005). The MFI board therefore has a key function as it decides on the strategic direction of 
the MFI, oversees, monitors and advises the managers, and makes sure that organizational 
goals are met (Campion & Frankiewicz, 1999). 
Microfinance policy papers such as those by Conger, Finegold, and Lawler (1999) and 
CMEF (2005) have suggested that MFI boards should be structured in such a way that their 
Figure 1: Overview of the dissertation 
Essay 2                                                                                 Essay 1                                                                                
Essay 3 & 4                                                                                 Essay 4                                                     
Stakeholders 
• Donors 
• Owners 
• Creditors 
• Employees 
• Customers 
 
Board Structure 
• Board Size 
• CEO duality 
• Independence 
• Gender diversity 
• Foreign diversity 
• Founders  
 
Board Roles 
• Monitoring 
• Strategic 
decision 
making 
• Resource 
 
 
 
 
MFI Performance 
• Financial 
• Social Outreach 
Characteristics 
• Regulation 
• International 
influence 
• Founder 
management 
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members are able to carry out their roles effectively. CMEF (2005), for example, argued that 
an MFI board should consist of a diverse group of members from both inside and outside the 
MFI. Outsiders are valuable as they provide the board with independent mindsets and 
experiences that can be shared with other members (Wagner III, Stimpert, & Fubara, 1998). 
Internal members provide the benefit of MFI-specific knowledge. This was further 
emphasized by Hartarska and Mersland (2012), who suggested that MFI boards should be 
composed of a mixture of (1) independent members, (2) insiders with a monetary interest in 
the MFI, and (3) representatives of stakeholders who represent different interests.  
As can be seen from Figure 1, all the essays study the composition, structure and influence 
of the MFI board. First, the dissertation looks at the characteristics of MFIs and then examines 
them in relation to the board structure and MFI performance. Second, the dissertation 
identifies various MFI stakeholders and examines their representation on boards and their 
influence on (1) the strategic decision-making process and (2) board structure and MFI 
performance. 
This introductory chapter is therefore organized accordingly: First, it gives an overview of 
microfinance and MFI boards in section 2. Then, section 3 provides the theoretical foundation 
for the essays. Section 4 elaborates on the data used and section 5 summarizes the essays. 
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2.0 OVERVIEW OF MICROFINANCE 
2.1 The Context of Microfinance 
Microfinance is acknowledged as an industry that plays an important role in creating 
economic and social development from the grassroots level (Maes & Reed, 2012). It is 
recognized as an important instrument in the struggle against poverty (Sengupta & Aubuchon, 
2008). Maes and Reed (2012) reported that the number of customers reached by MFIs 
worldwide was more than 200 million as of December 2010 and that 56.5% of these 
customers were among the poorest people in the world when they took out their first loan.  
The major regions offering microfinance services and those with the highest outreach are 
Asia and the Pacific, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Africa (Maes & Reed, 2012). The 
African region is shown to have the next biggest market for microfinance after Asia. Within 
Africa, East Africa, which is also the focus of this dissertation, is recognized as the fastest 
growing market (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor [CGAP], 2009). According to Maes 
and Reed (2012), 5.3 million East Africans were borrowing from MFIs as of December 2010.  
Across these regions different types of MFIs are providing financial services to the poor. 
These include commercial banks, credit unions, non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Galema et al, 2012a). However, in most regions, 
the most common providers of microfinance are socially oriented NGOs (Galema et al, 
2012b). Regardless of type, MFIs normally pursue a dual objective: financial sustainability 
and poverty reduction (Mersland et al, 2011). The goal of financial sustainability (the 
financial objective) focuses on the importance of the MFI being able to cover all of its 
operational costs from the income it generates from the outstanding loan portfolio (Hermes et 
al, 2011). The poverty reduction goal (the social objective) stresses the idea of the MFI being 
able to offer financial services to the poor and helping them to set up their own income-
generating businesses (Hermes et al, 2011).  
Banks and NBFIs tend to have less of a focus on social objectives and more on financial 
sustainability, due to factors such as ownership structure (Mersland, 2009), financing (i.e. 
fewer donations, more commercial debt) (Galema et al, 2012a) and banking regulations 
(Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007). NGOs focus more on social objectives than on financial 
objectives (Hermes & Lensink, 2011). NGOs have, for a long time, been pioneers in the 
industry and are often the first to start offering services to the poor in a particular region. They 
are often supported by donors, who focus mainly on social objectives, and are thus better able 
to serve the poorest segments of the population.  
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In line with their dual objective, MFIs (of all types) tend to offer a variety of services. The 
main focus of most MFIs is on providing financial services such as micro-loans, deposits and 
money transfers. In addition, MFIs offer other services such as vocational training, marketing 
and technical assistance, technology access, product design, and accounting and legal services 
(Galema et al, 2012a). Other services include raising customers’ awareness of health 
practices, the use of formal health care, and the availability of micro-health insurance (Maes 
& Foose, 2006).  
The different types of MFIs, their dual objective and the variety of services offered make 
this industry unique. This has also made the industry attractive internationally and has led to 
the involvement of many international stakeholders (Mersland et al, 2011). Table 1 provides a 
summary of the types of MFIs, their main focal areas and the services offered.   
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Table 1: MFI Forms, Objectives and Services 
 NGOs Cooperatives/Credit 
Unions 
NBFIs Banks 
Definitions Registered as 
non-profit for tax 
purposes or other 
legal charter. 
Registered as a non-
profit, member-based 
financial intermediary. 
An institution that 
provides similar 
services to those of a 
bank, but is licensed 
under a separate 
category. 
A licensed financial 
intermediary regulated 
by a state banking 
supervisory agency. 
Objectives Dual objective Dual objective Financial objective Financial objective 
 
Regulation Unregulated Unregulated Partly regulated Regulated 
 
    
Services Credit; 
non-voluntary 
deposit taking; 
social services 
Credit; 
deposit taking;  
social services 
Credit; 
voluntary deposits;  
limited social services 
Deposit taking; credit; 
payment services; 
money transfers; 
no social services 
 
    
Profit 
distribution 
Non-distribution To members To owners To owners 
Adapted from Galema et, al. (2012a, 2012b) 
 
 
2.2 The Boards of MFIs 
Given the popularity of the industry, corporate governance, specifically that of MFI boards, is 
currently at the forefront of the microfinance policy debate (CSFI, 2011; Galema et al, 
2012b). The literature gives several reasons for the importance of having good boards and 
corporate governance in MFIs. First, the high growth rate of MFIs translates into more 
customers who need to be served by well managed structures (Coleman & Osei, 2008). 
Second, MFIs have evolved from focusing on a single product to offering a wide range of 
financial services (Labie & Mersland, 2011). Third, there has been a rise in the number of 
local depositors and international microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs), who are spurring 
on microfinance and becoming important stakeholders of MFIs (Urgeghe & Mersland, 2011). 
Fourth, previous neglect of the industry by public authorities is being replaced by more 
proactive policies, and regulatory frameworks are being created all over the world (Labie & 
Mersland, 2011). 
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Despite their importance, however, the CSFI (2011) has reported that poor boards and 
corporate governance as one of the top five risks that MFIs face. The report also showed that 
the quality of the board is fundamental to an MFI’s business and that only the MFI itself can 
address this. The focus of concern here is not only on the individual quality of each MFI 
board member, but also on the risk of conflicts of interest, the lack of independence, poor 
representation and poor accountability. The CSFI (2011) particularly highlighted that, across 
Africa, including East Africa, boards are a major problem (ranked as the second most 
common risk). Weak boards create management problems and thus increase the chance of 
incurring high credit risks.  
These challenges and their importance have motivated several studies to analyze the 
contribution of boards and other corporate governance mechanisms to MFIs. Hartarska 
(2005), for example, examined the link between governance mechanisms and the performance 
of MFIs in Central and Eastern European countries. The results showed that smaller boards 
lead to better performance, boards with employee representation result in poorer performance 
and those with a higher proportion of donors have better social performance. Similar results 
were obtained by Soltane (2009), who conducted a similar study in the Mediterranean 
countries. Mersland and Strom (2009) studied whether different governance measures, such as 
international board members, board size, competition and regulation, affect MFIs’ financial 
performance and outreach. Their results indicated that an MFI’s financial performance 
improves when its board is informed by local members and it has internal auditors.  
Hartarska and Mersland (2012) studied which governance measures promote efficiency in 
reaching poor customers. They found that MFIs with large boards and with creditors on their 
boards were efficient and those with employees and donors on their boards were less efficient. 
Focusing on Africa, Coleman and Osei (2008) studied the impact of governance measures on 
the performance of MFIs in Ghana. They found that independence of the board and clear 
separation of the positions of CEO and board chairperson have a positive correlation with 
MFI performance. They further argued that boards play a critical role in the making MFIs 
successful.   
These studies are few, however, and do not provide a detailed picture of MFI boards. 
Given the unique nature of the industry, there is a lack of knowledge on what determines the 
structure of an MFI board and how that structure contributes to the board’s strategic roles and 
performance. There is also a gap in the knowledge about stakeholders’ influence on different 
types of MFIs. In addition, past studies have examined many governance mechanisms 
simultaneously and mainly use one theory at a time. This dissertation departs from that 
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approach by focusing solely on boards and using a wide range of theories to shed more light 
on MFI boards and their effect. The dissertation also shows that MFI boards should not 
remain static because the evolution of the sector requires boards of high calibre. The 
microfinance environment is currently one of the more challenging ones there is; the 
international exposure of the sector and the growing complexity of the industry necessitates 
better and carefully structured boards, based on an examination of various theoretical angles. 
 
3.0 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
As mentioned earlier, MFIs are of various types but, as Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest, the 
board should be a mechanism for directing the organization, regardless of type. The 
microfinance literature indicates that the MFI board has several roles. First, it oversees the 
various constituencies served by the MFI. Second, it makes strategic decisions for the MFI. 
Third, it attracts and mobilizes resources and expertise. Fourth, it oversees and monitors the 
management of the organization. Finally, it assists in identifying the MFI’s core mission and 
works to keep it on track (Campion & Frankiewicz, 1999; Dorado & Molz, 2005). The board 
structure is a mechanism that helps the board to perform these roles (CMEF, 2005; Linck et 
al, 2008). This dissertation makes use of various theories to help explain how board structure 
and composition is conducive to the attainment of the MFI board’s roles and the enhancement 
of its performance.  
The agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), a dominant theory in corporate governance 
research, assumes that the owners of an organization (principals) and those who manage the 
organization (agents) have different interests. According to this theory, the board has the role 
of monitoring the management. The microfinance literature indicates the necessity of 
monitoring by boards (Hartarska, 2005; Mersland & Strøm, 2009). Soltane (2009), for 
example, suggests that such board monitoring and control mechanisms are necessary in 
microfinance because the managers and providers of funds may have diverging preferences 
and objectives. Mersland and Strøm (2009) argue that large MFI boards induce members to 
free-ride in monitoring the CEOs. Similarly, Hartarska (2005) shows that diverse MFI boards 
are better at monitoring. Three essays in this dissertation (1, 2 and 4) use the agency theory 
for explaining board structure and its influence on both its monitoring role and MFI 
performance.  
Other board roles suggested by the microfinance literature (Campion, 1998; Campion & 
Frankiewicz, 1999; Dorado & Molz, 2005) include strategy formulation and resource 
management, which members bring from both external and internal sources. A supportive 
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board structure is needed for this. I used the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978) to explain how resources are drawn from external sources and the resource-based 
theory to explain how they are drawn from internal sources. The resource dependence theory 
views organizations as depending crucially for their survival on other organizations and 
actors, from which they obtain resources. As a result, they need to find different ways of 
managing this dependence and ensuring they get the resources and information they need.  
On the other hand, the resource-based theory suggests that the performance of the 
organization is enhanced when it explores its distinctive and idiosyncratic resources and 
capabilities and/or its ability to deploy resources (Barney, 1991). These theories complement 
each other with regard to access to resources and, therefore, the board should be structured in 
such a way that it gives the MFI control of critical resources. Based on them, it should be able 
to build a competitive advantage. Essays 1 and 4 use the resource dependence theory and 
essay 2 uses the resource-based theory.   
Stakeholder representation is important in the microfinance industry (Lapenu & Pierret, 
2005; Mersland, 2011). The stakeholder theory suggests that including stakeholder 
representatives on boards is a formal mechanism that acknowledges the importance of their 
relationship with the organization (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). This mechanism may 
increase the organization’s linkages with important external and internal contingencies. In 
addition, stakeholders’ representation on boards enables them to be more independent 
(Hillman et al, 2001) because the managers are not only responsible to the owners but also 
respond to the various concerns of other stakeholders (Cornforth, 2003; Mersland, 2009). 
Essays 3 and 4 use this theory. Table 2 summarizes these theories, showing the assumptions 
they make about boards, and giving examples of other microfinance (MF) studies that have 
applied them and how they are used in this dissertation. 
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Table 2: How the theories are used in the dissertation 
Theories Assumptions of 
Boards 
MF studies which use the 
theory  
 How they are used in the dissertation 
Agency Monitor and 
control 
management 
 
Provide strategic 
direction for the 
organization 
Hartarska (2005)  
Coleman and Osei (2008) 
Mersland and Strøm (2009)  
Soltane (2009) 
Hartarska and Mersland 
(2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Essay 1:Explaining how the board 
structure is conducive to board monitoring 
roles 
 
Essay 2: How does monitoring enhance 
MFI performance? 
 
Essay 4: Stakeholders’ monitoring results 
in structure and performance  
     
Resource 
dependence 
Provide a variety 
of resources 
 
Advise and 
counsel 
management 
None  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Essay 1: Explaining how the board 
structure is conducive to board resource 
roles 
 
 
Essay 4: Stakeholders’ resource sharing  
results in structure and performance 
     
Resource-
based view 
Board’s valuable 
resources enhance 
competitive 
advantage 
None  
 
 
 
 
Essay 2: How resource availability 
enhances competitive advantage and 
performance of an MFI  
 
     
Stakeholder Stakeholders 
protect their 
interests 
 
Stakeholders have 
capabilities that 
enable them to 
fulfill board roles 
Mersland and Strøm (2009)  
Hartarska and Mersland 
(2012) 
Labie and Mersland (2011) 
Mersland (2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Essay 3: Types of stakeholders and how  
they influence boards’ strategic decision-
making processes 
 
Essay 4: Where in MFIs are different 
stakeholders represented and how do they 
influence structure and performance? 
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4.0 DATASETS 
Two datasets are used. The first is global and is used in essay 4. These data were obtained 
from secondary sources; they were compiled from rating reports available at 
www.ratingfund2.org and were previously used by Mersland (2009). The rating reports were 
collected by major microfinance rating agencies (MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, 
Crisil and M-Cril) and contain information from 2001 to 2008. Each of the rating agencies is 
approved to rate and assess MFIs according to the Rating Fund of the Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor (CGAP), which is a branch of the World Bank. The methodologies used by 
these agencies were compared and there were no major differences in their MFI assessments. 
The information included in the dataset comprises governance variables, financial statements 
and risk management by MFIs. It pertains to 379 MFIs from 73 countries worldwide.  
However, the global dataset does not contain detailed information on board structure 
variables or board members’ demographic information. Furthermore, it contains many 
contextual variances since it covers more than 70 countries. This dissertation goes deeper, not 
only theoretically, but also empirically; in order to understand microfinance boards at this 
level, there must be less contextual variance. Because of this, the researcher constructed a new 
and more detailed dataset covering MFIs in the three East African countries of Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda. This region was selected for four main reasons. First, it is among the 
regions in Africa in which microfinance is most developed, as reported by CGAP (2010). 
Second, as Table 3 shows, most of the East African MFIs have international affiliations. This 
may influence their corporate governance as we know that international organizations 
involved in MFIs are likely to specify how the board should be made up (CMEF, 2005).  
Third, there are more founder CEOs and founder board members in this region than in the 
global dataset, which makes it an interesting area for the study of corporate governance. It 
may be that corporate governance in the region is affected by the presence of so many founder 
CEOs. Fourth, the region also has many regulated MFIs, which is important for corporate 
governance. Usually, regulatory authorities provide specifications regarding how the boards 
of regulated MFIs should be composed. One of the regulatory specifications is in regard to the 
maximum timeframe for CEOs and board members. The question of interest then is how can 
this region have so many regulated MFIs, such extensive international influence and still so 
many founder CEOs and founder board members? This puzzle led to two of the essays 
focusing on this region. Overall, the East African dataset is unique and provides more insights 
into the corporate governance of MFIs.   
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The East African data were hand-collected by the researcher between January and August 
2010. The researcher contacted umbrella microfinance associations in each of the countries 
selected for the study, and received MFI directories containing the names of MFIs, their 
CEOs, the number of customers of each MFI and their contact addresses. The MFIs selected 
from the directories were visited and the CEOs were asked if they would answer some 
questions on governance, board members’ demographics, and MFI operations. The researcher 
also collected audited financial statements from 2004 to 2009. Other MFIs were also 
identified and visited using snowball sampling (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2003). 
Furthermore, the researcher conducted face-to-face interviews with selected board members 
of the MFIs visited. The data collection process led to a dataset containing a total of 63 MFIs, 
board demographic information on 465 board members, interview results of 30 board 
members and financial information for six years.  
 
Table 3: Comparison of MFIs in the two datasets 
Variables East African 
Dataset 
Global Dataset 
 Mean Mean 
Regulated MFIs 0.39 0.25 
Asset size (USD) 7,984,000 6,031,000 
Age (years) 9.69 9.00 
International influence  0.66 0.33 
Board diversity (proportion of females) 0.25 0.28 
Founder CEOs  0.54 0.38 
Board size 7.18 7.23 
Operational self-sustainability  1.04 1.14 
Number of customers 35,742 14,978 
Average loan per customers (USD) 348 751 
Number of MFIs 63 379 
Year-observations 343 2,200 
Period 2004-2009 2001-2008 
Number of countries covered 3 73 
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5.0 THE ESSAYS 
All of the essays have been presented at different conferences and gone through a blind 
review process to improve their quality. Essay 3 has been published and Essay 4 accepted for 
publication in peer-reviewed journals. Essay 1 and essay 2 are currently under review.  
 
5.1 Essay 1: Determinants of board structure in MFIs 
This essay argues that the microfinance industry is unique in terms of its newness, the 
diversity of its organizations,  because they include those that are both for-profit and not-for-
profit, and because its dual objective, both financial and social, with the social objective 
focusing on both women and the poor. The essay investigates the association between MFI 
characteristics and board structure. It uses the agency and resource dependence theories and 
the East African dataset. The results show that the presence of regulations and international 
influence in MFIs is associated with larger boards, while the presence of founders is 
associated with small boards and less board independence. There is also evidence of a higher 
level of gender diversity and nationality diversity on the boards of MFIs managed by founders 
and those that are internationally influenced. The paper concludes that MFIs should select 
board structures that are adapted to their unique governance environment in order to enhance 
their resource access and monitoring ability. 
 
5.2 Essay 2: Board Composition and Outreach Performance of MFIs 
Essay 2 is an extension of Essay 1 and looks at the effect of board structure on the 
performance of MFIs. Since MFIs are known to serve poor people, the paper only looks at the 
social performance of MFIs. In order to develop hypotheses for this paper, the researcher first 
conducted personal interviews with board members in East Africa. The hypotheses were 
developed based on the theories and the interview responses, and then tested on the same East 
African dataset. This mixed-methods approach was used to link board composition 
(independence, female, nationality and founder representation) with three dimensions of 
outreach performance: number of customers, percentage of female customers and average 
loan size. The findings suggest that poverty outreach (social performance) is enhanced when 
MFI boards have independent, international and/or female members. The paper concludes 
that, given the relative newness of microfinance, and the importance of entrepreneurship in 
the industry, the social mission of MFIs is enhanced by greater board diversity. Board 
independence appears to improve the quality of board members’ monitoring and their ability 
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to provide resources to the MFI. International board members typically bring strong 
capabilities and access to unique resources. Also, given the fact that there are more 
desperately poor women than men, having female board members might help MFIs to better 
understand the needs of these poor women, and also build the trust of female customers.  
 
Essays 3 and 4 
These essays were motivated by the interview responses gathered in the course of researching 
Essay 2. During the interviews, we observed that some board members sit on boards because 
they regard themselves as stakeholders, and they represent other stakeholders. These essays 
respond to the need for more knowledge on how stakeholders influence MFIs. For example, 
Labie and Mersland (2011) argue for a more stakeholder-based approach to determining 
“who” and “what” really count in the governance and performance of MFIs.  
 
5.3 Essay 3: The Influence of Stakeholders on Strategic Decision Making of MFIs 
This essay identifies the local and international stakeholders on MFI boards, and discusses 
their roles and involvement in strategic decision-making processes (SDMPs). Based on the 
stakeholder theory, the paper lists five stakeholder groups: customers, employees, creditors, 
owners and donors. Guided by the strategic decision-making literature, the paper discusses the 
influence of stakeholders on two aspects of SDMPs – information gathering/usefulness and 
political behaviour. Based on the review of the literature, the paper argues that when 
stakeholders serve on MFI boards both information gathering/usefulness and political 
behaviour occur simultaneously during SDMPs. Stakeholders are a source of useful 
information, which benefits MFIs by leading to high-quality strategic decisions. However, 
they also bring costs due to conflict, debate and disagreements, which are a source of poor-
quality decisions. Furthermore, their involvement in SDMPs enables MFIs to make a trade-off 
between their two main objectives. Propositions and a model are developed to guide future 
empirical studies in this direction. The paper concludes that stakeholders are important but 
they also introduce costs into MFIs’ SDMPs. To benefit from them, MFIs should identify 
their primary stakeholders, and involve them in their activities. 
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5.4 Essay 4: The Boards of MFIs: How do Stakeholders Matter? 
Essay 4 empirically analyzes the influence of stakeholders on MFI board structure and 
organizational performance. The paper looks at three issues: the representation of 
stakeholders across different types of MFIs, the extent to which stakeholders affect an MFI’s 
board structure (board size and CEO duality) and the influence of stakeholders on an MFI’s 
performance (social and financial). This paper uses the global dataset mentioned in section 4 
and is supported by the stakeholder, agency and resource dependence theories. The results 
show that donors and employees are better represented in NGOs, creditors in banks and 
customers in cooperatives. Also, donors appear to be associated with small boards, non-
duality and better performance. Employees are associated with large boards, while customers 
are associated with duality and good financial performance, and creditors with duality and 
better social performance. The study concludes that stakeholders, specifically donors and 
creditors, should take a more active role in their partnership with MFIs and should sit on 
boards more often, rather than simply providing funding.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
These four essays contribute to the corporate governance literature on microfinance 
institutions. They provide a broader understanding of microfinance board structures and the 
results of stakeholder influence on these organizations. While each essay answers the 
questions it set out to answer, there are still many unanswered questions relating to the 
theories and the microfinance industry that need to be examined.  
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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the association between the unique characteristics of microfinance 
institutions and board structure. The agency and resource dependence theories provided the 
theoretical guidance for this study. Using a panel dataset of 63 microfinance institutions in 
East Africa, we found that the presence of regulations and international influence is associated 
with larger boards, while the presence of founders is associated with small boards and less 
board independence. There is a higher level of board gender diversity in microfinance 
institutions managed by founders. There is greater diversity of nationalities in microfinance 
institutions that are internationally influenced. The implications for practice and theory from 
this study are further discussed. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
With the coming of age of the microfinance industry, it has recently been highlighted that 
microfinance providers need to improve their corporate governance structures (CSFI, 2011). 
As suppliers of financial services to poor people, microfinance institutions (MFIs) are under 
pressure to improve their performance and a better governance structure is one way of 
achieving this objective (Labie & Mersland, 2011). In this paper, we address how board 
structure serves as one such governance mechanism.  
In order for board-members to oversee and advise the organization’s managers (Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003), they need a structure that supports such roles (Jackling & Johl, 2009). 
However, little is known about MFI boards and what determines their structure. Microfinance 
policy papers (e.g. CMEF, 2005; Conger, Finegold & Lawler, 1999) suggest how MFI boards 
should be composed and structured, but we lack knowledge on how these boards are actually 
structured and what factors determine the choice of a certain structure. This study addresses 
this knowledge gap by examining the relationship between MFIs’ unique characteristics and 
their board structure. Specifically, our research question is: What determines the board 
structure of an MFI? 
The unique characteristics of MFIs are related to a number of aspects. First, MFIs are 
characterized by their combined commercial and social goals. Their objectives are therefore to 
be financially sustainable while reaching out to poor people (Mori and Mersland, in press). 
These objectives have brought them to the attention of international aid agencies and 
philanthropic investors (Mersland, Randøy & Strøm, 2011). Second, the international 
affiliations of MFIs give the industry another unique characteristic. Mersland et al (2011), for 
example, found that the internationalization of MFIs leads to better organizational 
performance. Third, MFIs vary in operational form. Some MFIs operate as regulated bank-
like entities, with a profit motive, others as unregulated non-for-profit ones. Lastly, the 
microfinance industry is young and―to a large extent―managed by its founders. For 
example, in our East African dataset, 54 percent of the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of 
MFIs are also their founders. These characteristics are our motivation for this study; we argue 
that they partly determine MFI board structure.  
Steier (1998) found that board structure in for-profit organizations is set in a way that 
supports the specific demands of the industry. In relation to the microfinance industry, Conger 
et al (1999) provide guidelines for a desirable MFI board structure. The authors suggest that 
MFI boards should be composed of a mixture of members with different skills, especially 
expertise in social and financial issues. Based on the agency and resource dependence 
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theories, board roles are divided into two main categories: monitoring and advising (Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003). The theories suggest that the ability of a board to undertake these roles 
effectively depends on how they are structured (Linck, Netter & Yang, 2008). CMEF (2005) 
further suggests that MFI boards should be structured so that their members are beneficial to 
the organization’s attainment of their dual objective.  
We examined the determinants of board structure in East African MFIs (Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda). There are two reasons why we were motivated to study this region. First, Africa 
is recognized as the least developed continent in terms of microfinance, but has the biggest 
potential market for it (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP, 2010)). Within Africa, 
East Africa is shown to be the most developed region in terms of microfinance. For example, 
CGAP (2010) reports that 30 percent of borrowers in Africa are from East Africa. Second, 
microfinance policy papers indicate that most international funding is channelled into East 
Africa (CGAP, 2010). We expected that this significant influence of international donors and 
capital providers would push MFIs in the region into having an effective governance and 
board structure.  
We examined the association between three MFI characteristics (regulatory status, 
international influence and founder management) and three board structure dimensions (board 
size, board independence and board diversity). Hypotheses were tested using an unbalanced 
panel dataset of 63 MFIs, obtained through a survey conducted between January and August 
2010. The data were analyzed using a mixture of analytical procedures. We used random 
effects estimation as the main analytical tool and regressed single measures of each board 
structure variable in relation to the MFI variables. To check robustness, we did joint 
estimations, using seemingly unrelated regression analysis, and to tackle endogeneity 
challenges, we performed a two-stage least squares regression with instrumental variables.  
The results indicate that the structure of MFI boards is indeed determined by the MFI’s 
unique characteristics. We found that large board size was determined by whether the MFI is 
regulated and whether it is exposed to international influence. These findings suggest that 
highly influential stakeholders, such as owners or international funders, have the power to be 
included on boards, which is a way for them to reduce agency costs. We showed that 
Founder-managed MFIs are associated with small boards. Regulated MFIs are shown to be 
associated with highly independent boards, while MFIs that are internationally influenced and 
those managed by founders have less independent boards. The results further showed that 
MFIs that are internationally influenced are associated with a greater diversity of nationalities, 
while those managed by founders are associated with higher gender diversity on their boards.  
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To our knowledge, this is the first study to address the determinants of MFI boards. We 
see this paper as providing a contribution in three areas. The first is in relation to boards and 
governance in MFIs, as little is known about MFI boards. Labie and Mersland (2011) suggest 
that governance structure is among the most important factors that help MFIs to sustainably 
offer financial services to the poor. Our study shows the factors that lead to a given choice of 
governance structure and, based on the agency and resource dependence theories, we suggest 
ways of improving that structure. Second, we contribute to an understanding of board 
selection and board members’ roles in non-profit and mission-driven organizations. We show 
the roles played by board members in this industry and how they are achieved through a given 
structure. Third, we contribute to research on corporate governance in emerging markets, as 
the focus of our empirical study is East Africa.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the background to microfinance in East 
Africa. Section 3 presents the theoretical background, followed by section 4 which presents 
our hypotheses. Section 5 presents the data and methodology used. We present and discuss 
the results in section 6 followed by conclusions and implications in section 7. 
 
 
2.0 MICROFINANCE IN EAST AFRICA 
The East African countries chosen for this study were Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. These 
countries share significant similarities in their legal and regulatory regimes (La Porta, Lopez-
de Silanes & Shleifer, 2008) but are heterogeneous in terms of the development of their 
national microfinance industry. This combination of cross-country institutional similarity with 
industry variations makes East Africa a suitable environment for microfinance research, 
particularly in relation to other English common-law countries.  
Microfinance operations in East Africa officially started in the 1990s (Randhawa & 
Gallardo, 2003) but there were microfinance-related activities before then. For example, the 
Uganda Finance Trust was established in 1984, and the Kenya Female Finance Trust in 1982. 
The number of microfinance activities and operators has increased dramatically over the last 
twenty years. CGAP (2010) reports that 3.3 million East Africans were borrowing from MFIs 
reporting to the MIX database, as of December 2009. The current major providers of 
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microfinance services in East Africa can be divided into four institutional forms*: banks, non-
bank financial institutions (NBFIs), cooperatives and non-profit MFIs, which are commonly 
referred to as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Cooperatives have vastly different 
ownership forms and structures and are therefore not included in this study (Hartarska, 2005). 
For example, cooperative members vote for board members, who must be cooperative 
members themselves. This implies that the board structure of cooperative MFIs cannot be 
compared to those of other MFIs.  
Another characteristic of the microfinance industry in East Africa is the existence of both 
domestically and internationally-funded/owned MFIs. MFIs with international partners, or 
those with international networks, have access to international funding and/or technical 
assistance in various areas. Commonly, fund providers influence the governance of these 
MFIs. For example, some funders specify how the board should be organized before they 
provide funding. Since the region receives extensive international attention, one might expect 
the governance structure of its MFIs to be more “developed” than that in regions with less 
international involvement.  
The level of government regulation in East Africa is more extensive than in other African 
regions and this again makes the MFIs of this region particularly interesting. We argue that 
this adds to the pressure to put an effective governance structure in place. In terms of 
regulatory regime, for-profit MFIs are regulated by central banking authorities, while non-
profit MFIs are not regulated. All MFIs are required to have boards. Furthermore, the boards 
of all regulated MFIs must satisfy certain requirements. As Table 1 shows, for the boards of 
regulated MFIs in Kenya, at least two-thirds of the members must not be affiliated to the MFI. 
In Kenya and Uganda, regulated MFIs are required to have at least five board members. 
Board diversity is not specified in the regulations, although there are general specifications 
about the roles, skills and expertise needed on boards. 
 
 
                                                 
*
 In these forms, banks and NBFIs are regulated by central banks and operate on a for-profit basis. NGOs are not 
regulated and operate on a not-for-profit basis. Cooperatives are regulated by a council of cooperatives and 
operate on a for-profit basis; we do not include these in our study.  
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Table 1: Requirements for Boards of Regulated MFIs 
Aspects Kenya Tanzania Uganda 
Board size Minimum: 5 members Minimum: 2 members Minimum: 5 members 
Independence Two-thirds of members not 
affiliated 
Not specified Not specified 
Diversity Not specified Not specified Not specified 
Skills/expertise Not specified Banking, finance and 
support skills 
Business-related skills 
CEO=Chair Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed 
Roles Monitor management activities 
and approve/review strategies 
Provide direction, guidance 
and oversight 
Ensure good corporate 
governance and organizational 
performance 
Meetings per year Minimum: 4 Minimum: 4 Minimum: 4 
Source: Bank of Tanzania (2006), Bank of Uganda (2003), Central Bank of Kenya (2006) 
  
Despite the guidelines, there is still significant flexibility in terms of how MFI board members 
are appointed (CSFI, 2011). Regulators only approve members who have been appointed by 
MFIs (CMEF, 2005). In Uganda, five of the biggest MFIs became regulated between 2005 
and 2007, with the founder remaining the CEO in some cases. In Kenya and Tanzania, 
similarly, more than half of the MFIs are managed by their founders.  
Unregulated non-profit MFIs in East Africa come in a mixture of sizes and also vary in 
terms of whether their founders are local or international. Locally-founded, non-profit MFIs 
are typically still managed by their local founders and, since they are unregulated*, these 
founders have a great deal of influence over who sit on their boards. Internationally-founded 
non-profit MFIs have board structures that vary depending on where the MFI was originally 
based. It is common to find non-profit MFIs in Tanzania whose board-members are CEOs (or 
board members) of the same MFI in other countries.  
Table 2 compares MFIs in East Africa with MFIs worldwide. The global data were 
obtained from the rating agencies at www.ratingfund1.org and include MFIs from 73 
countries.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
*
 In our dataset, 60 percent of unregulated (non-profit) MFIs are managed by founders (have founder CEOs). 
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Table 2: Comparing MFIs from Global Rating Reports with our East African Data 
 Global Data: 379 MFIs 
(Mersland et al, 2011) 
East African Data: 63 MFIs 
(our dataset) 
 
 
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev. t-test diff 
Regulated 0.25 0.43 0.39 0.49 -4.88** 
Asset size (ln) 14.58 1.78 15.58 2.52 -6.96** 
Age (years) 9.00 7.14 9.69 6.96 -1.65 
International influence 0.33 0.47 0.66 0.47 -11.72** 
Board diversity: Female- ratio 0.28 0.42 0.25 0.23 1.82 
Founder Management-CEOs 0.38 0.52 0.54 0.49 -5.38** 
Board size 7.23 3.57 7.18 2.24 0.33 
** p < .05 
 
Table 2 shows that, on average, MFIs in East Africa are somewhat similar to those worldwide 
in terms of age, gender diversity and board size. However, other characteristics are 
significantly different. In the East African industry, 66 percent of MFIs have international 
affiliations, a larger proportion than in the global dataset. A larger proportion of East African 
MFIs, 54 percent, are managed by founders, compared to 38 percent of the global dataset. 
Finally, there are significant differences between regulated MFIs in East Africa and those in 
the rest of the world.  
 
 
3.0 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
From the management and finance literature we know that boards serve two roles (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003). First, they advise managers on the organization’s strategies, which is referred 
to as the resource and advisory role. Second, they monitor and control the performance of 
managers (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991), which is referred to as the monitoring role. 
Similarly, in MFIs, board members are expected to fulfil a mixture of roles and 
responsibilities.  
Looking at microfinance boards, Campion and Frankiewicz (1999) and Dorado and Molz 
(2005) suggest that MFI boards undertake the following roles simultaneously. First, the board 
oversees the various constituencies served by the MFI. Second, it establishes the reputation of 
the MFI, thereby helping to ensure external legitimacy. Third, the board attracts and mobilizes 
resources and expertise. It oversees the management, including the selection and removal of 
top managers. Finally, it assists in identifying the MFI’s core mission and works to keep it on 
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track. In addition, the microfinance literature suggests that the board itself is expected to 
change according to changing organizational priorities and environmental demands (Dorado 
& Molz, 2005). We grouped the first three roles together as resource and advisory roles, 
grounded in the resource dependence theory (Brown, Hillman, & Okun, 2011; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). The final two roles come under monitoring, which was guided by the agency 
theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Pant & Pattanayak, 2010). We used these theories to 
complement one another since they guide MFI board roles and help to explain the board 
structure that is most suitable for the fulfilment of these roles. 
The premise of this paper, therefore, is that an appropriate board structure is necessary if 
MFI boards are to carry out their roles effectively. These ideas are highlighted in the 
microfinance practitioner literature, such as in Conger et al (1999) and CMEF (2005), both of 
which provide guidelines on MFI board structure in terms of composition, representation and 
size. Regarding composition, this literature suggests that board members should have social 
and commercial expertise, strategic and operational abilities, and legal and communication 
abilities. Furthermore, it suggests that these skills can be provided by a diverse group of board 
members, from both inside and outside the MFI. Outsiders (independent members) are 
particularly valuable as they provide the boards with an independent mindset and experiences 
they can share with other members (CMEF, 2005). Internally-recruited (dependent board 
members), like employees, and closely-related stakeholders (i.e., from sister organizations), 
and provide the benefit of MFI-specific knowledge (Dorado & Molz, 2005). Regarding board 
size, Conger et al (1999) argue that MFIs should balance the need for skills and resources 
with the logistical advantages of small boards. These suggestions imply that board structure 
matters in MFIs in order for members to undertake their roles effectively and to enhance the 
attainment of MFIs’ dual objective. Based on these suggestions, theories and other arguments 
from past corporate research on board structure (e.g. Jackling & Johl, 2009; Linck et al, 
2008), we chose to address three dimensions of board structure: board size, board 
independence and board diversity.  
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3.1 Board Size 
Board size is an important dimension, as past research indicates that it influences board 
effectiveness. The literature suggests that large boards are associated with higher coordination 
costs and free-rider problems (Jensen, 1976; Yermack, 1996). These agency-theory-based 
arguments imply that relatively small boards operate more effectively, for example by being 
better at monitoring the CEO. For instance, Lipton & Lorsch (1992) argue that “when a board 
has more than ten members it becomes more difficult for them all to express their ideas and 
opinions”. Similarly, Jensen (2010) conjectures that “keeping boards small helps improve 
their performance”. In contrast, resource dependence scholars suggest that large boards are 
the source of various resources (Hillman, et al, 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). From this 
perspective, board size is a measure of an organization’s ability to form environmental links 
with secure critical resources. With different kinds of expertise more likely on large boards, 
CEOs will obtain better advice and resources.  
Within the microfinance industry, we argue that board size should be determined in a way 
that facilitates attainment of MFIs’ dual objective. A large board may enhance MFIs’ access 
to resources while being weaker at monitoring the CEO. Microfinance policy papers advocate 
boards that are large enough to provide adequate monitoring and resources (CMEF, 2005; 
CSFI, 2011). Hartarska and Mersland (2012) indicate that MFIs with large boards are 
associated with better social performance. They argue that MFIs can benefit from having 
large boards although the effect can change after some time. Their results are consistent with 
the literature on banks and non-profit organisations, whose boards are found to be larger than 
conventional ones.  
However, Mersland and Strom (2009) state that larger boards in the microfinance industry 
may induce members to free-ride in their monitoring responsibility, allowing CEOs greater 
independence. Similarly Hartarska (2005) shows that MFIs with small boards have better 
performance. She argues that, through their ability to monitor management, small boards 
contribute to better results. These studies provide evidence that MFIs can benefit from having 
both small and large boards, but there are some trade-offs between effective monitoring 
enhanced by small boards, and resource abundance enhanced by large ones. Since MFI board 
members fulfil both roles simultaneously, we argue that MFIs with large (small) boards 
benefit more (less) in terms of resources but are less (more) effectively monitored.  
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3.2 Board Independence 
Board independence is important as it affects the ability of the board to monitor and provide 
resources to the management. The agency theory suggests that independent boards provide 
better monitoring and can better protect stakeholder interests (Fama, 1980). Jensen (2010) 
further suggests that, because inside (non-independent) board members are likely to be 
ineffective at monitoring and evaluating the CEO, the only inside member on the board 
should be the CEO. The resource dependence theory argues that independent boards are more 
likely to reduce uncertainties and bring linkages and resources such as funding, skills, 
information and access to key constituents like policy decision makers (Hillman et al, 2009). 
Raheja (2005) developed a model that takes into account both the monitoring and resource 
provision roles of the board and found that independent boards are beneficial to organizations.  
On the other hand, Harris and Raviv (2008) demonstrate that, when insiders have 
important information relative to outsiders, insider-controlled boards are preferred. Insiders 
can be better sources of internal information but weak at monitoring. Baysinger (1990) 
demonstrated that insiders contribute to boardroom discussions in ways that external board 
members cannot because the former have knowledge of the organization’s operations and 
capabilities.  
In a young and entrepreneurial industry like microfinance, various stakeholders value 
clarity and strategic direction. Roche (2009) suggest that young entrepreneurial organizations 
need more legitimacy and greater acquisition of resources than mature organizations. 
Similarly, we argue that most MFIs are at the development stage where the need for resources 
is great (in line with the corporate governance life-cycle arguments of Filatotchev, Toms & 
Wright (2006) and Roche (2009). Also, as indicated in boards’ roles, MFIs, regardless of their 
age, need board members that can oversee management and help the MFI mission to be on 
track.  
This means MFIs can benefit from more independent boards, not only for better 
monitoring, but also because of the greater variety of resources that can be brought by 
outsiders (Dorado & Molz, 2005). Insiders, due to their specific knowledge, are also 
important and can better assist CEOs with defining and maintaining a strategic focus for the 
MFI. However, Hartarska (2005) and Hartarska and Mersland (2012) found that MFIs with 
boards dominated by insiders are not beneficial. This implies that the level of board 
independence is important for an MFI and should be determined so that it benefits in terms of 
resources and monitoring.  
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3.3 Board Diversity 
Board diversity relates to a combination of attributes, characteristics and expertise that 
individual board members contribute to the board’s activities. Similar to Walt and Ingley 
(2003), we define board diversity as the mix of human capital that a board comprises 
collectively and draws upon in undertaking its roles. This diversity is made up of age, gender, 
nationality, culture, religion, professional background, knowledge, technical skills, expertise 
and experience (Walt & Ingley, 2003). Both the agency and resource dependence theories 
advocate diverse boards (Brown, Hillman & Okun, 2012; Walt & Ingley, 2003). According to 
the agency theory, diverse boards are better able to monitor CEOs. The resource dependence 
theory suggests that diverse boards are better at linking the organization to external resources 
such as access to funding, and connections with competitors and the market. We focused on 
diversity in terms of gender (Adams & Ferreira, 2009) and nationality (Ruigrok, Peck & 
Tacheva, 2007) as these aspects contain a mixture of human capital. 
Similarly, the microfinance literature advocates diverse boards (CMEF, 2005; Hartarska, 
2005; Strøm, D’Espallier & Mersland, 2010). Gender diversity is especially important 
because of females constitute the main market for microfinance (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2006: 
Strøm et al, 2010). The objective of the Microcredit Summit Campaign, which plays a central 
role in promoting microfinance, is “to ensure that 175 million of the world’s poorest families, 
especially females, have access to financial services” www.microcreditsummit.org.  Mersland 
and Strøm (2009) also report that 73 percent of the customers in their global dataset are 
female. Similar to Mattis (2000), we suggest that there are benefits to increasing the number 
of women in leadership and board positions for organizations that market their products to 
women. Women’s ability to contribute to boards may also be attributable to their different 
leadership styles. Strøm et al (2010), meanwhile, suggest that gender-diverse boards are 
important for the effectiveness of MFIs, and not only as a means of promoting democracy and 
equality.  
In addition, past microfinance research highlights that female representation on boards can 
enhance MFIs’ understanding of female customers’ needs (Mersland & Strøm, 2009). Strøm 
et al (2010), for example, argue that female leadership and board members create a 
competitive advantage for MFIs due to their market orientation (i.e., females make up the 
majority of the MFI market). The authors further explain that female leaders may more easily 
tap into local information sources and help the MFI to create products that are better suited to 
its customers. Female leaders may also simply have better business acumen. Therefore, we 
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expect MFI boards to be gender-diverse, so that MFIs can benefit not only from gender 
equality but also from the expertise, skills and experience of both genders.  
Because of the high level of involvement of international organizations in the 
microfinance industry (Mersland et al, 2011), we see diversity of board members’ 
nationalities as advantageous to MFIs. Board members from other countries (than the MFI’s 
home country) are likely to possess a diversity of cultural values and preferences (Caligiuri et 
al, 2004). Diversity of nationalities provides the board with a broader range of information 
resources, skill sets and cultural capital. 
 
4.0 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The above review highlights that board size, level of independence and diversity matter and 
are important dimensions of MFI board structure. The question is, then, what are the factors 
that determine the choice of a certain board structure? Past corporate governance literature 
helps us to identify possible factors (Lehn, Patro & Zhao, 2009). Factors that have been 
widely studied are the organization’s size, legal status and age (e.g. Alonso, Palenzuela & 
Merino, 2009; Linck et al, 2008). Since these factors are generic and mostly based on research 
in the corporate sector, we included them as control variables. Our contribution is to examine 
factors that we argue are unique to the microfinance industry, and subsequently we 
hypothesized and tested the relationship between these factors and board structure 
dimensions. We focused on three factors: regulatory status, international influence and 
founder management. 
 
4.1 Effect of Regulatory Status 
MFIs are either regulated by central banking authorities or are unregulated. Regulated MFIs 
have defined shareholders and operate on a for-profit basis (CMEF, 2005). Unregulated MFIs 
are NGOs and operate on a not-for-profit basis. Governance literature shows that non-profit 
organizations have large boards due to the fact that they lack owners with a monetary 
incentive to monitor their investments (Speckbacher, 2008). For example, Alonso et al (2009) 
showed that the average board size of a sample of non-profit organisations is eleven members.  
Similarly, regulated organizations, such as banks, are shown to have large boards. Studies 
by Adams and Mehran (2003, 2008), for example, reported that the average size of a bank 
board is eighteen members. Regulated organizations have large boards due to the fact that 
they have a number of important constituencies who, according to the agency theory, sit on 
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the boards to protect their interests (Adams & Mehran, 2008). Constituents can be 
shareholders, deposit holders, or other independent board members (who indirectly “help” 
regulators). Similarly, the resource dependence theory suggests that large boards are 
beneficial due to the resources that each member brings (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Board 
members, in this case, are a tool for managing external dependencies and reducing 
uncertainties (Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold, 2000). Furthermore, the regulatory requirement 
in East Africa for example, see Table 1, requires boards to have at least five members, but sets 
no limit. Based on the above arguments, we suggest that regulated MFIs need to appoint more 
board members than non-regulated MFIs in order to protect shareholders’ interests, and 
increase support for the organization by including key stakeholders that can be co-opted. 
Thus: 
Hypothesis 1a: Regulated MFIs have larger boards than non-regulated MFIs 
 
Unlike unregulated MFIs, regulated MFIs have defined shareholders who need to protect their 
interests by having independent boards who will monitor the management. Also, regulated 
MFIs have greater flexibility over leveraging and seeking funding from various sources 
(Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007). This means that regulated MFIs need to have board members 
who can support and assist them with leveraging and accessing funds. Hillman et al (2000) 
further argue that regulated organizations need the expertise and skills of independent 
members such as business experts, influential members of the community and support 
specialists, such as lawyers, in order to manage external dependencies. Furthermore, regulated 
MFIs in East Africa, for example, are required to have non-affiliated board members. Adams 
and Mehran (2008) examined banks’ boards and showed that they are highly independent. 
This suggests that regulated MFIs, because they need to monitor management, attract outside 
resources and comply with regulatory requirements, will opt for more independent boards. 
Thus: 
Hypothesis 1b: Regulated MFIs have greater board independence than unregulated MFIs. 
 
Unregulated MFIs have been shown to focus more on social goals through serving female 
customers (Cull, Morduch & Demirguc-Kunt, 2009). The suggestion of Mattis (2000) and 
Strøm et al (2010) that industries that serve females need to have more females on their 
boards implies that unregulated MFIs may have more female board members than regulated 
MFIs. Furthermore, international donors provide more support to unregulated MFIs since 
these are non-profit organizations and to a large extent focus on social objectives (Mori & 
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Mersland, in press; Mersland et al, 2011). When international donors provide funds to MFIs, 
they monitor the usage of these funds by sitting on their boards (Mori & Mersland, in press). 
Steane and Michael (2001) provide further evidence that the boards of non-profit 
organizations are more diverse than corporate boards. Since unregulated non-profit MFIs 
focus more on social goals, and have more international donors than regulated for-profit 
MFIs, we expect their boards to be more diverse. Furthermore, regulated MFIs face regulatory 
requirements which prescribe board members’ skills. This implies that regulated MFIs have 
less incentive to recruit diverse board members; they only recruit members who match the 
skills specified by the regulator. Therefore:  
Hypothesis 1c: Regulated MFIs have less board diversity than non-regulated MFIs.  
 
4.2 International Influence 
There is a high level of international influence in the microfinance industry, which comes in 
various forms, such as networks, funding providers and international knowledge transfers 
(Mersland et al, 2011). CGAP (2010) reported that East African MFIs are strongly influenced 
by international partners (also see Table 2). International business research shows that the 
internationalization of organizations brings about better performance (Lu & Beamish, 2004; 
Mersland et al, 2011). This is achieved through, among other means, the provision of 
resources by international partners and better governance mechanisms (Ruigrok et al, 2007). 
Similarly, Sanders and Carpenter (1998) suggest that internationalization is a way of 
strengthening access to resources and the interdependence of organizations. Furthermore, 
Barroso, Villegas and Perez-Calero (2011) show a positive association between 
internationalized organizations and board size. We therefore suggest that MFIs that are 
influenced by international partners (who are members of international networks) are more 
likely to have larger boards, as this facilitates the transfer of resources such as funding, 
networks, information and skills by their international partners. 
Hypothesis 2a: MFIs that are internationally influenced have larger boards than those 
that are not.  
 
Typical international partners in the microfinance industry are large international NGOs, such 
as CGAP, FINCA international, Accion international and so forth (Rhyne, 2005). These 
partners play the role of initiating, funding and owning MFIs. They also participate in 
selecting MFIs’ board members. Sanders and Carpenter (1998) argue that complexities, such 
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as cultural differences and information asymmetries, arise from being associated with 
international partners. These complexities have implications for the agency relationships 
between the MFIs and their partners, enhancing the need for monitoring. In this case, we 
would expect international partners to require their partner MFIs to have more independent 
boards, hoping they would provide enhanced monitoring and better access to 
resources/networks. We further expect the internationally influenced MFIs to be more 
exposed to the governance practices of their international partners. Based on the above 
arguments we suggest that:  
Hypothesis 2b: MFIs that are internationally influenced have greater board independence 
than those that are not.  
 
Since most international networks and supporters of microfinance come from the developed 
world, they prefer MFIs to have diverse boards, as advocated by the political and social forces 
in their countries. CMEF (2005) provides guidelines for MFIs that collaborate with 
international partners. Among other things, they recommend that boards should be diverse in 
terms of gender and cultural background. As mentioned earlier, international affiliations bring 
cultural complexities, and board members with diverse backgrounds could help to reduce 
these complexities and enhance monitoring. Ruigrok et al (2007) further suggest that 
increased internationalization of organizations leads to a higher demand for diverse board 
members who possess the necessary knowledge and contacts in both local and foreign 
markets. We therefore expect internationally influenced MFIs (MFIs which are members of 
international networks) to have more diverse boards, since this could enhance monitoring and 
facilitate better access to resources. 
Hypothesis 2c: MFIs that are internationally influenced have greater board diversity than 
those that are not.  
 
4.3 Founder Management 
Anecdotal evidence, as in the case of Muhammed Yunus and the Grameen Bank, indicates 
that founder CEOs are critically important organizational players in MFIs. The importance of 
founders could be due to the relatively young age of the industry (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002). 
Our East African dataset shows a median MFI age of eight years (Table 2). The implication is 
that a large number of founders are still present, and they exert a significant influence (Alonso 
et al, 2009). We argue that founder CEOs have a tendency to treat the organization as their 
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“baby” and want to hold on to it and control it for as long as possible. This was further 
exemplified in the recent struggle between the Bangladeshi government and Muhammad 
Yunus, regarding whether the latter should hold on to a board position within Grameen Bank 
(Burke, 2011).  
Corporate research shows that organizations with active founder CEOs have different 
agency issues, and that such CEOs have an influence over the choice of board structure 
(Boeker & Karichalil, 2002; Randøy & Goel, 2003). This is due both to their formal position 
and their history within the organization. Wasserman (2003) suggests that founder CEOs exert 
power through board seats and over strategic decision making. The agency theory advocates 
small boards since they are better monitors of CEOs (Yermack, 1996). Monitoring might not 
be in the interests of founder CEOs, but they opt for small boards in order to exert greater 
control over board decisions (Daily & Dalton, 1993). The literature also provides evidence 
that founder-managed for-profit organizations are associated with small boards due to their 
founders’ attachment and need to control the organization (Certo, Covin, Daily & Dalton, 
2001). We therefore suggest that founder CEOs do not want to lose their control, power and 
influence and thus opt for small boards. 
Hypothesis 3a: Founder-managed MFIs have smaller boards than non-founder managed 
MFIs. 
 
Corporate research in developed countries suggests that inside board members are an 
important complement to CEOs (Certo et al, 2001). Founder CEOs believe that inside board 
members can provide organization-specific information that outside board members may lack 
(Certo et al, 2001). This is in line with resource dependence theorists, who claim that insiders 
are valuable for supplying the board with specific information about the firm’s competitive 
environment (Hillman et al, 2000). However, founder CEOs are likely to be less objective in 
assessing their organizations. Similarly, as founder CEOs need to maintain their influence and 
power, they are more likely to opt for more insider board members, whom they can control 
more easily (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002). Daily and Dalton (1993) posit that insiders are 
unlikely to aggressively monitor and evaluate CEO actions due to their subordinate position in 
the organization. Similar to the corporate world, we argue that CEO founders in the 
microfinance industry want to maintain their power, influence and control, and therefore opt 
for less independent boards. This influence can be seen in Table 2. Nelson (2003) further 
shows that organizations managed by founders are less independent, which results in less 
monitoring and a high degree of CEO influence. We thus expect MFIs with founder CEOs to 
  
38 
 
have more insiders on their boards as this facilitates the CEO-board influence and access to 
organization-specific resources.  
Hypothesis 3b: Founder-managed MFIs have less independent boards than non-founder-
managed MFIs.  
Diverse boards might enhance monitoring since the CEO is less able to control the board’s 
decision making. In order to maintain his influence, a CEO founder might opt for a less 
diverse board. As Johannisson and Huse (2000) argue in relation to family-based 
organizations (many of which can be compared to other founder-influenced organizations), “it 
is the CEO, not the shareholders, who recruit board members, and when you recruit people, 
you recruit people in your own image, people you trust and can easily communicate with”. 
This implies that founder CEOs use their connections and invite people from their networks 
onto their boards. Founder CEOs are also likely to invite members they think will be easy to 
influence, so that decisions can be made in their favour. Diverse board members will be less 
dependent on the CEO and could provide contrasting views and discipline the management as 
needed (Walt & Ingley, 2003; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Despite the benefits brought by diverse 
boards, we expect to find that the boards of MFIs managed by their founders are less diverse, 
as this enables CEOs to maintain their control, power and influence.  
Hypothesis 3c: Founder-managed MFIs have less board diversity than non-founder-
managed MFIs. 
Table 3 below summarizes the stated hypotheses and their expected signs.  
 
Table 3: Summary of the Hypotheses 
 
Board Structure variables MFI Characteristics 
 
Regulated Internationally-influenced Founder-managed 
Board Size + + - 
Board Independence + + - 
Board Diversity (gender & nationality) - + - 
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5.0 METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Sample and Data Collection 
The major source of data for this study was a hand-collected survey, conducted by one of the 
researchers between January and August 2010. The researcher contacted umbrella 
associations of MFIs in the respective countries and obtained MFI directories. These 
directories included information on MFI and CEO names, MFI locations and addresses. The 
researcher identified all of the MFIs listed in the directories, excluding cooperatives. Then, 
she contacted the CEOs of the identified MFIs and, out of 103 MFIs contacted, 49 (47.6 
percent) were willing to participate. The MFIs that were unwilling to participate gave reasons 
such as the following: the CEO needed permission from the board chair in order to approve 
our visit (which he/she was not willing to do); others said that their information was 
confidential and could not be shared for research purposes. 
The researcher visited the headquarters of the MFIs that were willing to participate, and 
the CEOs provided information based on the checklist of questions about governance, board 
demographics and MFI operations. The researcher further requested audited financial 
statements for the years 2004 to 2009 from each of the MFIs visited. Additionally, the 
researcher used the snowball sampling technique (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2003), 
whereby, when visiting an MFI, she asked the CEO to provide contact details of another MFI, 
which could have been on our original list or not. The researcher visited any MFIs that fitted 
her categorization (i.e., that were not cooperatives and had audited financial statements).  
The researcher also visited the websites of some of the MFIs that publish information on 
governance and audited financial reports. To further check the quality of our information, we 
compared the information from these websites with that obtained from the CEOs. The data 
collection process led to a total of 63 MFIs (a mixture of local and international), board 
demographic information, and financial information for six years. Some MFIs did not have all 
the information needed and therefore our dataset is an unbalanced panel of 63 MFIs, with 343 
observations in total (Wooldridge, 2006).  
These MFIs probably represent between a quarter and a third of MFIs in the region. We 
recognize that, since most of the data were based on MFI directories, it is possible that some 
were left out and that we have some sample bias. However, we argue that our sample of MFIs 
represents the major and most established players in the region’s microfinance industry.  
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5.2 Variables and Measures 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables are based on three board structure dimensions and measured at the 
end of each year. Board size is measured as the logarithm of the number of board members 
(Linck, et al, 2008). Board independence is measured as the proportion of board members 
who are not current or former employees (or initiators) of the MFI or members of their 
families (Wagner III et al Linck et al, 2008; 1998). We measured board diversity using two 
variables: gender diversity, defined as the ratio of female members to the total number of 
board members (Adams & Ferreira, 2009) and diversity of nationalities, measured as the ratio 
of foreign members to the total number of board members (Caligiuri et al, 2004). Data on 
these variables were compiled from CEOs’ responses to questions about board members’ 
demographics and, in some cases, the MFIs’ websites.  
 
Independent Variables  
The independent variables are the MFIs’ characteristics. Data on these variables were 
obtained from the CEOs’ responses. Regulated was measured as a binary variable equal to 
one if the MFI is regulated and zero otherwise. Here, we asked the CEOs whether the MFI 
was regulated by central banking authorities and if so when it began to be regulated. 
International influence was measured as a binary variable equal to one if the MFI is a 
member of any international network or organization that is based outside the MFI home 
country and zero otherwise (Mersland et al, 2011). The CEO here was asked whether the MFI 
was a member of any international organization or network, and for what purpose. Founder 
management was measured as a binary variable equal to one if the CEO of the MFI was also 
the founder of it (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002). The data here were obtained from the CEOs, by 
asking whether or not they were a founding CEO.  
 
Control Variables 
As mentioned earlier, and in line with previous studies on corporate governance, we included 
control variables that also affect board structure. Since organization size relates to possible 
economy of scale effects, we controlled for MFI size, measured as the logarithm of total 
assets (Al-Najjar, 2011). Age is related to changes caused by organizational life-cycle 
changes (Filatotchev et al, 2006) and therefore we included MFI age, measured as the 
number of years since the MFI began providing microfinance services. We also controlled for 
legal status, using a binary variable, equal to one if the MFI is an independent legal 
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organization or a branch of another organization abroad and zero otherwise (Mori & 
Mersland, in press). Data for these variables were obtained from the audited financial 
statements and CEO responses. We also employed country dummy and time dummy 
variables in order to capture variations in economic development and time. 
 
5.3 Data Analysis 
Since our dataset was an unbalanced panel over six years, we could have used either a fixed 
effects or a random effects model, depending on the time invariance of the variables (Greene, 
2008). A fixed effects regression should be used when one wants to control for omitted 
variables that differ between cases (MFIs) but are constant over time. It allows the variables 
to change over time so that one can estimate the effects of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2006). Some omitted variables may be constant over time 
but vary between cases, and others may be fixed between cases but vary over time. To tackle 
this challenge, one can use random effects in order to take both situations into consideration 
and obtain efficient estimators. To choose between the two models, we ran a Hausman test 
(Hausman, 1978) to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the efficient 
random effects estimator are the same as those estimated by the consistent fixed effects 
estimator. The results (unreported) of this test failed to reject the null hypothesis. We 
therefore used the random effects model, with the generalized least squares (GLS) estimation 
methodology as the main analysis technique.   
 
 
6.0 RESULTS 
6.1 Descriptive Results 
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the variables used. On average, an MFI has seven 
board members; the minimum number of members is two and the maximum is fourteen. The 
average proportion of independent board members is 37 percent, which implies that most 
boards are less independent and dominated by insiders. In terms of board diversity, we see 
that 25 percent of board seats are held by females and 23 percent by foreign members. 
Regulated MFIs make up 39 percent of the MFIs in our sample, while 66 percent are under 
some form of international influence, either in terms of their main donor/funder or other key 
relationships. The results also show that 54 percent of the MFIs are managed by founders. The 
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average age of the MFIs is 9 years and 76 percent of them have their own legal status. Kenyan 
MFIs make up 34 percent of the sample, Ugandan MFIs 30 percent and Tanzanian 36 percent. 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Dependent variables      
Board size 7.18 2.24 2.00 14.00 331 
Board size (ln) 1.92 0.35 0.69 2.64 331 
Board independence-ratio 0.37 0.26 0.00 1.00 325 
Board diversity: female-ratio  0.25 0.23 0.00 1.00 320 
Board diversity: nationality-ratio 0.23 0.33 0.00 1.00 331 
 
Independent variables 
     
Regulated 0.39 0.48 0.00 1.00 328 
International influence 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 343 
Founder management 0.54 0.49 0.00 1.00 315 
 
Other variables 
     
MFI size (ln assets) 15.58 2.51 8.41 24.90 255 
Age (years) 9.69 6.96 2.00 31 311 
Internationally-initiated 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 343 
Legal status  0.76 0.39 0.00 1.00 330 
Operating self-sufficiency 104.35 42.41 6.42 521.87 256 
Number of customers 35742 74917 2.00 715969 220 
Number of customers (ln) 9.47 1.56 3.13 13.48 220 
Kenya 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 343 
Uganda 0.30 0.45 0.00 1.00 343 
Tanzania 0.36 0.49 0.00 1.00 343 
 
Table 4 presents the correlations between the variables. First, we looked at correlations 
between the board structure variables. Although we argue that these variables are separate 
constructs, it is not surprising that they are significantly related, as they are all measures of 
different aspects of board structure. In the multivariate tests, we ran separate regressions for 
each dimension (Table 6), but also, as a robustness check, we performed a joint test using all 
variables simultaneously (Table 7).  
The correlates provide a first simple test of our hypotheses and we see that a number of 
them are consistent with our hypotheses. For example, the variable for regulated MFIs is 
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positively and significantly correlated with board size (coefficient: 0.35, p<0.01), while the 
variable for founder-managed MFIs is negatively correlated with both board size (coefficient: 
-0.31, p<0.01) and board independence (coefficient: -0.23, p<0.01), as hypothesized. We also 
see significant correlations between board structure and control variables. For example there 
is a positive correlation between board size and age (coefficient. 0.49), between board size 
and MFI size (coefficient. 0.41) and between board independence and MFI age (coefficient. 
0.32). Because of these significant correlations, we controlled for these variables in the 
regression models. 
As we prepared for the multivariate tests, we turned to the question of multicollinearity 
among the independent variables. Correlation coefficients among the independent variables 
were rather low, with the highest being between regulated and legal status (coefficient: 0.51, 
p<0.01). Kennedy (2008) holds that correlations need to be above 0.7 to detect 
multicollinearity between the two variables. None of the coefficients were this high but 
significant coefficients are a warning signal that multicollinearity problems may arise. 
Therefore, variance inflation factors (VIF) are used to test for multicollinearity. The results, as 
shown in Table 4, range between 1.27 and 2.21, suggesting that multicollinearity was not a 
problem in our study (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim & Wasserman, 1996). 
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Table 5: Pearson Correlations for Variables in the Regression Model 
 
* p < .05  ; ** p < .01  
 
 
 
 
Variables N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 VIF 
1. Board size (ln) 331 1.00             
2.Board independence 325 0.41** 1.00            
3.Diversity: gender 320 0.12* -0.34** 1.00           
4.Diversity: nationality 331 0.01 0.32** -0.21** 1.00          
5.Regulated 328 0.35** 0.09 -0.04 0.12* 1.00        2.21 
6.International influence 331 0.24** -0.09 0.17** 0.19** -0.04 1.00       1.38 
7.Founder management 315 -0.31** -0.23** 0.04 0.04 -0.13* -0.13* 1.00      1.27 
8.Age 311 0.49** 0.32** 0.36** -0.08 0.45** 0.12* -0.27** 1.00     1.93 
9.Size 255 0.41** 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.46** 0.06 -0.30** 0.50** 1.00    1.73 
10.Legal status 330 0.17** -0.13* -0.07 0.08 0.51** 0.03 -0.04 0.23** 0.46** 1.00   1.98 
11.Kenya 343 0.03 0.13* 0.06 -0.19** -0.08 -0.02 0.17 0.19** 0.09 0.26** 1.00  1.79 
12.Uganda 343 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.08 0.10 -0.01 -0.09 0.01 0.02 -0.18** -0.47** 1.00 1.47 
  
45 
 
6.2 Regression Results and Discussion 
Table 5 reports the regression findings for the random effects estimations. Model 1 reports the 
results for board size, model 2 for board independence, model 3 for gender diversity and 
model 4 for diversity of nationalities. 
 
MFI Regulatory Status 
The first hypothesis concerns the effect of regulatory status on board structure. Table 5, model 
1 provides support for hypothesis 1a, which relates regulation to board size. Regulated MFIs 
have larger boards than unregulated MFIs (coefficient: 0.09, p<0.05). Interestingly, this is in 
line with Adams and Mehran’s (2003, 2008) findings for US banks. Despite the fact that 
unregulated MFIs have a broader set of stakeholders, regulated MFIs need larger boards to 
assist them by bringing intellectual knowledge to improve decision making, increase support 
for the MFI, and in turn boost organizational performance (Jackling & Johl, 2009).  
Model 2 provides support for hypothesis 1b, which deals with board independence 
(coefficient: 0.06, p<0.10). This is in line with the corporate literature that argues that 
regulated organizations need the expertise and skills of independent board members (Hillman 
et al, 2000). However, we do not know whether these independent board members really add 
expertise and skills, or whether they merely make the MFI “look good” in the eyes of the 
regulators. 
We found evidence of partial support for hypothesis 1c, stating that regulated MFIs have 
less diverse boards. In regard to gender diversity, model 3 shows support (coefficient: -0.02, 
p<0.10) while diversity of nationalities is not supported in model 4 (coefficient 0.08, not 
significant). This suggests that regulated MFIs have fewer female board members. One 
possible explanation could be that regulated MFIs need to comply with regulatory 
requirements (banking and business expertise) that are less prevalent among female board 
candidates. This is also in line with studies from the corporate sector in developed countries, 
that a lack of high-level business experience reduces women’s chances of being appointed to 
boards (Ruigrok et al, 2007). The evidence, however, contradicts the agency and resource 
dependence theory, which advocate board diversity as a better tool for organizational 
performance (Walt & Ingley, 2003). From these results we argue that regulated MFIs have 
less incentive to recruit diverse board members. 
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International Influence 
The second set of hypotheses looks at the relationship between international influence and 
board structure. Hypothesis 2a, addressing the relationship between international influence 
and board size, is supported in model 1 (coefficient: 0.16, p<0.01). This suggests that, when 
international actors from the global North are substantially involved in an MFI, they opt for 
larger boards. We deduce that they do so in order to provide the funding, skills, networks, 
technical assistance and information needed for long-term MFI survival (Mersland et al, 
2011). Furthermore, as international supporters provide resources to MFIs, they also need to 
sit on their boards to control the usage of their resources, which therefore enlarges board size. 
Contrary to the prediction in hypothesis 2b, model 2 shows a significantly negative effect 
of international influence on board independence (coefficient: -0.09, p<0.05). One possible 
explanation for the lower level of board independence when the MFI has international 
partners  could be that MFI board insiders could be helpful in providing organization-specific 
information and enhanced decision making (as argued in the case of the corporate sector by 
(Wagner, Stimpert & Fubara, 1998). Secondly, the results suggest that MFIs that are 
influenced by international actors could potentially also be influenced by their CEO founders 
and, therefore, these CEOs prefer insider-dominated boards. To cross-check this, we reran the 
regression to test whether there is an interaction effect between international influence-
founder CEO and board independence. The results show that, out of the 66 percent of MFIs in 
our sample that are internationally influenced, 38 percent are managed by founders. By 
rerunning the model with this interaction variable (unreported), the regression results support 
the existence of such an effect (coefficient: -0.06, p<0.05). We therefore conclude that 
internationally-influenced MFIs have less board independence, possibly due to the 
information advantage of board insiders and the CEO founders’ strong position within MFIs. 
Hypothesis 2c, regarding the relationship between international influence and board 
diversity, is partially supported. Model 3 does not show significant results in regard to gender 
diversity (coefficient: 0.06, not significant). This is surprising, as we expected international 
partners to advocate gender-balanced boards, as suggested by the literature and investors from 
the global North (CMEP, 2005; Rhyne, 2005). Model 4, however, provides statistically and 
economically significant results in relation to diversity of nationalities (coefficient: 0.23, 
p<0.001). This is in line with the corporate literature, suggesting that international board 
members help to reduce cultural complexities and enhance monitoring (Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003). 
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Founder Management 
Hypothesis 3 addresses the relationship between founder-managed MFIs and board structure. 
Model 1 provides support for hypothesis 3a, that founder-managed MFIs are associated with 
small boards (coefficient:-0.06, p<0.10). In line with the findings in the corporate literature 
(Boeker & Karichalil, 2002; Certo et al, 2001), we argue that founder-managed MFIs are 
associated with small boards due to their founders’ attachment to the organization and their 
ability to control the organization. One possible reason why founder CEOs opt for small 
boards could be that it is easier for them to influence small boards and be accountable to 
fewer board members. For example, when a CEO seeks the board’s consent, it is easier for 
him to speak informally to a small number of individual members.  
Regarding the relationship between founder-managed MFIs and board independence, 
model 2 provides evidence in support of hypothesis 3b (coefficient: -0.07, p<0.01). One 
explanation could be that founder CEOs believe that inside board members provide an 
additional source of MFI-specific information, which outside board members would not. 
Another possibility could be that founder CEOs prefer less board independence, as this makes 
it easier for them to maintain their power, influence and control (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002). 
This was also shown by Nelson (2003), who found that corporate organizations managed by 
founders prefer less board independence, which results in less vigilant board monitoring and 
greater CEO influence. 
Regarding the relationship between founder-managed MFIs and board diversity, model 3 
provides evidence contrary to the relationship we propose in hypothesis 3c. We expected that 
founder-managed MFIs would be negatively associated with gender diversity. However, our 
findings show a significant positive relationship (coefficient: 0.05, p<0.10). This suggests that 
founder-managed MFIs prefer board gender diversity, which could be explained by the 
founder’s desire to achieve the social goal of the MFI; he/she thus uses female board 
members’ skills to emphasize female outreach (Strøm, et al, 2010; Mersland and Strøm, 
2009). The high level of openness to female board membership could also be a reflection of 
the high proportion of female founder CEOs in the industry. It is possible that female founder 
CEOs want to maintain their influence, and find this easier to achieve if they invite their 
female friends onto their boards. To check this further, we ran a regression with an interaction 
variable for female-founder CEO and gender diversity. The unreported results (coefficient: 
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0.23, p<0.001) show similar results to those described above, namely that female-founder 
CEOs are positively associated with board gender diversity.  
In line with our prediction, model 4 provides evidence that founder-managed MFIs are 
associated with less board diversity in terms of nationalities (coefficient: 0.05, p<0.05). Since 
diversity of nationalities might bring more independent monitoring of the CEO, and 
potentially more complex and slower decision making, a powerful founder CEO might not see 
it as in his or her interests to advance international board membership.   
 
Table 6: Results of Random Effects GLS Regression 
Variable Board Structure 
Independent Variables Model 1:  
Size 
Model 2:  
independence 
Model 3:  
gender  
Model 4: 
nationalities 
 Coef Z Coef Z Coef Z Coef Z 
Regulated 0.09* 1.74 0.06+ 1.32 -.02+ -1.51 0.08 1.09 
International influence 0.16** 2.02 -0.09* -1.83 0.06 0.98 .23*** 3.54 
Founder management -0.06+ -1.07 -0.07** -2.65 0.05+ 1.45 -0.05* -2.40 
 
        
Control variables         
Size 0.02 1.32 -0.01 -0.94 -0.01 -1.04 -0.02 -0.97 
Age 0.02** 3.71 0.02** 2.46 0.02** 3.09 -0.01 -0.85 
Legal status 0.01 0.12 -0.08 -1.29 -0.04 -0.68 0.08 1.09 
Kenya -0.16+ -1.64 0.04 0.50 -0.01 -0.04 -0.16 -2.00 
Uganda -0.14 -1.52 -0.05 -0.69 -0.04 
 
-0.49 
 
-0.03 -0.43 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.39 0.24 0.21 0.25 
Chi2 42.16 24.09 18.00 34.25 
N 235 235 231 235 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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In summary, our results show that there are multiple associations between the unique 
characteristics of MFIs and their board structures. We found evidence that internationally 
influenced and founder influenced East African MFIs tend to produce a board structure that is 
more suitable for accessing resources mainly from insiders than for monitoring and accessing 
resources from outsiders. This is not the case for regulated MFIs. We also showed the 
significant impact founder CEOs have on board structure, which suggests that these leaders 
have substantial power within the organizations and with their key stakeholders. These 
findings might reflect the youth of the industry and organizational life-cycle effects 
(Filatotchev et al, 2006; Roche, 2009) suggesting that as the industry matures the effect might 
change. As is also evidenced from the effect of our control variables, age is positively 
associated with board independence and board diversity.  
We also saw this effect of founder CEOs and MFI life-cycle effects when we cross-
checked and reran the regressions (unreported), after dividing the sample into two subsamples 
based on the median MFI age of eight years. The CEO-founder effect is stronger in the sub-
sample of MFIs under eight years old than it is in MFIs over eight years old. This implies that, 
as MFIs grow older, CEO founders are more likely to step down and MFIs will tend to attract 
more independent and diverse boards. 
 
6.3 Robustness 
As part of our robustness checks, we reran the models. First, we used panel data estimation 
with the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) methodology (Greene, 2008; and was 
previously applied to microfinance by Mersland et al, 2011), a procedure that takes account of 
possible correlations among dependent variables. We also performed a Breusch-Pagan test to 
check the extent to which the residuals in the SUR regression were independent. The results 
are reported in Table 6. 
A common challenge in corporate governance research is the issue of possible reverse 
causality. Our second robustness check was to rerun all models using instrumental variables 
with a two-stage linear regression (2SLS). The methodological concern here was the 
possibility of an omitted unobservable variable that affects both independent and dependent 
variables (Adam & Ferreira, 2009). The literature shows that many of the variables of interest 
in corporate governance investigations are not truly exogenous, that is they are determined 
completely outside the model systems but are endogenous (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). 
Carter et al (2010) suggest that we can use lagged performance variables as instruments even 
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though they are not completely outside the system of equations. We followed their 
suggestions and use lagged variables of MFI performance. We used lagged operational self-
sufficiency* and lagged number of customers† as our instruments. We tested the correctness‡ 
of these instruments (Cheung, Connelly, Limpaphayom & Zhou, 2007) and ran a 2SLS 
(Wooldridge, 2006). The results are presented in Table 7. 
The results in both Table 6 and Table 7 are to a large extent similar to the main results of 
most of the hypothesized relationships. We showed that regulated MFIs are associated with 
large boards and a lack of board gender diversity, and that internationally-influenced MFIs 
have larger and less independent boards. Also, international influence has no significant 
association with board gender diversity, but does have a positive relationship with diversity of 
nationalities. Overall, we highlight that our results show that there is a need to address the 
three dimensions of MFI board structure individually, and that our random effects model is 
efficient.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
*
 Operational self-sufficiency (OSS) is a financial performance measure that is widely used in the microfinance 
literature. It measures the ability of the organization to cover its operating costs using interest income. It is 
computed as operating revenue / (financial expenses + loan loss provisions + operating expenses). High OSS 
means better financial performance. 
†
 Number of customers is used as a proxy for measuring the social performance of MFIs. Many customers means 
greater outreach to the poor and better social performance. 
‡
 Following Cheung et al. (2007), we test for the correctness of the instrument as follows. We first run OLS for 
each dependent variable with independent variables. Then we estimate residuals for each dependent variable. 
Afterwards, we correlate the residuals with the endogenous-independent variables and suggested instruments. 
The results show that the instrument variables correlate significantly with the endogenous variables but not with 
the dependent variables’ residuals. 
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Table 7: Results of Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Variable Board Structure 
 Model 1:  
Size 
Model 2: 
Independence 
Model 3: 
Gender  
Model 4: 
Nationalities 
Independent variables Coef Z Coef Z Coef Z Coef Z 
Regulated 0.16*** 3.54 0.09** 2.27 -0.08* -2.02 0.06 1.13 
International influence 0.19*** 5.52 -0.09*** -3.13 0.04 1.42 0.24*** 5.12 
Founder management -0.06+ -1.60 -0.08*** -3.26 0.09*** 3.11 -.07+ -1.72 
 
Control variables 
        
Size 0.02 1.73 -0.01 -1.60 -0.01* -1.94 -0.01 -1.36 
Age 0.01*** 4.98 0.01*** 3.87 0.02*** 5.80 -0.01 -2.05 
Legal status -0.14** -3.05 -0.13** -3.35 0.00 0.01 0.11 2.10 
Kenya -0.06 -1.28 0.11* 3.00 -0.05 -0.33 -.19*** -3.80 
Uganda -0.15 -3.62 -0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.31 -0.09* -1.83 
         
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.46 0.28 0.25 0.26 
Chi2 197.84 91.41 75.26 80.69 
N 231 231 231 231 
 
 
    
Correlations of Residuals 
 
Board size Board independence Gender diversity Diversity of 
nationalities  
Board independence 0.35    
Gender -0.06 0.34   
Nationalities -0.09 -0.28 -0.28  
Breusch-Pagan Chi2 (3) 93.99    
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 8: Results of a Two-Stage (2SLS) Regression 
Variable Board Structure 
 Model 1:  
Size 
Model 2: 
Independence 
Model 3: 
Gender 
Model 4: 
Nationalities 
Independent variables Coef   t Coef   t Coef  t Coef t 
Regulated 0.84** 2.05 0.33 1.12 0.04 0.13 -0.29 -0.70 
International influence 0.31+ 1.60 -0.25+ -1.67 0.28 0.79 0.52+ 1.99 
Founder management -0.15* -2.04 -0.10* -1.97 0.06+ 1.53 -0.07 -0.99 
 
        
Control variables         
Size 0.01 0.20 -0.09* -1.73 -0.06 -1.8 -0.01 -0.25 
Age 0.01 0.13 0.01+ 0.11 0.03*** 3.19 -0.01 -0.27 
Legal status -0.51*** -2.23 -0.28+ -1.32 -0.08 -0.53 0.29 1.21 
Kenya 0.19 1.40 0.22* 1.40 -0.01 -0.06 -0.28* -2.11 
Uganda -0.20 -2.42 -0.05 -0.90 -0.06 -1.01 -0.08 0.36 
Instruments Operational self-sufficiency; number of customers 
R2   0.14  
F stat 4.82 4.38 4.06 3.40 
N 163 163 163 163 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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7.0 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This study examined the determinants of board structure in MFIs. Guided by the agency and 
resource dependence theory, we examined three unique characteristics of MFIs: regulation 
status, international influence and founder management. Using a sample of 63 East African 
MFIs, we showed the relationship between these characteristics and three dimensions of 
board structure: board size, board independence and board diversity (gender and nationality). 
We used a mixture of analytical procedures to obtain valid and robust results.  
The results showed that there are significant associations between MFI characteristics and 
board structure. We found that MFIs that are regulated have larger boards, high board 
independence and less gender-diverse boards. The lower diversity in regulated MFIs might be 
due to the expertise demanded by the regulators (see Table 1), or it could reflect 
discrimination against females. This needs to be further explored in future studies. Similarly, 
MFIs that are internationally influenced have larger boards, more international boards, and 
less independent boards. Past research highlights that MFIs’ international partners establish 
connections with MFIs in order to provide them with resources, such as funding, and 
international experience, through technical assistance and advice (Mersland et al, 2011). 
Founder-managed MFIs show similar characteristics to those demonstrated in the corporate 
founder-CEO literature (Certo et al, 2001). These results have various implications.  
 
7.1 Implications for Theory 
In this study, we applied the agency and resource dependence theories as complementary 
theories in studying the microfinance industry. Past studies on board structure mostly applied 
these theories in relation to large for-profit organizations in developed countries (Jackling & 
Johl, 2009; Linck et al, 2008). We showed that these theories can be applicable to research on 
a young entrepreneurial industry like microfinance, about which corporate governance 
research is still very limited (Mersland & Labie, 2011).  
To our knowledge, we are among the first to highlight the relevance of the resource 
dependence theory for examining corporate governance in MFIs, though several studies have 
used the agency theory (Hartarska, 2005; Mersland & Strøm, 2009). The resource dependence 
theory is particularly useful for understanding microfinance, due to the common dual 
objective of MFIs (financial sustainability and having a social mission), and the need for 
MFIs to obtain access to key stakeholders (fund providers, community leaders, etc.). As stated 
by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978:1), “to understand the behaviour of an organization you must 
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understand the context of that behaviour”. This means that to understand the behaviour and 
structure of MFIs, there is a need to first understand the context and environment of the 
microfinance industry.  
Agency-theory-based studies commonly suggest that small and independent boards are 
better at monitoring organizations, particularly their CEOs. We found that CEO founders do 
not like such “controls” and that the CEOs’ ability to affect the choice of board structure 
indicates that they are able to exercise power over MFIs. We therefore argue that, despite the 
commonly emphasized monitoring benefits of having small and independent boards, the 
social mission attachment of the founder CEO might make “strong” monitoring less 
necessary, as is the case in founder-managed for-profit organizations (Randøy & Goel, 2003).
 There is still relatively little corporate governance research from emerging economies and 
Africa in particular (Rossouw, 2005). This study indicates that the agency theory and resource 
dependency theory are useful for understanding boards in an emerging market context such as 
East Africa. 
 
7.2 Implications for Practice 
The CSFI (2011) reported that corporate governance is one of the major challenges facing 
African MFIs. One highlighted challenge is the lack of board independence. We found this 
lack in both internationally-influenced and founder-influenced MFIs, but we argue that this 
lack of board independence is due to the industry’s newness and we suggest that this will need 
to change as MFIs grow. As the CEO of one East African MFI put it, “four years ago, the 
board’s role was largely advisory. Now, stakeholders expect it to take a more active role, 
especially in monitoring and risk control. We need to draw more on the specialized expertise 
of outside members” (CMEF, 2005). MFIs should also be aware that board insiders are a 
source of organization-specific information (Wagner et al, 1998) and help with the strategic 
direction of the MFI. However, we suggest that their presence on boards should not be so 
overwhelming as to make monitoring difficult.  
Another practical implication relates to regulation. Currently, some public policy suggests 
that MFIs should change from operating as NGOs on a not-for-profit basis to being regulated 
and operating on a for-profit basis (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007). MFIs should be aware that 
this type of change will have implications for the board structure, not only through regulatory 
requirements (see Table 1), but also because the owners/trustees (or other legal bodies in 
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charge) will have to focus on recruiting board members who can assist with monitoring and 
provide access to resources.  
In this study, we found evidence of the strong influence of CEO founders on MFI board 
structure. We urge MFI founders, as their organizations grow, to make room for independent 
boards, so that the CEO does not limit the MFI’s access to new people with new ideas 
(Boeker & Karichalil, 2002). There is some evidence in the corporate literature that some 
founders might stay on too long (Filatotchev et al, 2006; Wasserman, 2003), and the 
owners/trustees of MFIs should be aware of this challenge and be ready to replace CEO 
founders if necessary.   
With the financial crisis in the global North, the ability of international partners to support 
MFIs might diminish and MFI governance structures should reflect this risk. Specifically, 
MFIs should seek to recruit board members who provide strong links with multiple 
stakeholders, so that they can work more independently from past or present major 
donors/owners.  
 
7.3 Limitations and Direction for Future Research 
This study has several limitations. First, we used only a few dimensions of board structure. 
There are other board structure dimensions that we did not consider, and which probably 
would be useful to consider when researching microfinance. Dimensions such as the 
education, age and expertise of board members (e.g. in Ruigrok et al, 2007) and CEO duality 
could be considered in future studies.  
The independent variables (regulations, international influence, and founder management) 
chosen for this study might be explored in more detail: for example, the cultural and 
institutional distance between the MFI and its international partner/network, the specific 
background of the CEO founder, the content of the regulations, and finally, a more detailed 
picture of the MFIs’ customer environment. In addition, there might be other determinants of 
board structure that should be considered in future studies, for example the nature of the 
corporate governance environment (such as the legal regime), and the level of financial 
development of the country.  
In this study we found, surprisingly, that international influence brings less board 
independence. Corporate governance policies, in general and also in the microfinance context, 
advocate greater board independence in order to reduce information asymmetries between 
owners/trustees and management. Future research should therefore address this paradox. 
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ABSTRACT 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) provide financial services to poor customers living in 
poverty. This study addresses the relationship between MFI board composition and the 
poverty outreach (social performance) of MFIs. In particular, we investigated whether the 
proportion of independent, international, female and/or founding board members is associated 
with measures of outreach performance. We used data from a survey, containing information 
about the boards of 63 MFIs in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Our findings suggest that 
outreach performance is improved when MFI boards have a higher share of independent, 
international and/or female members, which supports the hypothesis that board composition is 
important in helping MFIs to achieve their social objectives. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Past research suggests that board decisions have an impact on the (broadly defined) 
performance and/or mission of organizations (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; 
Zahra, Filatotchev, & Wright, 2009). Furthermore, the significant interest in board issues, 
within both academic and policy circles, is partly driven by the fact that board decisions and 
board behaviour are believed to be affected by board composition and board diversity (e.g., 
Van, Gabrielsson, & Huse, 2009). Policy makers have looked at the role of boards in 
discussions about corporate governance best practices, which in many cases have been 
developed into corporate governance codes and in some cases into law (e.g. the Sarbanes-
Oxley act in the United States). In the academic literature, a large number of studies have 
analyzed the relationships between various board characteristics – such as board member 
demographics, board diversity, and board processes – and organizational performance. These 
studies almost exclusively focus on for-profit firms. Much less is known about the role that 
the boards of non-profit, mission-driven organizations play in attaining organizational goals.  
 This paper looks into the role the boards of microfinance institutions (MFIs) play in the 
attainment of organizational goals. In contrast to formal banks, most MFIs have a dual 
objective of outreach to poor customers (i.e. outreach (or social) performance) and covering 
long-term costs (i.e. financial performance, sometimes referred to in the industry as self-
sustainability) (Mersland, Randøy, & Strøm, 2011). The question is how and to what extent 
the boards help them to reach these objectives.  
From a practitioner’s perspective, it has been stressed that the governance of MFIs should 
receive more attention. Only recently has it been acknowledged that good governance may 
make an important contribution to the achievement of the objectives of these institutions.  
As an example of this emerging trend, in 2011 the BBVA Microfinance Foundation, in 
collaboration with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), published a guide for the 
adoption of good governance principles in MFIs. According to this guide, “good corporate 
governance contributes to efficient management and to considering stakeholder interests, 
boosting the microfinance institution's reputation and integrity and fostering customer trust” 
(p.7). Moreover, the Banana Skins report – published by the Centre for the Study of Financial 
Innovation (CSFI, 2008) –listed weak corporate governance and management quality among 
the ten most important risks confronted by the microfinance industry during the last few 
years. Inarguably, the recent attention paid to the governance of MFIs is related to the 
increasing interest of private investors in financing these institutions. Transparency and trust 
  
66 
 
in the internal operations of MFIs are key elements in the funding decisions of these private 
investors. 
Previous studies on the relationship between MFI governance and performance have 
mainly analyzed the impact of leaders, in particular female leaders (Strøm, D'Espallier, & 
Mersland, 2010) or governance mechanisms, such as competition, regulation, board size and 
stakeholders (employees, donors and creditors) (Hartarska, 2005; Mersland and Strøm, 2009; 
Soltane, 2009) on the financial performance of MFIs. As an alternative, Hartarska and 
Mersland (2012) employed the cost efficiency concept from the banking literature and 
modified it to capture the duel objectives of MFIs. Our study theoretically and empirically 
embodies different strands of literature and methodology.   
To our knowledge, no other study to date has examined MFI boards in detail, and 
specifically the impact of board characteristics on achieving the MFI’s social mission. As 
mentioned above, the governance mechanisms of MFIs and their implications have received 
wide attention in the industry. Therefore, this study addresses the industry’s call for good 
practices and the theoretical shortcomings of previous studies (for example, Hartarska and 
Mersland, 2012, failed to capture the poverty level of MFI clients) by examining the detailed 
characteristics of MFI board members and the extent of their influence on the attainment of 
the MFI’s social mission, focusing on both the breadth and depth of outreach to customers. 
Examining board impact is important due to the MFI board’s role of monitoring and guiding 
it to attain its mission (Galema, Lensink, & Mersland, 2012). 
This study therefore contributes to the microfinance literature by focusing on MFI board 
composition and its impact on MFI social performance. We did this by first identifying the 
key board members who arguably have a direct influence on the outreach mission of these 
institutions. MFIs operate in environments where the social mission of serving the poor is 
commonly highlighted as the most important objective (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, & Morduch, 
2009). Therefore, understanding the relationship between boards, as a governance 
mechanism, and social performance is particularly important.  
The microfinance industry is also argued to be an entrepreneurial industry. with a focus on 
developing innovative strategies that will better serve the poor (Strøm et al, 2010). This 
justifies basing our arguments about board composition on the entrepreneur literature and 
adapting them to the context of MFIs. This helped us to identify the factors that significantly 
affect the MFI governance structure, and enables MFIs to achieve their social mission. This is 
an important consideration given the potential role MFIs can play in facilitating development 
and alleviating poverty. In particular, we emphasized composition by examining to what 
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extent boards include independent (or external) board members, international members, 
female members and/or founding members and how these characteristics of boards are related 
to outreach performance.  
A further contribution of this paper is its focus on sub-Saharan Africa, a region that is 
considered the poorest in the world, with one of the largest markets for microfinance (CGAP, 
2009). We used this context to investigate the link between an MFI’s board composition and 
its potential to help the poorest in the community. The empirical analysis is based on 
information on the board characteristics of 63 MFIs in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The 
information was collected by conducting detailed surveys of the boards of these institutions. 
The information we collected covers the period 2004-2009. We found support for the fact that 
boards with a higher proportion of independent, international and/or female board members 
perform better in terms of both the depth and breadth of their outreach. These results suggest 
that MFI board composition is indeed important for the achievement of social objectives. 
There are practical policy implications in terms of advising the boards of MFIs on the 
selection of new board members. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss the theoretical 
framework supporting the general hypothesis that board characteristics are related to the 
social performance of MFIs. In section 3 we develop hypotheses relating different board 
characteristics to MFIs’ social performance based on the theoretical framework discussed in 
section 2 as well as on information about board members’ behaviour and incentives obtained 
from several in-depth interviews. Section 4 discusses the data and methodology. In section 5 
we present the descriptive statistics, after which we discuss the results of the multivariate 
analysis in section 6. We end with the implications and contributions of our research, its 
limitations and directions for further research in section 7. 
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2.0 THE IMPORTANCE OF BOARDS: A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE THEORY 
Literature on the board has traditionally focused on large listed companies owned by a large 
number of minority shareholders (e.g., Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003). In this literature, 
explanations of the board-performance relationship are rooted in two widely applied 
theoretical models, the agency theory and resource-based theory. The agency theory 
emphasizes that the separation of management and stakeholders leads to a divergence of their 
respective interests. Thus incentives and controls have to be provided to induce managers 
(agents) to maximize organizational goals. According to the agency theory, boards play an 
important role in screening, monitoring, and enforcing contracts with managers. These board 
roles may safeguard the organization from the misuse of resources by managers, which 
reduces the agency costs in both for-profit and non-profit firms (Dalton et al, 1998; Dalton, 
Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Speckbacher, 2008).  
The resource-based theory suggests that the performance of the organization is enhanced 
when it explores its distinctive and idiosyncratic resources and capabilities and/or its ability to 
deploy resources (e.g., Barney, 1991; Kogut & Zander, 1993; Peteraf, 1993). Applying this 
theory to the question of the importance of board composition, it suggests that board members 
provide access to resources that are critical for the organization’s performance. These 
resources may be (1) gathered through board members’ networks that grant the organization 
access to, for example, external finance or contacts with governmental organizations, (2) 
advice, for example with respect to strategic decision making, or (3) knowledge or 
information about regulations or clients. 
Thus, based on these two theoretical models, boards serve two main roles. First, they 
monitor and control the performance and accountability of managers on behalf of the 
shareholders, keeping them focused on their goals (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). Second, 
they advise and inform managers on issues relating to business strategy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978) and provide access to resources. This is referred to as the resource and advisory role of 
boards (Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire 2008). In undertaking both roles, boards guide and 
motivate managers to accumulate resources, effectively configure and bundle them, and 
leverage their use to create a competitive advantage. This holds for profit organizations and 
non-profit organizations such as MFIs. 
One recently emerging research stream emphasizes the role of boards for young 
entrepreneurial organizations (see, e.g., Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001; Zahra & Filatotchev, 
2004; Zahra et al, 2009). For these organizations, a board’s role should be geared more to 
helping them to overcome the liabilities of their newness and small size. The argument is that 
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a board can add significant value by providing access to resources and strategic advice. Since 
MFIs have emerged relatively recently, we therefore expect the resource-providing role of 
boards to be particularly important for their performance. Being successful in attaining 
organizational objectives is positively associated with having access to and/or acquiring a 
wide array of resources, which may help to improve managerial skills and expertise. 
The corporate governance literature recognizes that the individual characteristics of board 
members, such as age, gender, experience, nationality, etc., can be predictors of their ability to 
monitor and provide access to resources (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). More specifically, it 
highlights several dimensions of board composition as being important for carrying out these 
two board roles, including board size (Yermack, 1996), board diversity (Adams & Ferreira, 
2009), board leadership (Rechner & Dalton, 1991), board stakeholder representation (Luoma 
& Goodstein, 1999) and international board members (Riahi-Belkaoui, 1998). Following on 
from the corporate governance literature, a few studies have looked at MFI boards together 
with other governance mechanisms, and have identified the (potential) impact of board 
characteristics, such as board size, stakeholder representation and the existence of female 
leadership on the performance of MFIs (Hartarska, 2005; Hartarska & Mersland, 2012, Strøm 
et al, 2010).  
The importance of the governance of MFIs has also been on the agenda of practitioners in 
microfinance. As mentioned in the introduction, the CSFI (2011) listed inadequate corporate 
governance as one of the most important risks currently faced by the microfinance industry. 
Moreover, several policy-oriented studies have advocated the importance of having a mixture 
of skills and experience among the members of MFI boards (Council of Microfinance Equity 
Funds [CMEF], 2005). These studies have generally argued that, since the industry provides 
poor people with financial services, it is necessary for board members to have a mixture of 
social and business skills and experience (Campion, 1998; Campion & Frankiewicz, 1999). 
For example, CMEF (2005) suggested that, when selecting new board members, MFIs should 
target individuals with the ability and willingness to devote time and talent, who are seen as 
independent, bringing skills and objectivity, and who are influential and can assist with 
political issues, tap funding, and help the organization to build a positive public image.  
Moreover, CMEF stressed the need for a diverse board (in terms of gender, ethnicity 
and/or cultural background) to ensure a broad perspective. The advice provided by this 
institute stresses the importance of both the monitoring and advice/resource access roles of 
the boards of MFIs. Finally, the 2011 guidelines published jointly by the BBVA Microfinance 
Foundation and the IDB, referred to earlier, stress, among other things, the importance of 
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having independent board members with the financial, legal and social knowledge to achieve 
the MFI’s goals, who are committed to being actively involved in attaining these goals, and 
who will provide input into strategic decision making. Moreover, the guidelines stress the 
importance of optimal board size, board diversity and CEO/chairman duality. These best 
practices developed for MFIs are very similar to those described in the corporate governance 
literature and corporate governance codes.* 
 
 
3.0 HYPOTHESES 
So as to analyze the relationship between board composition and MFIs’ outreach 
performance, we derived several hypotheses explaining how specific board member 
characteristics may contribute to the attainment of the social mission of these institutions. In 
developing these hypotheses, we were guided by two sources. First, our hypotheses were 
grounded in the theoretical models discussed in the previous section, the agency theory and 
resource-based theory. Second, we carried out detailed interviews with 30 board members 
from 20 MFIs in the three focal countries. These interviews helped us to establish what 
motivates individuals to serve on the boards of MFIs and what board member characteristics 
are perceived as being potentially important for achieving better social performance. In 
particular, the interviews focused on how the board members were recruited, what motivated 
them to accept the position and to stay on as a board member, how their 
background/competencies related to their contribution to the MFI’s mission, and whether they 
felt they influenced the key decisions and performance of the organization. 
Combining the theory-based arguments with the information gathered from these 
interviews, we identified four characteristics of board members that may be instrumental in 
promoting better social performance of MFIs: independence, nationality, gender and the 
presence of the founder on the board.  
 
 
 
                                                 
*
 The BBVA Microfinance Foundation/IDB guidelines, for example, take the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance as their point of departure. 
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3.1 Independent Board Members 
Independent board members have no affiliation to the organization on whose board they are 
sitting. In the corporate governance literature, board independence is seen as an important 
dimension of board composition as it determines the ability of the board to monitor the 
management and provide a greater variety of resources. Having no affiliation to – and thus no 
direct interest in – the organization increases a board member’s objectivity and ability to 
safeguard the organization from the misappropriation of resources. This reduces agency costs, 
which contributes to better organizational performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hillman et al, 
2008; Speckbacher, 2008). Moreover, it has been argued that independent board members 
bring new skills and capabilities that may be instrumental in whether organizations obtain 
their goals (Raheja, 2005; Zahra et al, 2009; Zhang, Baden-Fuller, & Pool, 2011).  
Past research suggests that the independence of board members is also important for the 
social performance of MFIs. Hartarska (2005) found  that the outreach performance of MFIs 
whose boards contain a higher proportion of internal members is worse. Galema, et al, (2012) 
further argue that MFI board members are generally independent persons who simply wish to 
support these organizations. Our interview findings are in line with these observations. 
Independent board members, who commonly have more “outside” exposure and experience, 
appear to be motivated to serve on boards in order to contribute to MFIs’ social outreach 
mission. They indicated that they are willing to do this by monitoring management, as well as 
by using their skills and experience. Many outside board members revealed that they were 
recruited to serve on MFI boards in the hope that they would use their experience and 
networks to help the MFI gain access to resources that would contribute to its outreach 
mission. We therefore hypothesized that independent board members enhance the outreach 
performance of MFIs due to their ability to effectively monitor, provide skills and experience, 
and enable access to valuable resources: 
H1: A higher proportion of independent board members is positively associated with the 
outreach performance of MFIs. 
 
3.2 International Board Members 
International board members are those who do not come (originally) from the country where 
the organization is located. The corporate governance literature indicates that organizational 
performance may improve when boards are international. For example, Oxelheim and Randøy 
(2003) found that the internationalization of the boards of publicly traded firms enhances firm 
performance as international board members have more experience and are better at 
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monitoring management. In particular, they may facilitate the transfer of value-enhancing 
corporate governance practices. International board members can also take a more 
independent role in monitoring as they will often have less vested interests in the 
organization, which helps to reduce agency costs and forces the organization to be more 
performance-oriented. Finally, international board members are perceived as having more 
extensive networks, which may at least potentially better link the organization to valuable 
resources.  
Similar arguments may hold for international MFI board members. They may facilitate the 
transfer of international competencies and may contribute to better monitoring and resource 
provision, thereby enhancing MFIs’ outreach performance (Mersland et al, 2011). For 
example, they may link the institution with international partners, investors and organizations 
such as CGAP and ACCION international (Mersland et al, 2011; Rhyne, 2005). Links with 
international networks can also be established if the board members in question represent the 
international organizations that were involved in starting the MFI in the first place. This is 
actually the case for a number of institutions in our sample of East Africa MFIs (Hospes, 
Musinga, & Ong'ayo, 2002; Randhawa & Gallardo, 2003). Our interviews revealed that 
international board members tend to push for the achievement of social goals. Those we 
questioned stressed that they are motivated to share their experience with the CEOs of MFIs 
in order to reduce poverty and assist in reaching poor people. Based on the above discussion, 
we derived the following hypothesis: 
H2: A higher proportion of international board members is positively associated with the 
outreach performance of MFIs. 
 
3.3 Female Board Members 
The corporate governance literature identified several arguments in favour of the recruitment 
of female board members, such as the increased diversity and independence of opinions on 
the board, their positive influence on strategic decision making and the leadership style of the 
organization, and an improved organizational image with stakeholder groups (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009; Burgess & Tharenou, 2002; Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 1999). Empirical 
evidence indicates that increasing the number of female board members has a positive 
relationship with the monitoring efforts of the board as a whole, which may contribute to 
improving value creation and organizational performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Erhardt, 
Werbel, & Shrader, 2003). 
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With respect to the boards of MFIs, females may have a particularly important role to play 
as in many cases most of the customers are women (Mersland & Strøm, 2009). This also 
holds for the MFIs in the three East African countries in our dataset. Female board members 
may be strongly motivated to serve the needs of these female clients. Moreover, they may be 
better informed about the financial services needed by the poor, which may help to improve 
outreach performance (Strøm et al, 2010). This too was corroborated by our interviews. 
Female board members claimed to have better insights into what women need and said that 
they were motivated by a desire to contribute to meeting the needs of the poor. Based on the 
above discussion we derived the following hypothesis: 
H3: A higher proportion of female board members is positively associated with the 
outreach performance of MFIs. 
 
3.4 Founding Board Members 
Corporate governance research is inconclusive with respect to the relationship between 
founding board members and organizational performance. Some papers have shown that 
founders serving on boards may have a lot of power over strategic decision making and board 
composition due to their history with the organization (Nelson, 2003; Wasserman, 2003). 
Another section of the literature suggests that founding board members identify more strongly 
with the mission of the organization than non-founding members (Block & Rosenberg, 2002). 
Finally, it has been argued that founders may have developed unique social capital through 
their relationship with the suppliers of input and capital, as well as with their customers (Ben-
Ner & Van Hoomissen, 1994).  
These characteristics of founding members may help the organization to achieve better 
growth and performance (Baum & Bird, 2010; Meyskens, Robb-Post, Stamp, Carsrud, & 
Reynolds, 2010; Willard, Krueger, & Feeser, 1992). Founding members may possess firm-
specific attributes that can help the organization to break through start-up barriers. These 
attributes may comprise managerial, technical, motivational and/or political skills and can be 
difficult for non-founders to replicate. Thus, founding board members may have a positive 
impact on performance, especially during the early stages of organizational growth, by 
providing knowledge and commitment tailored to the organization’s aims.  
It has also been pointed out, however, that founding board members may adversely affect 
performance. Founders may identify themselves too much with the organization and have a 
tendency to treat it as their “baby” (Wasserman, 2003). Consequently, they may try to control 
and dominate decision making for too long, pushing their ideas and views at the cost of 
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others, which may compromise organizational performance (Schein, 1983). A related 
argument states that founding board members continue to sit on boards, claiming to be 
motivated by the organization’s mission, but in reality they are more concerned with retaining 
control than enhancing performance (Nelson, 2003). Another possible negative effect is that 
the presence of founder board members may crowd out other board members with links to 
valuable resources. Finally, while, as mentioned above, the presence of founder board 
members may be particularly beneficial during the early stages of organizational growth, in 
later stages they may become a barrier to growth. As indicated in the entrepreneurship 
literature, founders are particularly good at designing new products and services, but their 
ability to lead and create good governance structures may diminish over time (Wasserman, 
2003; Willard et al, 1992).  
This discussion of the role of founding members also applies to MFIs. The person who 
started the MFI – often with the aim of reducing poverty – still serves on the board in many 
cases (Alonso, Palenzuela, & Merino, 2009). Such board members may be particularly 
motivated to hold on to the mission of poverty reduction. Our interviews with founding board 
members corroborated several of the above observations. Many of these board members 
indicated that they started the MFI to help poor people to gain access to financial services. 
They showed themselves to be passionate about working for the MFI and serving the poor. At 
the same time, several of them claimed that they had held on to their board position because 
they believed they were the right person to ensure the MFI attained its  mission. 
In the light of the above review of the corporate governance literature on the relationship 
between founding board members and organizational performance, the question still remains 
over whether the commitment of a founding board member to the institution and its mission 
creates a positive relationship with social performance and whether or not this positive 
relationship is dependent on where the MFI is in its life-cycle. Therefore, we derived the 
following hypotheses followed by table 1 which summarises all the stated hypotheses: 
H4a: A higher proportion of founding board members is positively associated with the 
outreach performance of MFIs. 
H4b: A higher proportion of founding board members is negatively associated with the 
outreach performance of MFIs. 
H4c: A higher proportion of founding board members is positively associated with 
outreach performance, but the positive association diminishes over the MFI’s life-cycle. 
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Table 1: Summary of the Hypotheses 
Board Composition Outreach Performance 
 Breadth Depth 
 
Customers Female customers Average loan 
Independence + + - 
International + + - 
Female + + - 
Founders +/- +/- +/- 
 
 
4.0 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Sample and Data Collection 
We collected data on the boards of MFIs in sub-Saharan Africa, focusing on the three East 
African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. We chose to collect our data in this region 
for a number of reasons. First, sub-Saharan Africa is considered to be the poorest continent in 
the world, and is recognized as one of the largest markets for microfinance (CGAP, 2010). 
Within the continent, East Africa has the most developed microfinance industry (CGAP, 
2010). The three countries show significant similarities in their legal and regulatory regimes 
(La Porta, Lopez, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997), but at the same time are heterogeneous in terms 
of the development of their national microfinance industry. The importance of MFIs for the 
development of the region and the combination of cross-country institutional similarities and 
industry variations makes the East African region an interesting context for microfinance 
research. 
Microfinance in these countries only really took off in the 1990s (Hospes et al, 2002; 
Randhawa & Gallardo, 2003), although microfinance activities were initially developed in the 
1980s. For example, the Uganda Finance Trust was established in 1984, while Kenya’s 
Women’s Finance Trust was established in 1982. However, it was in the mid-1990s that the 
governments of the three countries began to recognize the importance of providing financial 
services to the poor and introduced several rules and regulations to support the industry 
(Randhawa & Gallardo, 2003). Despite these efforts, a study by FinScope (2009) showed that 
only a small percentage of the poor had access to financial services and there was still a huge 
unmet need.  
Table 2 provides an overview of access to financial services in Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda. It shows that the proportion of people with no access to either formal or informal 
finance ranges from 30 percent (Uganda) to 56 percent (Tanzania). Moreover, it shows that 
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only between 17 percent (Tanzania) and 33 percent (Uganda) of people have accesses to 
formal modes of finance through banks or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
SACCOs (savings and cooperative societies). According to the data from the MIX market 
dataset (www.mixmarket.org), at the end of 2009 the number of active borrowers from MFIs 
in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda was 3.3 million, less than 3 percent of the total population of 
the three countries. These figures show that there is still much room for enhancing the 
outreach of MFIs to the poor in the three countries. This makes a study of the determinants of 
improved outreach particularly relevant. As indicated earlier in this essay, governance may be 
one such important determinant, of which board composition, studied here, is one element. 
 
 
Table 2: Financial Institutions and Access to Financial Services in East Africa 
Financial access and number of MFIs Uganda Kenya Tanzania 
Full access to financial services (banks) 21% 18.5% 12.4% 
Partial access to financial services (SACCOs, NBFIs - non-bank 
financial institutions, NGOs) 
12% 8.1% 4.3% 
Informal access to finance (groups, individuals, money lenders) 34% 35.0% 27.3% 
Excluded (no access) 30% 38.4% 56% 
 
Number of SACCOs (approximate) 
 
3,000 
 
4,000 
 
3,000 
Number of NGOs (approximate) 250 300 200 
Sources: FinScope (2009); Johnson and Zarazua (2011) 
 
 
Data on corporate governance indicators are generally difficult to obtain. This is no different 
for non-profit organizations such as MFIs. We collected our data from various sources. The 
most important source was a survey conducted by one of the authors in the three countries 
between January and August 2010.We contacted umbrella microfinance associations in each 
of the three countries to provide us with a list of the names of MFIs, their CEOs, and their 
contact addresses. The researcher visited all the MFIs on the list (excluding cooperatives) and 
asked them if they would take part in the research by filling in a survey. The survey included 
questions about their governance, board members’ demographics, clients, activities and 
operations. Moreover, the researcher asked the respondents to provide audited financial 
statements (and/or annual reports) from 2004 to 2009. Finally, the researcher asked them to 
provide names and contact details of any other MFIs they knew of. We then visited these 
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MFIs as well and asked for the same information using the same survey instrument. This 
methodology is referred to as snowball sampling (Goodman, 1961; Heckathorn, 1997).* 
Altogether, we finally identified and contacted 103 MFIs, of which 49 (almost 50 percent) 
completed the survey. 
We also collected data by visiting the MFIs’ websites. Several of these provided 
information on governance, clients, activities and operations, as well as published audited 
financial reports. We were also able to verify some of the data we had obtained through the 
survey using information from the MFIs’ websites.  
Together, these sources provided us with information about governance indicators and 
financial information for the period 2004-2009 for 63 MFIs. Our sample represents between a 
quarter and a third of all MFIs (excluding cooperatives†) in the three countries. We recognize 
that our method of collecting information may have introduced bias, in particular by leaving 
out smaller MFIs that provide little or no information with respect to governance and financial 
statements. This sample-selection bias is a well-known problem in research on microfinance. 
For example, several studies have made use of data from the MIX market or rating reports. 
These studies suffer from a similar selection-bias problem, because the data they use are 
mostly from larger, more developed MFIs. 
 
 
4.2 Variables 
Dependent Variables 
As already explained, our analysis focused on the relationship between board composition 
and the outreach performance of MFIs. According to the microfinance literature, MFI 
outreach can be measured in terms of both breadth and depth. In line with the standard in 
microfinance research, we measured breadth as the number of customers, specifically the 
logarithm of the total number of customers served by the MFI (Mersland & Strøm, 2008). The 
greater number of customers served, the greater is the breadth of the outreach. Depth was 
                                                 
*
 Snowball sampling is a sampling technique where existing respondents recruit new respondents from their 
vicinity to create a sample that is large enough for research. This technique is mainly used in sociological 
research to create a sample of respondents from a population that is difficult to approach, such as drug users, 
alcoholics, and so forth. In our case, this technique was very helpful for solving the problem of finding MFIs not 
listed by the relevant microfinance umbrella organization. 
†
 Cooperatives have a different governance structure (i.e. the customers are also the owners of the organization). 
They are usually much smaller and, in most cases, do not have audited financial statements. 
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measured as the proportion of female customers, that is the ratio of female customers to total 
customers. As an alternative measure of depth, we looked at the (logarithm of the) average 
loan size per customer. Again, both measures are in line with what is used in the literature. A 
higher proportion of female customers indicate a higher depth of outreach, while a lower 
average loan size indicates a higher depth of outreach, since most poor customers receive 
small loans (Schreiner, 2002).  
 
Independent Variables  
We used the following four measures of board composition. First, we measured board 
independence as the proportion of outsiders on the board, where outside directors are defined 
as those who are not current or past employees and who do not have significant business or 
family ties with the MFI’s management (Adams & Mehran, 2005). We acknowledge that the 
proportion of outsiders does not equate to true board independence. However, similar to 
Combs et al (2007), we argue that an outsider-dominated board will be more independent that 
an insider-dominated board because outsiders do not have an employment relationship with 
the MFI. Our measure of the independence of the board members is in line with other 
previous studies (e.g. Wagner III, Stimpert, & Fubara, 1998). Second, we used the proportion 
of board members who originate from a country other than the country where the MFI is 
located to measure the extent to which the board is international (Mersland et al, 2011). 
Third, board gender diversity was measured as the proportion of board members who are 
female (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Finally, board membership by founders was measured as 
the proportion of board members who are among the original founders of the MFI.* We also 
had a founder-age interaction variable which represents the life cycle effects as shown in 
hypothesis 4c.  
 
Control Variables 
We included a number of control variables that, according to previous empirical literature, 
may be correlated with the outreach performance of MFIs (Mersland et al, 2011; Strøm et al, 
2010). First, we used board size, which is measured as the logarithm of the number of people 
sitting on the board. Larger boards may provide a wider range of skills and experience, which 
                                                 
*
 It should be noted that, as a robustness check, we explored the possibility of a concave relationship (quadratic 
terms) for all independent variables. However, we did not find any significant evidence in favour of such a 
prediction.  
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may contribute positively to higher outreach. On the other hand, larger boards may experience 
more difficulties making decisions due to problems with communication and/or different 
viewpoints, leading to lower outreach. We also included MFI age, which was measured as 
the number of years since the organization started its operations. Older MFIs may have 
developed more experience in reaching the poor, suggesting a positive correlation between 
outreach and the age of an MFI.  
Next, we controlled for the MFI’s financial performance using operating self-
sustainability, measured as the ratio of revenue from operations to all expenses, and return 
on assets, measured as the ratio of net operating income to average annual assets. Several 
studies have argued that, because focusing on outreach can be costly, financial performance 
and outreach are negatively correlated, that is, there is a trade-off between financial and social 
performance (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, & Morduch, 2007; Hermes & Lensink, 2011). Others, 
however, have claimed that financial and social performance are complementary, suggesting a 
positive correlation between the two (Gonzalez & Rosenberg, 2006). We included a dummy 
variable indicating the MFI type, which took the value one if the MFI is operating on a for-
profit basis, and zero otherwise. Controlling for MFI type is important since for-profit MFIs 
are generally assumed to have a weaker outreach than non-profit ones (NGOs). Finally, we 
included country and time variables to capture variations in the economic development of the 
three countries and in social outcomes over time. 
A common challenge in corporate governance research is the issue of possible reverse 
causality. The methodological concern here was the possibility of an omitted unobservable 
variable that would affect both our independent and dependent variables (Larcker & Rusticus, 
2010). The literature further shows that many of the variables of interest in corporate 
governance investigations are not truly exogenous, that is they are determined completely 
outside the model systems but are endogenous (Carter et al, 2010; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2003).However, we believe that controlling for financial performance variables, as we did in 
this study, helps to reduce endogeneity problems. 
 
4.3 Regression Methodology 
Given that we had three different measures of outreach performance, we decided to use the 
system regression method, which allowed us to jointly estimate the equations for the different 
measures. We argue that a joint estimation is theoretically more correct since the social 
performance of an MFI is multidimensional (i.e. it may include various measures of the depth 
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and breadth of outreach). By using the system regression method we were able to capture the 
joint effect of the various outreach measures, taking into account the potential 
interdependency between them. We used panel data estimation, using data for six years, and 
applied the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) methodology (Greene, 2008). We also 
performed a Breusch-Pagan test to check the extent to which the residuals in the SUR 
regression were independent. 
 
 
5.0 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 3 gives the summary statistics for the variables used in this study. In terms of the 
dependent variables, first, we found that the average number of customers served by each 
MFI in the region is almost 36,000, of whom 63 percent are women. This indicates that the 
MFIs in the region concentrate on serving female customers. Second, the average loan size 
per customer is 348 US dollars. Both the high ratio of female borrowers and the relatively low 
average loan size reflect the fact that the MFIs in our sample are focused on serving the poor.  
With respect to our board composition variables, Table 2 reveals that 36 percent of all 
board members are independent. Moreover, we calculated to what extent the boards can be 
categorized as highly independent. We defined a board as being highly independent if more 
than 50 percent of its members are classed as independent. In our sample, this is the case of  
27 percent of the boards. These figures suggest that the MFIs are generally dominated by 
insiders. 
International board members make up 21 percent of all board members. Additionally, 20 
percent of the boards can be defined as highly international, i.e. comprising more than 50 
percent of international members. These figures indicate that the international board members 
in our dataset are concentrated in a minority of the boards in the sample. Moreover, when 
comparing these figures to those from other studies, it seems that East African MFI boards are 
relatively less international than the boards of MFIs in other regions. Mersland et al (2011), 
using a worldwide sample of MFIs, found that on average 55 percent of board members can 
be classed as international.  
The boards in our sample do not show a high degree of gender diversity as only 24 percent 
of all members are female. Moreover, only 13 percent of all boards have a high proportion 
(more than half) of female board members. Given the high proportion of female borrowers, 
these numbers could be considered rather low. 
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Finally, founding board members represent 33 percent of our sample, as 19 percent of all 
boards can be classed as founder dominated, that is, more than half of their board members 
are among the original founders of the MFI.  
The average number of board members on the boards in our sample is seven. The average 
age of the MFIs is nine years, which can be considered young. In terms of MFI types, for-
profit MFIs represent 38 percent of the sample, indicating that most MFIs in this region are 
working on a not-for-profit basis. In terms of financial performance, the MFIs in this region 
are able to cover their costs, as operating self-sustainability is on average above 100%. 
However, they are not profitable since the average return on assets is negative (-1%). Finally, 
34 percent of the MFIs are located in Kenya, 30 percent in Uganda, and the remaining 26 
percent in Tanzania. 
Table 4 presents the correlation between the variables used in the empirical analysis. The 
correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables are somewhat high, but are below 
the critical level of 0.8 (Kennedy, 2008). Moreover, the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
analyses run among all the independent variables (i.e. board composition and control 
variables), produced values ranging from 1.1 to 2.3, indicating low levels of multicollinearity. 
Also, in the econometric analysis, we ran regressions with a few variables at a time (Strøm et 
al, 2010. In addition, since panel data estimation provides more data points, the 
multicollinearity problem here was reduced even further (Wooldridge, 2006). 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations 
(firm-years) 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent Variables      
Number of customers 220 35742.3 74917.93 10 715969 
Ln number of customers 220 9.474 1.562 3.135 13.481 
Female customers – proportion 184 0.633 0.221 0.101 1.000 
Average loan 207 348.319 353.949 9.000 2158 
Ln average loan 207 5.426 0.982 2.197 7.676 
 
     
Composition Variables      
Independent board – ratio 331 0.364 0.253 0.000 1.000 
Independent board – high 331 0.276 0.448 0.000 1.000 
International board – ratio 331 0.216 0.298 0.000 1.000 
International board – high 331 0.202 0.409 0.000 1.000 
Gender diversity – ratio 326 0.246 0.226 0.000 1.000 
Gender diversity – high 326 0.134 0.341 0.000 1.000 
Founder board members – ratio 331 0.335 0.235 0.000 1.000 
Founder board members-high 343 0.198 0.399 0.000 1.000 
Interactive term: Founder - MFI age 311 2.476 2.234 0.000 11.000 
 
     
Control Variables      
Number of board members 331 7.184 2.237 2.000 14 
Board size (ln) 331 1.916 0.354 0.693 2.639 
MFI age 311 9.697 6.960 0.000 31.000 
Operating self-sustainability 256 104.355 42.412 6.421 521.871 
Return on assets 228 -0.016 0.130 -0.851 0.599 
MFI type  328 0.387 0.488 0.000 1.000 
Kenya 343 0.344 0.476 0.000 1.000 
Uganda 343 0.300 0.459 0.000 1.000 
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Table 4: Correlation Analysis 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12       13 
1. Ln number of customers 1.000             
2. Female customers – proportion 0.145 1.000            
3. Ln average loan 0.268** -0.321** 1.000           
4. Independent board -0.115 0.020 -0.174** 1.000          
5. International board 0.205* 0.139 0.168* -0.412** 1.000         
6. Gender diversity 0.098 0.290** 0.124 0.334** -0.292** 1.000        
7. Founder board members  -0.333** 0.084 -0.203** -0.485** -0.034 -0.056 1.000       
8. Board size 0.368** -0.171 0.477** 0.397** 0.067 0.163* -0.549** 1.000      
9. MFI age 0.549** -0.025 0.367** 0.325** -0.101 0.369** -0.444** 0.487** 1.000     
10. MFI type 0.249** -0.281** 0.331** 0.094 0.068 -0.027 -0.342** 0.354** 0.454** 1.000    
11. Operating self- sustainability 0.095 -0.168** 0.177* -0.052 -0.200** 0.017 -0.088 -0.044 0.155* 0.110 1.000   
12. Return on assets 0.093 -0.110 0.088 -0.025 -0.233*** -0.009 -0.048 -0.065 0.137* -0.156* 0.757* 1.000  
13. Kenya 0.133* -0.096 0.001 0.127 -0.186** 0.071 -0.016 0.031 0.199** -0.082 0.028 0-073 1.000 
14. Uganda -0.156* -0.157* 0.159* -0.006 0.083 -0.043 0.046 -0.025 -0.010 0.102 -0.029 -0.474 0.471 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
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In Table 5, Panel A, we present the results of a simple t-test analysis comparing the outreach 
performance of MFIs with high versus low board independence (where high independence is 
where more than half of the board members are independent). The results show that MFIs 
with highly independent boards serve significantly larger numbers of female borrowers and 
have significantly smaller average loans than MFIs whose boards are less independent. Both 
of these results suggest that more independent boards perform better in terms of outreach.  
Panel B shows the results of the t-test comparing the outreach performance of MFIs with a 
high versus a low proportion of international board members, where high is again defined as 
more than half of the members being international. These results indicate that MFIs with a 
high proportion of international board members lend significantly more to women, suggesting 
better outreach performance. This finding is in line with Mersland et al (2011).  
The results in Panel C of the table reveal that MFIs with a high proportion (more than half) 
of female board members also perform significantly better in terms of lending to women. This 
result corroborates previous findings by Mersland and Strøm (2009). Moreover, we also find 
that MFIs whose boards are dominated by women also have more clients.   
When we analyze the difference in outreach performance of MFIs with a high versus a low 
proportion of founding board members (again the cut-off point is 50 percent), we find no 
significant differences between the two groups with respect to our three measures of outreach 
performance. This suggests that dominance of the board by founding members is not 
correlated with better outreach performance. 
Summarizing the results of the simple t-test analysis, we find some evidence to support 
three of the four hypotheses (i.e. those relating to board independence, having an international 
board and board gender diversity) regarding the relationship between MFI board composition 
and outreach performance.  
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Table 5:  Performance Differences between Board Members 
 Panel A: Independent board - proportion Panel B: International board - 
proportion 
 High Low Diff  High Low Diff 
Outreach Performance       
Number of Customers 28894 37915 9021 31685 36814 5129 
Female Customers 0.692 0.620 0.07** 0.703 0.614 0.088** 
Average Loan 246.614 375.772 129.15** 296.152 363.222 67.070 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Board gender diversity – 
proportion 
Panel D: Founding board members - 
proportion 
 High Low Diff High Low Diff 
Outreach performance       
Number of Customers 43706 34628 9078** 17009 38362 21353 
Female Customers 0.822 0.601 0.221* 0.679 0.624 0.054 
Average Loan 357.888 346.882 11.006 
 
 
296.963 356.021 59.058 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
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6.0 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
As explained above, we performed SUR estimations to capture the joint effect on the various 
outreach measures, taking into account their potential interdependence*. The results of the 
estimations for our three outreach variables are presented in Table 6. We performed the 
Breusch-Pagan test, which is a test of the extent to which the residuals in the SUR regression 
are independent. The chi-squared test was highly significant, implying that we had to reject 
the hypothesis that the residuals of the variables are independent. This result confirms that it 
is statistically more correct to jointly run multiple social performance indicators.  
 The results in Table 6 reveal the following. First, we find a positive and a statistically 
significant association between the proportion of independent board members and our three 
measures of outreach performance. In particular, the outcome supports the notion that 
independent board members help MFIs to serve a larger number of customers (i.e. greater 
breadth of outreach) and encourage them to focus more on lending smaller amounts to their 
clients (i.e. greater depth of outreach). Thus, in support of our hypothesis 1, the results 
indicate that there is a positive relationship between board independence and the breadth and 
depth of an MFI’s outreach performance. This suggests that independent board members are 
more likely to have the incentive and ability to help MFIs achieve their social mission of 
reducing desperate poverty.  
Second, Table 6 shows that the proportion of international board members is positively and 
significantly associated with two of the three measures of outreach performance. More 
specifically, the table reveals that a higher proportion of international board members is 
correlated with a larger number of customers and with a higher proportion of female 
customers. This supports hypothesis 2, that there is a positive relationship between the degree 
to which the board of the MFI is international and the breadth and depth of outreach 
performance. It suggests that MFIs with international board members benefit from their 
superior monitoring ability and their better access to valuable resources, leading to better 
outreach performance. These results are in line with those of recent studies highlighting the 
positive impact of international initiators, donors, debt and networks on the outreach 
performance of MFIs (Mersland et al, 2011).  
 
                                                 
*
 Although our analysis is aimed at investigating the link between the board composition of MFIs and outreach, 
we also ran a number of robustness checks, including looking at the effects on the financial performance of the 
MFIs. These results are available on request.   
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Table 6: SUR Model – Joint Estimation of Measures of Outreach Performance 
Variable Ln number of 
customers 
Proportion of 
female customers 
Ln average loan 
Independent board 1.468* 0.156* -2.101*** 
International board 0.889** 0.332*** -0.210 
Gender-diverse board -0.544 0.381*** 0.914** 
Founder board members -0.057 -0.082 -0.374 
 
Control variables 
   
Board size 0.142 -0.224*** 1.604*** 
MFI age 0.131*** 0.002 -0.008 
MFI type 0.123 -0.131** -0.332** 
Operating self-sustainability -0.497 -0.017 0.409** 
Return on assets 2.019** 0.085 -0.326 
Kenya 0.308 -0.109** 0.487*** 
Uganda -0.635** -0.170*** 0.695*** 
 
Year dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Obs. 148 148 148 
R2 0.468 0.447 0.685 
Chi2 130.04 119.84 321.27 
Pr 0.000 0.000 0.000 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Third, our research provides evidence to support our hypothesis that board gender diversity is 
associated positively and significantly with outreach performance. The table shows a positive 
relationship between board gender diversity and the proportion of female customers, and a 
negative relationship between gender diversity and the size of loans, in both cases lending 
support to the notion that a higher proportion of female board members increases the depth of 
outreach.* Thus, we extend the results of Strøm et al (2010), which indicated a positive 
influence of female board members on MFIs’ financial and outreach performance. As 
mentioned earlier, this result may be explained by the fact that female board members have 
unique competencies and knowledge with respect to the specific needs of female customers 
(Mersland & Strøm, 2009).  
Finally, we find no support for hypothesis 4a or 4b, that is, our results do not reveal any 
association between the proportion of founding board members and outreach performance. 
One possible explanation for this outcome may be that the presence of a founder on a board is 
beneficial only during the MFI’s early stages of growth. Having more founding board 
members initially may lead to better monitoring and provide access to valuable resources but 
their ability to improve governance structures may diminish over time. We captured this 
possibility in hypothesis 4c. This hypothesis states that a higher share of founding board 
members is positively associated with social performance but that positive association 
diminishes over the MFI’s life-cycle. Stated differently, this hypothesis states that the 
marginal positive effect of founding members on social performance diminishes as the MFI 
gets older. We analyzed this by interacting the founding board member variable with the MFI 
age variable. We expected the founding member variable to have a positive coefficient, but 
the interactive term to have a negative one. The results are presented in Table 7. They reveal 
some support for hypothesis 4c, at least in the case of the number of customers (i.e. breadth of 
outreach). Thus, while founding board members may initially lead to better monitoring and 
provide access to valuable resources and thus to better social performance, their ability to 
facilitate these board roles diminishes over time, which is in line with the findings from the 
entrepreneurship literature. Comparing the results in the two tables reveals that including the 
interactive term does not change the outcomes for the other board variables. 
 
 
                                                 
*
 We also tested for the existence of a non-linear relationship between board gender diversity and outreach 
performance. However, we found no statistical evidence of the existence of such a relationship. 
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Table 7: SUR Model – Outreach Performance including Founder-Age Interactive Term 
Variable Ln number of 
customers 
Proportion of 
female customers 
Ln average loan 
Independent board 2.037** 0.119 -2.155*** 
International board 1.340** 0.349*** -0.186 
Gender-diverse board -0.061 0.413*** 0.961*** 
Founder members 2.794** 0.105 -0.100 
Founder - MFI age -0.335*** -0.022* -0.032 
 
Control variables 
   
Board size 0.469 -0.203*** 1.635*** 
MFI age 0.223*** 0.008* 0.001 
MFI type 0.358 0.146*** -0.310 
Operating self-sustainability -0.424 -0.012 0.416** 
Return on assets 1.886* 0.076 -0.339 
Kenya 0.119 -0.122*** 0.469*** 
Uganda -0.701* -0.174*** 0.689*** 
 
Year dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Obs. 148 148 148 
R2 0.533 0.459 0.686 
Chi2 167.32 125.73 323.50 
Pr 0.000 0.000 0.000 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
 
Our empirical results in Tables 6 and 7 also show that some of the control variables are 
significantly associated with the outreach performance of MFIs. In line with past research, our 
findings suggest that large boards are negatively associated with MFI performance (Mersland 
et al, 2011; Yermack, 1996). Specifically, we found that large boards are negatively 
associated with a focus on female customers and positively associated with average loan size. 
We also found that older MFIs have a greater breadth and depth of outreach as MFI age is 
positively and significantly associated with the number of customers and the percentage of 
female customers served. The relationship between legal status and outreach is not very 
strong; the only evidence we found was that non-profit MFIs seem to have a higher 
proportion of female borrowers. The idea that for-profit MFIs would be less concerned about 
the social mission appears intuitive. The fact that we did not find strong evidence of this 
suggests that the social mission is important throughout the industry, regardless of the legal 
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status of the MFI. Operating self-sustainability and return on assets are only significantly 
related to one each of the three outreach measures, namely average loan size and number of 
customers, respectively. Overall, these results do not provide strong evidence for either 
complementarity or substitution between social and financial performance. Finally, the 
country dummies were mostly statistically significant in the three regression models, 
indicating that country differences affect outreach performance.  
 
7.0 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
During recent years, microfinance practitioners have stressed that the governance of MFIs 
should receive more attention because inadequate governance presents one of the most serious 
risks to the industry. This study explored the relationship between MFIs’ board composition – 
as a governance mechanism – and outreach (i.e. social) performance. Combining the agency 
and resource-based theory with information from interviews with MFI board members, we 
suggested that four characteristics of boards may be instrumental in helping MFIs to achieve 
better social performance, namely, the independence of board members, their nationality, their 
gender and whether or not they were among the original founders of the institution.  
 Our multivariate analysis showed the following positive relationships between these 
characteristics and outreach performance: a higher proportion of independent board members 
to number of customers and average loan size; international board members to number of 
customers and proportion of female customers; female board members to female customers 
and average loan size; and founder board members to number of customers. Furthermore, we 
found that the relationship between outreach performance and the proportion of founding 
board members is moderated by the age of the MFI, with the positive impact diminishing over 
time.  
These results suggest that board members with specific attributes may help MFIs to attain 
social objectives. For example, independent board members may have a greater incentive 
ability, international board members may have superior monitoring ability and better access to 
valuable resources, and female board members may have unique competencies and 
knowledge with respect to the specific needs of female customers. Our main conclusion is 
therefore that for MFIs aiming to improve their outreach performance boards and board 
composition do matter.  
Our study makes a contribution in several dimensions. Theoretically, we fill the gap left by 
previous studies by exclusively considering the link between board composition and social 
performance. This is a valuable addition to the existing research on MFIs. Having an 
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understanding of board composition and its role in the achievement of the social objective has 
implications for best practices in the MFI industry. More specifically, studying the influences 
of founders in the context of MFIs is an important aspect due to the youth and entrepreneurial 
nature of the industry. In addition, the East African context – one of the poorest regions in the 
world, with one of the largest markets for microfinance – of this study highlights the potential 
role of MFIs in furthering development and alleviating poverty. No other study has covered 
this region.   
The main policy message of this study is that MFIs should be more careful when selecting 
board members. Enhancing board diversity – typically by adding more independent, 
international and/or female members – should be considered as a way of improving the 
board’s expertise in monitoring management and keeping it on the right track (i.e. focusing on 
social performance). Making the board more diverse might also give a greater understanding 
of poor customers’ needs and provide strong linkages with the providers of resources that are 
important to the MFI’s mission. Our research indicates that founder board members can also 
be of benefit, but that such board membership tends to become less advantageous as the MFI 
gets older.    
This study has several limitations. First, it only considered MFIs in three countries in East 
Africa. We suggest that a similar analysis should be carried out using data from a larger set of 
MFIs from a greater number of countries to test whether the relationship between board 
composition and outreach performance holds in different institutional and country-specific 
contexts. Second, we would suggest analyzing further the role played by founding members 
in influencing outreach performance. It may be that personal characteristics such as 
background, commitment and leadership moderate the relationship between the presence of 
founders on a board and the MFI’s outreach performance. This, however, would require more 
detailed data on board members than we gathered for this study.  
Third, we used rough proxies for outreach performance. Although these measures have 
been used widely in the microfinance literature, future research may benefit from developing 
measures that better measure the poverty of microfinance customers. Finally, future studies 
could focus on analyzing what is really happening in the boardrooms of MFIs, by focusing 
more on board processes such as mutual trust between board members, the existence of 
conflict and the type of conflict management practices used. Such avenues of research will 
help to deepen our knowledge of how the board – as an important governance mechanism – is 
linked to the attainment of MFIs’ social mission.  
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ABSTRACT 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) provide financial services to low-income people. These 
organizations have been increasing – both in number and average size – worldwide. This 
increase calls for these organizations to reconsider their role – particularly in relation to the 
participation of stakeholders on boards. Based on the literature, this paper identifies five types 
of microfinance stakeholders who may sit on boards: customers, employees, creditors, owners 
and donors. The paper explains the different roles played by these MFI stakeholders and 
discusses how they may contribute to the process of making strategic decisions. The general 
literature on boards, strategic decision making and stakeholder theory are used to show how 
the presence of these stakeholders on boards can be both advantageous and disadvantageous 
to MFIs, specifically with regard to strategic decision-making processes. Propositions are put 
forward, the implications are discussed and areas for future research on stakeholders and 
strategic decisions in MFIs are suggested. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) provide financial services to poor customers who in most 
cases have no access to formal financial institutions (Assefa, Hermes, & Meesters, 2012). 
These organizations evolved as a result of the efforts of committed individuals and 
development agencies to reduce poverty by promoting self-employment and entrepreneurship. 
MFIs are currently estimated to serve more than 200 million customers worldwide (Maes & 
Reed, 2012). Over the last decade, they have increased in size and number, and in some 
regions, they have become very competitive (Assefa et al, 2012; Galema, Lensink, & 
Mersland, 2012). As a result, MFIs are being encouraged to include stakeholders on their 
boards of directors (boards) to help build their competitive advantage and ensure their 
survival (McIntosh, Alain, & Elisabeth, 2005; Mori & Mersland, in press).  
Labie and Mersland (2011) additionally contended that future studies should adopt the 
stakeholder approach when studying the boards and governance of MFIs. They suggest that 
paying attention to the primary stakeholders of MFIs may give an accurate understanding of 
what the most influential governance mechanisms might be. Responding to research calls 
from Hartarska and Mersland (2012) and Mersland (2011), this paper discusses from a 
theoretical perspective the involvement of MFI stakeholders on boards and in MFIs’ strategic 
decision making. The specific research question is: how do stakeholders on boards influence 
the process by which MFIs make strategic decisions? 
The paper focuses on strategic decision making because it is one of the roles of the MFI 
board (Dorado & Molz, 2005; Mori & Randøy, 2011). Strategic decision making involves two 
perspectives: content and process (Dimitratos, Petrou, Plakoyiannaki, & Johnson, 2011). The 
content perspective deals with decision outcomes such as growth strategies, while the process 
perspective deals with the process by which strategic decisions are made. More specifically, 
the process perspective, which is the focus of this paper, concentrates on how decision makers 
influence an organization’s strategic position through the strategic decision-making processes 
(SDMPs) they use (Elbanna, 2006). 
This paper looks particularly at stakeholders’ influence on two characteristics of SDMPs: 
information gathering/usefulness and political behaviour (Ketchen, Thomas, & McDaniel, 
1996). Different stakeholders have access to different information so when they sit on MFI 
boards they enable the gathering of relevant information that is useful for decision making. 
However, stakeholders may also have conflicting interests (Spitzeck, Hansen, & Grayson, 
2011) meaning that, as board-members want their own interests to be considered, they may 
bring conflict and political behaviour into SDMPs. 
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Stakeholders on MFI boards can also influence SDMPs through the different expertise, 
experience, backgrounds and perspectives they bring (Hillman, Keim & Luce, 2001). 
Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997 pg 876) asserted that including stakeholders on boards is a 
“formal mechanism that acknowledges the importance of their relationship with and interests 
in the organization”. That is, by including stakeholders on boards and in SDMPs, 
organizations are signaling their commitment to their stakeholders in a visible way. Spitzeck 
and Hansen (2010) further showed that stakeholders’ involvement in SDMPs enables 
organizations to make innovative strategic decisions. This means that, since different 
stakeholders possess different information and have different interests, their inclusion on 
boards may influence SDMPs and the quality of the resulting strategic decisions. 
Past microfinance research has examined the representation of stakeholders on the boards 
of MFIs and their contribution to MFIs’ performance (Hartarska, 2005; Hartarska & 
Mersland, 2012; Mori & Mersland, in press). These studies concluded that stakeholder 
representation on boards matters and affects MFIs’ performance. This paper moves a step 
further and contributes to the literature by showing from a theoretical perspective how 
stakeholder involvement contributes to the characteristics of SDMPs. It applies the 
stakeholder theory and the strategic decision-making literature to map out the involvement of 
local and international stakeholders serving on MFI boards.  
The paper argues that the presence of stakeholders on MFI boards causes SDMPs to be 
characterized simultaneously by information gathering/usefulness and political behaviour. 
Stakeholders are a source of useful information, which benefits MFIs by leading to better 
strategic decisions. However, they also bring costs in terms of conflict, debate and 
disagreements, resulting in poorer decisions. Furthermore, their involvement in SDMPs may 
enable MFIs to face the trade-off inherent in their dual objective (financial self-sufficiency 
and poverty reduction). Stakeholders, like owners, may be motivated to focus only on 
financial sustainability, while donors may focus only on poverty reduction. The discussion 
throughout the paper argues that successful MFIs need to make high-quality strategic 
decisions. In order to reach these decisions, the process should unfold smoothly so that the 
decision makers can act in a timely manner, considering the useful information gathered and 
managing the political behaviour engaged in by the various stakeholder groups.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review of stakeholder 
theory and boards and discusses the stakeholders in MFIs. Section 3 gives an overview of 
SDMPs. Section 4 discusses stakeholders’ involvement in SDMPs, and develops some related 
  
102 
 
propositions. Section 5 presents and discusses the model. Section 6 presents conclusions, 
implications, limitations and suggestions for future research. 
 
2.0 STAKEHOLDER THEORY AND BOARDS 
Stakeholder theory is based on the premise that organizations should be responsible to a range 
of groups in society rather than just their owners (Freeman, 1984). In this way, Freeman 
argued, the organization is envisioned as the centre of a network of stakeholders, a complex 
system through which services, information, influence and other resources are exchanged. 
Stakeholders have been defined in various ways, ranging from the narrow to the broad 
(Mitchell et al, 1997). A broad definition was introduced by Freeman (1984), who referred to 
a stakeholder as any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of 
the organization’s objectives. Mitchell et al (1997) further classified stakeholders according to 
power, legitimacy and urgency. They stated that, in order for organizations to identify and 
work with their stakeholders, they should first categorize them in terms of these three 
dimensions. They also asserted that stakeholders possessing at least two of the three 
dimensions are those to whom organizations are likely to pay the most attention.  
This paper adapts Clarkson’s (1994 pg. 5) definition, which states that the primary 
stakeholders are those who “bear some form of risk as a result of having invested some form 
of capital, human or financial, something of value, in an organization. Examples of these 
stakeholders, Clarkson stated, are owners, investors, employees, customers, suppliers, 
communities and governments. Mitchell et al (1997) called these stakeholders “dominant”, 
stating that they possess legitimacy and power. Spitzeck and Hansen (2010) further argue 
that, in situations where stakeholders are both powerful and legitimate, their influence over 
the organization is assured 
Proponents of the stakeholder theory have further suggested that including stakeholder 
representatives on boards is a way of formally demonstrating the strength of their ties with the 
organization (Mitchell et al, 1997; Hillman et al, 2001). Stakeholders on boards may also 
cause organizations to incorporate stakeholder interests, may assist in providing a variety of 
resources and may improve SDMPs (Spitzeck et al, 2011). On the other hand, stakeholders on 
boards may lead to a conflict of interests (Gijselinckx, 2009). This may impose on boards the 
political task of negotiating and resolving the conflicting interests of different stakeholders in 
order to set policies and make good strategic decisions. This implies that organizations need 
to clearly identify their primary stakeholders in order to minimize conflicts of interest and 
benefit from the presence of those stakeholders on their boards. 
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2.1 Stakeholders in MFIs 
Labie and Mersland (2011) suggested that, in order to know how MFIs are really managed, it 
is necessary to consider their many different stakeholders as this will give a clear idea of 
where true power lies. Various stakeholders play an important role in microfinance due to the 
industry’s diversity. First, a variety of financial institutions are involved in microfinance 
activities, including commercial banks, credit unions, non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), 
and non-profit organizations (Galema et al, 2012). Different types of institutions have 
different stakeholders. For example, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may have 
donors (Galema et al, 2012; Mersland, 2011), credit unions may have customers and 
commercial banks creditors. 
Second, MFIs commonly have two often conflicting objectives: financial self-sufficiency 
and poverty reduction (Hermes, Lensink, & Meesters, 2011). Their mission – to reach the 
poor while simultaneously remaining financially sustainable – implies that there will be 
different stakeholders with varying interests in MFIs’ performance. Lastly, the industry has 
received a lot of international attention, partly due to the United Nations naming 2005 as the 
“Year of Microcredit” and as a result of the Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to the Grameen 
Bank and Mohammad Yunus in 2006 (Labie & Mersland, 2011). Today, thousands of 
international NGOs, politicians and celebrities are getting involved in microfinance and this 
means that the number of stakeholders, including international donors, creditors and owners, 
is increasing. These factors all imply that stakeholders play a dominant role in the life of 
MFIs (Mitchell et al, 1997).  
Hartarska and Mersland (2012) discuss groups of MFI stakeholders who may be on 
boards, including customers, employees, donors and creditors. I borrow these groups and add 
a further group: owners. Also, due to the international nature of the industry, I categorize 
stakeholders as either local or international. Local stakeholders are defined as those who are 
located within the country where the MFI operates and international stakeholders as those 
located elsewhere. I use this categorization to show how the contextual background  of  
stakeholders can vary. Table 1 defines the groups of stakeholders and lists their interests in 
MFIs.  
Having stakeholders on boards might be a source of goodwill towards the MFI, but one 
can also imagine it leading to them extracting resources. As Table 1 shows, stakeholders 
represent a range of interests that could lead MFIs making good or bad strategic decisions. 
Strategic decisions are important for MFIs as they chart the direction the organization will 
  
104 
 
take (Freeman, 1984; Labie & Mersland, 2011). Thus, any groups with the ability to affect 
that direction should be involved in SDMPs. 
 
  
Table 1: Stakeholders on MFI boards 
Category Group Primary interests in the MFI 
 
 
 
Local 
Customers High-quality products and services 
Affordable prices of products and services 
Sustainability of products and services 
 
Employees Financial sustainability 
Good working conditions 
 
Creditors Repayment capacity 
Outreach to poor customers 
 
Owners Outreach to poor customers 
Financial sustainability 
Generating dividends 
 
  
 
 
 
International 
Donors  
 
Outreach to poor customers 
Providing technical assistance  
 
Owners Outreach to poor customers 
Financial sustainability 
Generating dividends 
 
Creditors Repayment capacity 
Outreach to poor customers 
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3.0 STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES (SDMPs) 
SDMPs refer to a set of activities through which strategic problems are identified, interpreted, 
tackled and solved (Elbanna & Child, 2007b). The process has also been described as a 
sequence of behaviours through which decision makers scan the environment to gather data 
about important events and trends (Dimitratos et al, 2011). They then convert this data into 
information using interpretation systems, which they use to make strategic decisions (Ketchen 
et al, 1996). SDMPs can be complex as they involve many conflicting interests. Thus, they 
can take a long time, possibly facing interruptions, delays and disruptions (Ji, 2010). They can 
be shaped by environmental and decision-specific factors and by factors relating to the 
decision makers themselves (Elbanna & Younies, 2008; Hart, 1992).  
The literature shows that SDMPs are multi-dimensional in nature, with most studies 
focusing on selected characteristics (Dimitratos et al, 2011; Elbanna, 2006). Similar to 
Ketchen et al (1996), this study conceptualizes SDMPs in terms of information 
gathering/usage (information), and political behaviour. Information refers to the data that 
decision makers collect and process in making strategic decisions. It has been associated with 
the ability to make comprehensive decisions and to be rational about all aspects of strategic 
decisions (Dean & Sharfamn, 1996; Elbanna & Child, 2007a). Information also enables 
decision makers to be exhaustive or inclusive when making and integrating strategic decisions 
(Frederickson, 1984). Decision makers enter into the process with known objectives, which 
determine the value of the possible consequences of an action. The actors gather appropriate 
information, and develop a set of alternative actions. They then select the optimal alternative 
(Elbanna & Younies, 2008). Collecting and processing information is therefore essential to 
making rational and high-quality decisions. 
Political behaviour refers to the lobbying, disagreements, conflict and bargaining that 
surround SDMPs (Eisenhardt, 1999; Ketchen et al, 1996). This characteristic assumes that 
decisions emerge from a process in which decision makers have different goals, and thus form 
agreements so as to achieve their goals, leading to a situation where the preferences of the 
most powerful prevail (Dean & Sharfamn, 1993; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988). The key 
assumption here is that organizations and boards are coalitions of people with competing 
interests. These people may share some goals but they may also have conflicting interests 
(Elbanna, 2006).  
Past research suggests that a high level of  the political behaviour of the board is 
associated with poor performance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988) because 
politics distracts decision makers from dealing with strategic issues. However, other studies 
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contend that conflicts and disagreement as a result of political behaviour may bring about a 
consensus (Roberto, 2004). Collier, Fishwick, and Floyd, (2004) for example, argued that 
political behaviour is not always bad. When everyone shares a common vision, political 
behaviour may be the only means for creating strategic change. However, when power and 
politics become the dominant basis for strategic decision making, the outcomes are likely to 
be adverse (Collier et al, 2004). 
These two characteristics have been widely discussed in the corporate literature, and have 
been examined in relation to constructs such as strategic decisions and organizational 
performance (see the review by Elbanna, 2006). In addition, studies have focused on 
identifying the effects on SDMPs of individual factors (such as CEOs; Elbanna, 2007), group 
factors (such as top management team; Eisenhardt, 1989) and organizational factors (such as 
management policy; Dimitratos et al, 2011; Elbanna, 2006). These studies have shown that 
various contextual factors contribute to strategic decisions. The present study contributes to 
the topic by looking at stakeholders’ influence on SDMPs, something that has been missing in 
previous studies.  
 
 
4.0 BOARD AND STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT IN SDMPs 
Involvement in strategic decision making is one of the most important governance and 
strategy-related roles of the board (Minichilli, Zattoni, & Zona, 2009; Pugliese et al, 2009). 
Board involvement here refers to the overall level of participation by board members in 
making strategic decisions that affect the long-term performance of an organization (Judge & 
Zeithaml, 1992). The board’s involvement in SDMPs enables it to challenge the CEO, 
improve its execution of strategy, reach high-quality strategic decisions, develop a 
competitive advantage and improve organizational performance (Collier et al, 2004; Pugliese 
et al, 2009).  
For MFIs, the main strategic decisions typically revolve around determining the growth 
strategy in terms of new product development, a change in geographical outreach, the choice 
of top managers, lending policies and interest rates (Lapenu & Pierret, 2005). Labie and 
Mersland (2011) further suggested that MFIs’ governance should not only be based on the 
ability to ensure financial sustainability and regulatory fitness, but also on a clear strategic 
vision and a high level of transparency. It is also emphasized that strategic vision and 
transparency can be well articulated when these organizations include stakeholders on their 
boards and involve them in making strategic decisions (also see Lapenu & Pierret, 2005). 
  
107 
 
Furthermore, in the wake of the global financial crisis, increasing competition and 
international recognition of the microfinance industry, strategic decisions are even more 
important for ensuring MFIs’ survival, strengthening the case for the involvement of 
stakeholders (Galema et al, 2012; Lapenu & Pierret, 2005). 
Several microfinance studies have looked at the relationship between the presence of 
stakeholders on boards and MFI performance. These studies have important implications for 
stakeholders’ involvement in SDMPs. For example, a study by Hartaska (2005) found that 
boards including employee stakeholders had a lower level of performance, while those 
including a high proportion of international donors had higher level of social performance. 
She also found that boards with a high proportion of local, mainly customer, stakeholders had 
better financial performance. Similarly, Hartarska and Mersland (2012) studied which 
governance measures promote efficiency in reaching poor customers. Their results showed 
that MFIs with a large proportion of employees or donors on their boards were less efficient, 
while those with both local and international creditors on their boards were more efficient 
In summary, these studies have shown that microfinance stakeholders sit on boards and 
their presence on them influences MFIs’ performance. Even though these studies looked at 
stakeholders on boards as a governance measure, we know from the literature that boards 
make strategic decisions and therefore, if stakeholders are on boards, they must be involved in 
strategic decision making as well. Since these studies have shown that stakeholders can have 
both a negative and positive effect on MFI performance, this study analyzes how their 
involvement in SDMPs determines the board’s ability to make strategic decisions. The next 
section explains the importance of each type of stakeholder, the reasons why they sit on MFI 
boards and their influence on the two characteristics of SDMPs being studied – information 
gathering/usefulness and political behaviour. The propositions developed are based on the 
assumption that stakeholders are represented on boards and, as a result, are involved in 
making strategic decisions. 
 
4.1 Customers 
Microfinance customers are poor people, most of whom are excluded from the formal 
banking sector. They can be divided into two types: depositors and borrowers. MFIs serve 
their customers in a variety of ways in consideration of their low-wealth status. For example, 
depositing and lending processes are different from those of corporate banks (Abbink, 
Irlenbusch, & Renner, 2006). As a result, it is important for MFIs to involve customer 
representatives in making strategic decisions so that they meet customers’ needs.  
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Recent studies have shown that many MFIs are now embarking on a market-oriented view 
instead of the product view taken in the past (Galema et al, 2012). This is a result of 
competition, customer knowledge, and the organizations’ experience with various products 
and services (Assefa et al, 2012; Bédécarrats, Baur, & Lapenu, 2011). Taking a marketing 
approach means that customers’ needs are put first, making their involvement in SDMPs more 
important as it provides the board with information about what is best for customers in terms 
of types and ways of delivery. This information is key to helping MFIs compete with others 
by making the right strategic decisions.  
When customers invest their time and energy in serving on MFI boards and helping with 
decision making, they will want their personal interests to be considered. Mori and Mersland 
(in press) showed that customer representation on boards is positively associated with an 
MFI’s financial performance and negatively with its social performance. They argued that the 
presence of customers on boards leads MFIs to serve better-off customers (by improving their 
financials) and to neglect the desperately poor, going against the mission of MFIs.  
Meanwhile, borrowers and depositors are likely to have conflicting interests concerning  
strategic decisions, such as the choice of interest rates (Lapenu & Pierret, 2005). For example, 
depositors will prefer high interest rates while borrowers will want to see low interest rates. 
The above arguments imply that customer involvement in SDMPs gives them the ability to 
exercise their influence and bring in conflicting interests (Collier et al, 2004). Based on this, I 
propose the following: 
Proposition 1a: The involvement of customers in making strategic decisions is associated 
with the board’s ability to gather and use information. 
Proposition 1b: The involvement of customers in making strategic decisions is associated 
with a high level of political behaviour on boards. 
 
4.2 Employees 
For the MFI to have good outreach and financial sustainability, it must have committed 
employees. The employees of MFIs are generally local, and include middle managers, credit 
officers, cashiers and others. They tend to be highly involved in the MFI, often having contact 
with customers, both in offices and at customers’ sites (Labie, Meon, Mersland, & Szafaraz, 
2011). As a result, employees can offer relevant information to boards concerning how to 
improve their products, service and delivery, possibly offering a better competitive strategy 
(Lapenu & Pierret, 2005). It has also been argued that employees have direct access to 
detailed information concerning organizational activities (Clapham & Cooper, 2005). Their 
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involvement in SDMPs will give them the opportunity to participate in the long-term growth 
of the MFI, giving them a sense of ownership that, in turn, will improve the MFI’s 
performance and its strategic decisions (Kuye & Sulaimon, 2011).  
On the other hand, employee involvement may produce biased information that may 
discriminate against certain customer groups: Labie et al (2011) show that some MFI 
employees are reluctant to interact with certain minorities, such as the disabled. Involving 
these employees in SDMPs could result in conflict and debate, slowing the pace of decision 
making (Roberto, 2004). 
Employees may also give biased information to boards because they fear repercussions 
from their bosses (CEOs), or because it may hamper their relationship with the CEO (Wagner, 
Stimpert, & Fubara, 1998). Moreover, employees will also have their own self-interests they 
will want the board to consider (Hartarska & Mersland, 2012; Labie et al, 2011). Their 
involvement in SDMPs could thus lead to debate and disagreements, particularly over issues 
such as salaries and working conditions. 
Hartarska and Mersland (2012) found that boards with a high proportion of employees on 
them are inefficient. This finding contradicted that of Cerise (2002 as noted in Lapenu & 
Pierret, 2005), who showed that MFIs with employees on their boards and involved in 
SDMPs perform better than those without. These arguments suggest that employee 
involvement has both advantages and disadvantages – bringing in valuable information with 
less political issues but also possibly biased information and more disagreement – which may 
produce a curvilinear relationship with the characteristics of SDMPs. Based on the above, I 
propose the following: 
Proposition 2a: The involvement of employees in strategic decision making has a 
curvilinear relationship with the board’s ability to gather and use information.  
Proposition 2b: The involvement of employees in strategic decision making has a 
curvilinear relationship with the level of political behaviour on the board. 
 
4.3 Creditors 
The relationship between creditors (local and international) and organizations is linked with 
increasing the latter’s access to funding (Dittmann, Maug, & Schneider, 2010; Hilscher & 
Sisli Ciamarra, 2011). Creditors’ involvement in organizational strategic decision making has 
two implications for the loans made to organizations and the exercise of proxy voting rights 
(Agarwal & Elston, 2001), and provides a strong channel of information moving in both 
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directions. One benefit is that, if creditors have access to private information about an 
organization, the latter may benefit from better access to finance.  
Creditors’ involvement in SDMPs may also cause a potential conflict of interests regarding 
financing decisions (Hilscher & Sisli Ciamarra, 2011; Kroszner, 2001). Creditors might 
encourage the management to undertake higher risk projects. Dittmann et al (2010) have 
shown that creditors who participate in strategic decision making favour their own interests. 
There is currently a high level of involvement by local and international creditors in the 
microfinance industry (Mori & Mersland, in press). These creditors are a combination of 
socially oriented and solely business-focused creditors. Socially oriented creditors have a 
social mission in mind and want to see the MFI achieve the social side of its previously 
mentioned dual objective. Some of these creditors may not charge any interest in return for 
lending to the MFI but they will want to get involved in most of the MFI’s activities, 
including making strategic decisions. Business-oriented creditors, on the other hand, act like 
commercial banks; here, the relationship is purely based on business and the MFI’s repayment 
capacity. Such creditors will want the MFI to be financially sustainable so that they will 
recoup their money. These two types of creditors thus have diverging interests and the 
presence of both on a board is likely to lead to debate and disagreement about what the MFI 
should do.  
A study by Olomi, Mori, and Khalid (2012) showed that some MFIs may have a 
relationship with more than four separate creditors, each of which may sit on the board and 
influence strategic decisions. They also showed that creditor influence is one of the causes of 
MFI failure, especially when creditors are highly involved in the MFI’s activities. In contrast, 
Hartarska and Mersland (2012) found that boards including creditor representation lead to 
MFIs that are more efficient at reaching poor customers, which implies that creditors may 
have an important role to play on boards and in SDMPs.  
From these arguments, it seems that creditors can be both beneficial and a curse to SDMPs, 
beneficial in terms of providing information and access to finance and a curse because they 
may use their power and influence to convince MFIs to make decisions in their own interests 
rather than the MFI’s (Dittmann et al, 2010), causing the process to be characterized by 
(overly) political behaviour.  
Proposition 3a: The involvement of creditors in strategic decision making is related to the 
board’s ability to gather and use financial information. 
Proposition 3b: The involvement of creditors in strategic decision making is related to a 
high level of political behaviour on boards. 
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4.4 Owners 
Similar to those of corporate organizations, MFI boards are mostly populated by owner 
representatives who are residual claimants. The microfinance industry has a variety of local 
and international owners. Some are international companies, agencies or NGOs, such as the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) which, through its “Council of Microfinance 
Equity Funds”, provides equity in return for shares or influence (Council of Microfinance 
Equity Funds, 2005; Urgeghe & Mersland, 2011). Other owners include local members of 
society who provide subscriptions in return for MFI shares. These owners can further be 
divided into the classic and mixed type (Labie, 2001; Mersland, 2009). Classic owners are 
profit motivated and their involvement in SDMPs will thus lead to decisions that are profit 
oriented. Mixed owners (or socially responsible owners) consider both profit and the social 
impact. Both types sit on boards to control, advise and bring information that will enable the 
MFI to attain its objectives.  
Having a mixture of classic and mixed owners on boards might be a further source of 
political behaviour in SDMPs. As argued by Elbanna (2006), decision-making board 
members use political tactics to exert influence on the decision-making process to ensure that 
their self-interests are embedded in the outcome. An example of a debate that is typical at 
present among the owners of MFIs is that regarding group versus individual lending. The 
literature has shown that individual lending is associated with serving less poor customers 
while group lending is associated with serving the very poor (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, & 
Morduch, 2011). Making this type of decision could involve a large amount of conflict among 
owners given their different interests. Therefore, owner involvement in SDMPs could bring in 
not only good advice, funding and information, but also increased political behaviour: 
Proposition 4a: The involvement of owners in the strategic decision-making process is 
related to the board’s ability to gather and use a variety of information. 
Proposition 4b: The involvement of owners in making strategic decisions is related to a 
high level of political behaviour on the board. 
 
4.5 Donors 
International donors and technical assistance providers (TAPs) are supporters and funders 
who speed up the evolution and success of MFIs. They specialize in giving funds, measuring 
progress, and spreading good practice (Schreiner, 2000). Their role in SDMPs is important 
because they contribute to the MFI’s ability to achieve its dual objective (Mersland, 2011). 
Donor involvement is also a way for them to control the use of the funding they provide and 
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to influence their relationship with MFIs (Mori & Mersland, in press). They also bring 
international expertise, information about funding opportunities and different cultural aspects 
that can be fruitful for MFIs (Mersland, Randøy, and Strøm 2011).Mersland, et al (2011) 
further showed that MFIs with international donors have better social performance. However, 
Hartarska and Mersland (2012) found that boards with a higher proportion of donors are less 
efficient.  
Most international donors have a social mindset regarding MFIs, that is, their support is 
offered to further the achievement of social objectives. As a result, their involvement in 
SDMPs may result in less conflict as they will have a similar mission to the MFI’s 
management. Thus, this paper argues that donor involvement in SDMPs is associated with the 
board’s ability to gather relevant information regarding funding, to provide advice based on 
the international exposure of the donors, and to do so with fewer conflicts:  
Proposition 5a: The involvement of donors in the strategic decision-making process is 
related to the board’s ability to gather and use information. 
Proposition 5b: The involvement of donors in the strategic decision-making process is 
related to a low level of political behaviour on boards. 
Table 2 summarizes the above discussion, showing how the various stakeholders influence 
the two aspects of SDMPs, information gathering/usefulness and political behaviour. 
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Table 2: Stakeholders and their influence on SDMP characteristics 
Stakeholder  Information gathering/usefulness  Political behavior 
Customers -Information about customers’ 
(depositors and borrowers) needs.  
-Information that assists with product 
design strategies and customer-related 
strategies. 
-Self-interested; not focused on the 
MFI’s mission. 
-Self-interested; focused on their 
own future relationship with the 
MFI. 
-Depositors argue for high interest 
rates, borrowers for low interest 
rates. 
Employees -Specific information on customers, 
needs and products/services that suit 
the market. 
-Internal-specific knowledge and 
information reducing reliance on the 
CEO. 
-Discrimination against minority 
customers. 
-May protect the CEO due to 
concern over their jobs. 
-May push for higher salaries and 
better working conditions. 
-Financial sustainability. 
Creditors -Advise on financial matters. 
-Bring information and resources 
regarding sources of finance. 
-Socially-oriented creditors focus 
on the social mission while 
business-oriented creditors focus on 
financial sustainability.- 
  -Focus on projects that benefit 
them. 
Owners Information necessary for the 
monitoring of their funds. 
 
Advising management on MFI 
objectives. 
Socially responsible owners focus 
on the social mission while classic 
owners focus on financial 
sustainability. 
Donors -Information about funding 
opportunities. 
-Provide assistance such as training and 
mentoring. 
-Information based on international 
exposure. 
-Focus on the social mission. 
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5.0 THE MODEL 
As the previous section showed, different stakeholders on boards influence information 
gathering/usefulness and political behaviour that characterize SDMPs in different ways. 
Elbanna and Younies (2008) showed that decision makers can be rational in terms of 
gathering and utilizing information while simultaneously behaving politically with regard to 
conflicts of interest and disagreements. Figure 1 represents the model derived from the 
previous section, which is divided into three parts: (i) inputs (local and international 
stakeholders on boards), (ii) the process (SDMP characteristics) and (iii) outputs (strategic 
decisions).  
 
 
Figure 1: Stakeholders and Their Involvement in Strategic Decisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Inputs 
Grönroos and Ojasalo (2004) referred to inputs as various stakeholders and their involvement 
in the processes that result in outputs. They further asserted that the interactions that are 
created by these inputs influence the efficiency of the decision-making process and its 
outcomes. Here, the five MFI stakeholder groups who sit on boards are the inputs to the 
process of making strategic decisions. Their actions and ideas are incorporated into the MFIs’ 
SDMPs. 
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5.2 Process 
The information that is gathered and acted upon is the basis for rationality as regards SDMPs 
(Elbanna, 2006). Rationality occurs when the decision makers (stakeholders in this case) 
gather useful information and act upon it to make strategic decisions (Chaserant, 2003). The 
propositions above argued that stakeholders are a source of a variety of useful information to 
be gathered and interpreted so as to make decisions. In addition, when stakeholders are 
involved as decision makers, they are in a position to enter into the decision-making process 
with known objectives. These objectives are likely to be used to determine the possible 
consequences of an output and to develop a set of alternative outputs from which the best will 
be selected (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The above figure and the propositions also suggest that stakeholders on boards are a 
source of political behaviour due to conflicting interests. Political behaviour occurs because 
stakeholders, as decision makers, have different amounts of power and different self-interests. 
Boards containing various types of stakeholders are likely to experience a high level of 
political behaviour since each member represents different interests and people. However, the 
literature indicates that these conflicts are minimized when efforts are made to ensure that the 
members have the same vision, approach and goals.  Following Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 
(1992), political behaviour will arise in SDMPs as long as there are many individuals 
involved with different interests. If this behaviour is not managed, it may result in poor 
decisions being made.  
 
5.3 Outputs 
The outputs of SDMPs are decisions, which in the context of microfinance, could concern 
product development, growth strategies such as reaching out to new markets, financing 
strategies and the setting of interest rates (Lapenu & Pierret, 2005). Stakeholder involvement 
in SDMPs may result in a shared vision among all the board members involved, which can be 
important in ensuring MFI survival. 
This model has various limitations. First, it is important to consider that a board can at any 
point be dominated by just one or a few of these stakeholder groups. For example, if it is 
dominated by customers, the SDMPs will be angled towards their interests, and most of the 
information gathered will be what customers can access. The strategic decisions may be 
geared towards serving the better-off customers, and financial sustainability (Mori & 
Mersland, in press). Meanwhile, if the board is dominated by employees, decisions may lean 
  
116 
 
towards higher salaries, which may lead to the charging of higher lending rates (Labie et al, 
2011). Funders such as creditors, donors or owners also have different and conflicting 
interests. Donors may encourage a social mission, owners financial sustainability. As a result, 
it is important that MFIs consider the conflicting interests of their stakeholders and assess the 
damage that could occur if the process is dominated by any one of these groups. 
Secondly, the model does not consider the timing in which strategic decisions are made 
and when is the most appropriate time to involve stakeholders. Eisenhardt (1989) argued that 
strategic decision making is different at different times. She provided evidence that, when 
organizations are faced with high competition and uncertainty about the future, they tend to 
gather more information from various sources and use it quickly to make strategic decisions. 
This implies that MFIs should take the timing of decisions into account when they involve 
stakeholders. It may be that when they are facing uncertainty, such as during the current 
financial crisis, certain groups of stakeholders need to be involved.  
This model helps to show that the involvement of diverse stakeholders on boards and in 
making strategic decisions is crucial for MFIs. Their role can ensure that strategic decisions 
are made that are in line with the mission of the MFI and that consider all stakeholders’ 
varying interests. The above model serves as a theory-based framework that will be useful for 
developing a more comprehensive understanding of the microfinance stakeholders who sit on 
MFI boards and their role in strategic decision making. 
 
 
6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The purpose of this paper was to identify stakeholder representation on the boards of MFIs, 
and discuss their role and involvement in the strategic decision-making processes. The 
literature review revealed that stakeholders can provide MFIs with both benefits, in terms of 
information gathering/usefulness, and costs, in terms of political behaviour. Overall, their 
inclusion on boards can increase MFIs’ ability to survive in the industry. Several studies have 
indicated that competition is a major driver of the performance of MFIs and should be 
encouraged in order to lower interest rates resulting in better outreach to the poor (Assefa et 
al, 2012; McIntosh et al, 2005). To be able to compete in the industry, MFIs need to operate 
strategically and one way of achieving this is to build closer relationships with stakeholders 
by appointing them to boards and involving them in strategic decision making. The 
discussions in this paper serve as a good basis for further research in this direction. The 
implications are discussed below. 
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6.1 Theoretical Implications 
This paper contributes on a theoretical basis to stakeholder theory and the strategic decision-
making literature. In terms of stakeholder theory, it responds to a call by (Laplume, Karan, 
and Litz, (2008), who suggested that the stakeholder theory should be used to study contexts 
other than large corporations in the developed world. This paper applies the theory to the 
context of the microfinance industry, which is unique in various ways. First, it is a young and 
entrepreneurial industry that focuses on providing finance to the poor (Hermes et al, 2011). 
Second, it has received a large amount of international attention since 2005, which the United 
Nations named the “Year of Microcredit” (Labie & Mersland, 2011). Third, there are a variety 
of organizational forms that offer microfinance services, such as NGOs, banks and 
cooperatives (Galema et al, 2012). As a result, the industry incorporates various stakeholders. 
This paper incorporated the unique characteristics of the microfinance industry into the 
arguments of the stakeholder theory in order to identify these stakeholders, and discussed the 
benefits and costs of their involvement on boards and in SDMPs.  
Most of the strategic decision-making literature looks at the content of strategic decisions, 
with less attention having been paid to the process side (Ji, 2010). However, Elbanna (2006) 
contended that the two perspectives are complementary rather than alternatives and that 
content research can significantly influence the direction of process research and vice versa. 
This paper contributes to process research by looking at two characteristics of SDMPs: 
information gathering/usefulness and political behaviour. The paper specifically argued that 
microfinance stakeholders provide unique information and it discussed the benefits of this 
information for making decisions. The paper further indicated how the conflicting interests of 
stakeholders can be a source of political behaviour in relation to SDMPs and how this can 
harm strategic decision making. To the author’s knowledge, this study is among the first to 
provide a theoretical framework of how stakeholder involvement affects SDMPs in MFIs. 
Past studies have focused mainly on top management (Eisenhardt, 1989; Elbanna, 2007) and 
employees (Kuye & Sulaimon, 2011) in large for-profit organizations 
 
6.2 Practical Implications 
In view of the current global financial crisis, it is important that MFIs start to consider the 
interests of various stakeholders in their activities, as it could be crucial for their survival. 
Holmes and Moir (2007) noted that stakeholders are a source of innovation and competitive 
advantage. Therefore, MFIs need first to identify their primary stakeholders, then work with 
them so as to benefit from their expertise.  
  
118 
 
One of the roles of MFI boards is to make strategic decisions that enable them to compete 
and succeed (Mori & Randøy, 2011). Appointing stakeholders to these boards involves them 
in making strategic decisions, a process that is important to the organization’s ability to 
perform and survive (Ji, 2010). This paper has argued that the relationship with stakeholders 
will open the door for better strategic outcomes, such as new products that match demand, or 
new ways of providing services, because of the relevant information these stakeholders will 
provide. Since stakeholders have intrinsic value, this paper claims that their involvement will 
aid MFIs’ long-term survival by enabling them to make unique strategic decisions. 
Despite the advantages, MFIs should also be aware that there are costs and risks 
associated with having stakeholders on their boards. They may be involved in rent-seeking 
behaviour by trying to meet their own objectives instead of the MFI’s and thus complicate 
SDMPs. Through political behaviour, they may also contribute to the conflict between the 
dual objective of MFIs. For example, owner or employee board members may want MFIs to 
serve wealthier customers so that they will receive higher returns or salaries/bonuses.  
 
6.3 Limitations and Further Research 
This paper has a few limitations. First, it discussed the influence of individual stakeholder 
groups on board decisions. It did not consider the interactions between different stakeholders. 
Future research should explore such effects on SDMPs. Second, the paper lacked empirical 
evidence regarding the extent to which stakeholders do in fact influence SDMPs. It did, 
however, develop propositions that could be used as a basis for future empirical studies. The 
research question of such studies could be: To what extent does each of these stakeholders 
influence the strategic decision making of an MFI and does stakeholder involvement affect 
the outcome of MFIs’ strategic decisions? 
Another area for future studies to explore is stakeholder governance in various contexts. 
MFIs operate in different countries with different institutions. This has implications for the 
capacities and skills of the stakeholders and their resulting influence on MFI boards. 
Furthermore, stakeholders do not influence MFI governance by serving on boards only (Labie 
& Mersland, 2011). It would be interesting to consider the influence of non-board 
stakeholders on the decision making and performance of MFIs. This would contribute further 
to our knowledge of the necessity of stakeholder involvement in MFIs, especially in the light 
of fierce competition, the financial crisis and the withdrawal of donor support. 
 
 
  
119 
 
7.0 REFERENCES 
Abbink, K., Irlenbusch, B., & Renner, E. (2006). Group size and social ties in microfinance 
institutions. Economic Inquiry, 44(4), 614-628. 
Agarwal, R., & Elston, J. A. (2001). Bank-firm relationships, financing and firm performance 
in Germany. Economics Letters, 72(2), 225-232.  
Assefa, E., Hermes, N., & Meesters, A. (2012). Competition and the performance of 
microfinance institutions. SSRN eLibrary. 
Bédécarrats, F., Baur, S., & Lapenu, C. (2011). Combining social and financial performance: 
A paradox? 2011 Global Microcredit Summit. Washington.  
Chaserant, C. (2003). Cooperation, contracts and social networks: From a bounded to a 
procedural rationality approach. Journal of Management and Governance, 7(2), 163-
186.  
Clapham, S., & Cooper, R. (2005). Factors of employees' effective voice in corporate 
governance. Journal of Management and Governance, 9(3-4), 287-313.  
Clarkson, M. (1994).  A risk based model of stakeholder theory. Paper presented at the 
Second Toronto Conference on Stakeholder Theory, Centre for Corporate Social 
Performance and Ethics, University of Toronto. 
Collier, N., Fishwick, F., & Floyd, S. (2004). Managerial Involvement and Perceptions of 
Strategy Process  Long Range Planning, 37(1), 67-83. 
Council of Microfinance Equity Funds. (2005). The practice of corporate governance in 
shareholder-owned microfinance institutions 
Cull, R., Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Morduch, J. (2011). Does regulatory supervision curtail 
microfinance profitability and outreach? World Development, 39(6), 949-965.  
Dean, J. W., & Sharfman, M. P. (1993). The Relationship between Procedural Rationality and 
Political Behavior in Strategic Decision Making. Decision Sciences, 24(6), 1069-1083 
Dean, J. W., & Sharfamn, M. P. (1996). Does decision process matter? A study of strategic 
decision making effectiveness. Academy of Management Journal, 39(2), 368-396.  
Dimitratos, P., Petrou, A., Plakoyiannaki, E., & Johnson, J. E. (2011). Strategic decision-
making processes in internationalization: Does national culture of the focal firm 
matter? Journal of World Business, 46(2), 194-204. 
Dittmann, I., Maug, E., & Schneider, C. (2010). Bankers on the boards of German firms: 
What they do, what they are worth, and why they are (still) there. Review of Finance, 
14(1), 35-71. 
  
120 
 
Dorado, S., & Molz, R. (2005). Co-evolution of boards of directors in microfinance 
organizations: The case of Bancosol and Los Andes. Developmental 
Entrepreneurship, 10(2), 99-121.  
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Making Fast Strategic Decisions in High-Velocity Environments. 
The Academy of Management Journal, 32(3), 543-576. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1999). Strategy as strategic decision making. Sloan Management Review, 
40(3), 65-85.  
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Bourgeois, L. J. (1988). Politics of strategic decision making in high-
velocity environments: Toward a midrange theory. The Academy of Management 
Journal, 31(4), 737-770.  
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Zbaracki, M. (1992). Strategic decision making. Strategic Management 
Journal, 13, 17-37.  
Elbanna, S. (2006). Strategic decision making: Process perspective. International Journal of 
Management review, 8(1), 1-20.  
Elbanna, S. (2007). The nature and practice of strategic planning in Egypt. Strategic Change, 
16(5), 227-243. 
Elbanna, S., & Child, J. (2007a). The Influence of decision, environmental and firm 
characteristics on the rationality of strategic decision-making. Journal of Management 
Studies, 44(4), 561-591.  
Elbanna, S., & Child, J. (2007b). Influences on strategic decision effectiveness: Development 
and test of an integrative model. Strategic Management Journal, 28(4), 431-453.  
Elbanna, S., & Younies, H. (2008). The relationships between the characteristics of the 
strategy process: Evidence from Egypt. Management Decision, 46(4), 626 - 639. 
Frederickson, J. W. (1984). The comprehensiveness of strategic decision processes: 
Extension, observations, future directions. Academy of Management Journal, 27(3), 
445-466. 
Freeman, E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Boston: Pitman. 
Galema, R., Lensink, R., & Mersland, R. (2012). Do Powerful CEOs Determine Microfinance 
Performance? Journal of Management Studies, 49(4), 718-742 
Gijselinckx, C. (2009). Co-operative Stakeholders: Who counts in Co-operatives and how? 
Paper presented at the International Conference on Social Enterprise, Trento, Italy. 
Grönroos, C., & Ojasalo, K. (2004). Service productivity: Towards a conceptualization of the 
transformation of inputs into economic results in services. Journal of Business 
Research, 57(4), 414-423. 
  
121 
 
Harrison, J. S., & Caron, H. S. J. (1996). Managing and Partnering with External 
Stakeholders. The Academy of Management Executive, 10(2), 46-60.  
Hart, S. L. (1992). An Integrative Framework for Strategy-Making Processes. The Academy 
of Management Review, 17(2), 327-351 
Hartarska, V. (2005). Governance and performance of microfinance institutions in central and 
eastern Europe and the newly independent states. World Development, 33(10), 1627-
1643.  
Hartarska, V., & Mersland, R. (2012). Which Governance Mechanisms Promote Efficiency in 
Reaching Poor Clients? Evidence from Rated Microfinance Institutions. European 
Financial Management, 18(2), 218-239 
Hermes, N., Lensink, R., & Meesters, A. (2011). Outreach and efficiency of microfinance 
institutions. World Development, 39(6), 938-948.  
Hillman, A. J., Keim, G. D., & Luce, R. A. (2001). Board composition and stakeholder 
performance: Do stakeholder directors make a difference? Business and Society, 
40(3), 295-314.  
Hilscher, J., & Sisli Ciamarra, E. (2011). Conflicts of interest on corporate boards: The effect 
of creditor-directors on acquisitions. SSRN eLibrary. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.1358465. 
Holmes, S., & Moir, L., (2007),"Developing a conceptual framework to identify corporate 
innovations through engagement with non-profit stakeholders", Corporate 
Governance, 7(4), 414 - 422 
Ji, J. (2010). Strategic decision making process characteristics, Confucian values and their 
effects on international entry mode decisions: A study of Chinese private firms. 
Doctoral dissertation, University of Glasgow.    
Judge, W. Q., Jr., & Zeithaml, C. P. (1992). Institutional and Strategic Choice Perspectives on 
Board Involvement in the Strategic Decision Process. The Academy of Management 
Journal, 35(4), 766-794. 
Ketchen, D. J., Thomas, J. B., & McDaniel, R. R. (1996). Process, content and context: 
Synergistic effects on organizational performance. Journal of Management, 22(2), 
231-257.  
Kroszner, R. (2001). Bankers on boards: Monitoring, conflicts of interest and lender liability. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 62(3), 415-452.  
Kuye, L. O., & Sulaimon, A. A. (2011). Employee involvement in decision making and firms’ 
performance in the manufacturing sector in Nigeria. Serbian Journal of Management, 
6(1), 1-15.  
  
122 
 
Labie, M. (2001). Corporate governance in microfinance organizations: A long and winding 
road. Management Decision, 39(4), 296-310.  
Labie, M., Meon, P.-G., Mersland, R., & Szafaraz, A. (2011). Discrimination by microcredit 
officers: Theory and evidence on disability in Uganda.A working paper, Université 
Libre de Bruxelles. 
Labie, M., & Mersland, R. (2011). Corporate governance challenges in microfinance. In B. A. 
M. Labie (Ed.), Microfinance handbook (pp. 283-300). Singapore: World Scientific 
Publishing Co. Plc. Ltd. 
Lapenu, C., & Pierret, D. (2005). The analysis of the governance for microfinance 
institutions.Working paper by Cerise, GTZ, France. 
Laplume, A., Karan, K., & Litz, R. (2008). Stakeholder Theory: Reviewing a Theory That 
Moves Us. Journal of Management, 34(6), 1152-1189 
Maes, J., & Reed, L. (2012). State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2012. 
Washington DC: The Microcredit Summit Campaign. 
McIntosh, C., Janvry, A., & Sadoulet, E. (2005). How Rising Competition Among 
Microfinance Institutions Affects Incumbent Lenders. The Economic Journal, 
115(506), 987-1004. 
Mersland, R. (2009). The cost of ownership in microfinance organizations. World 
Development, 37(2), 469-478 
Mersland, R. (2011). The governance of non-profit micro finance institutions: Lessons from 
history. Journal of Management and Governance, 15(3), 327-348.  
Mersland, R., Randøy, T., & Strøm, R. Ø. (2011). The impact of international influence on 
microbanks’ performance: A global survey. International Business Review, 20(2), 
163-176.  
Minichilli, A., Zattoni, A., & Zona, F. (2009). Making boards effective: An empirical 
examination of board task performance. British Journal of Management, 20(1), 55-74. 
Mitchell, R., Agle, B., & Wood, D. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and 
salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. Academy of 
Management Review, 22(4), 853-886. 
Mori, N., & Mersland, R. (in press). Boards in microfinance institutions: How do stakeholders 
matter? Journal of Management and Governance, doi: 10.1007/s10997-011-9191-4. 
Mori, N., & Randøy, T. (2011). Determinants of board structure in microfinance institutions: 
Evidence from East Africa. Paper presented at the 2nd European Research Conference 
on Microfinance. University of Groningen, Netherlands 
  
123 
 
Olomi, D., Mori, N., & Khalid, S. (2012). Project review of Sero-Lease Finance Limited. 
Consultancy report. Financial Sector Deepening Trust, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.   
Pugliese, A., Bezemer, P.-J., Zattoni, A., Huse, M., Van den Bosch, F. A. J., & Volberda, H. 
W. (2009). Boards of directors' contribution to strategy: A literature review and 
research agenda. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(3), 292-306.  
Roberto, M. A. (2004). Strategic decision-making processes. Group & Organization 
Management, 29(6), 625-658.  
Schreiner, M. (2000). Ways Donors Can Help the Evolution of Sustainable Microfinance 
Organizations. 23. Retrieved from 
http://microfinance.com/English/Papers/Donors_and_Evolution.pdf website 
Spitzeck, H., & Hansen, E. (2010). Stakeholder governance: How stakeholders influence 
corporate decision making. Corporate Governance, 10(4), 378-391.  
Spitzeck, H., Hansen, E., & Grayson, D. (2011). Joint management-stakeholder committees – 
A new path to stakeholder governance? Corporate Governance, 11(5), 560-568.  
Urgeghe, L., & Mersland, R. (2011). Performance and international investments in 
microfinance institutions. Working paper in In IDEAS (Ed.), Universite Libre de 
Bruxelles.  
Wagner III, J. A., Stimpert, J. L., & Fubara, E. (1998). Board composition and organizational 
performance: Two studies of insider/outsider effects. Journal of Management Studies, 
35(5), 655-677 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
124 
 
 
 
       ESSAY 4 
 
 
 
 
 
   THE BOARDS OF MFIS: HOW DO STAKEHOLDERS MATTER? 
 
  
125 
 
The Boards of MFIs: How Do Stakeholders Matter? 
 
 
 
Neema Mori* 
Roy Mersland† 
 
 
 
Forthcoming in Journal of Management and Governance 
 
 
 
Key words:  
Microfinance; MFIs; stakeholders; board structure; performance 
JEL classification:  
G21, G34 
 
 
Acknowledgments: 
We thank Professor Trond Randøy, Professor Niels Hermes, Dr. Emily Stapleton, participants 
of the 3rd International Workshop on Microfinance Management and Governance, 30-31 
August, 2010 (University of Groningen, the Netherlands), the editor and three anonymous 
referees of journal of management and governance for valuable advice and comments. 
 
                                                 
*
 Kristiansand School of Business: University of Agder; Postboks 422 4604 Kristiansand, Norway and 
University of Dar es Salaam Business School, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Email:neemagm@uia.no 
†
 Kristiansand School of Business: University of Agder; Postboks 422 4604 Kristiansand, Norway. Email: 
roy.mersland@uia.no 
 
  
126 
 
ABSTRACT 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) provide financial services to poor people. Governance of 
these organizations is important so that they can operate efficiently and sustainably. This 
study analyzes the influence of stakeholders (donors, employees, customers, and creditors) on 
board structure (board size and CEO duality) and on organizational performance. We used a 
global data set of 379 microfinance institutions from 73 countries, collected from rating 
organizations. Supported by the stakeholder theory, agency theory and resource dependence 
theory, we found that stakeholders are important and have various influences on MFIs. We 
found that donors are associated with small boards, non-duality and better performance. 
Employees are associated with large boards, while customers are associated with duality and 
good financial performance. Creditors opt for duality and better social performance. 
Implications and areas for future research are discussed. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) provide financial services to poor families and 
microenterprises. Access to microfinance has the potential to help poor people smooth 
consumption, mitigate risks, build assets and improve their income. The building of a self-
sustaining microfinance industry is high on the policy agenda (Cull et al 2009). However, 
most MFIs struggle to keep afloat financially without subsidies. Various policy papers 
indicate the importance of governance to the performance of MFIs (Labie and Mersland 2011; 
Lapenu and Pierret 2005), and industry actors rate “governance” among the most important 
risk factors in the industry (CSFI 2011). However, relatively little is known about the 
empirical relationship between governance structures and MFI performance. This study 
responds to the need for more knowledge on how stakeholders influence board structure and 
the performance of MFIs. In particular, this study responds to Labie and Mersland (2011), 
who argue for a more stakeholder-based approach to determining “who” and “what” really 
count in the governance and performance of MFIs. 
MFIs are private organizations incorporated as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
member-based cooperatives or banks*(Mersland 2009). This means that the stakeholders who 
are represented on boards may vary depending on the type of MFI. In addition, Labie and 
Mersland (2011) suggest that good governance is not only based on the ability to ensure the 
sustainability of the organization, but also on strategic vision and transparency. The authors 
further suggest that this is possible when organizations adopt a stakeholder approach that 
includes the key actors in an organization. Thus, in this study we aim to answer three 
questions: (1) What is the representation of stakeholders across different types of MFIs? (2) 
To what extent do stakeholders affect an MFI’s board structure? (3) What influence do 
stakeholders have on an MFI’s performance? 
Similar to other board members, stakeholders on boards are responsible for monitoring 
and advising managers (Hillman et al 2001). With MFIs’ dual objective of serving the poor 
and becoming sustainable, it is suggested that boards play an important role. We used the 
agency and resource dependence theories (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978) to discuss the role of board members. We also used the stakeholder theory (Freeman 
1984) to identify and discuss four types of stakeholder: donors, employees, customers and 
creditors.  
                                                 
*
 The term bank includes both commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions. 
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Microfinance policy papers provide several recommendations on how boards of MFIs 
should be structured, in particular in terms of size and stakeholder representation (Rock et al 
1998). However, there is little knowledge of which stakeholders are represented, and how and 
where they are represented. Also, few empirical studies have examined the relationship 
between stakeholders in and the performance of MFIs (Hartarska 2005; Hartarska and 
Mersland, 2012).The findings of those few are inconclusive, and this justifies the need for 
more studies on stakeholder analysis. For example, (Hartaska, 2005) found that donors 
positively influence social performance, while  (Hartaska & Mersland, 2009) found that they 
are not beneficial. Furthermore, these studies only examined the relationship between 
stakeholders and performance. We argue that stakeholders may also influence board structure 
(CEO duality and board size). We therefore generally hypothesized that stakeholders on 
boards affect board structure and the performance of MFIs. 
We used data from public sources, containing 379 MFIs from 73 countries, collected 
between 2001 and 2008. We used a mixture of techniques to carry out the analysis. For MFI 
characteristics and board structure variables, we used ordinary least square regressions and 
probit regression. To tackle endogeneity concerns, we used a two-stage least square 
regression with instrumental variables to analyze the association between stakeholders and 
performance. 
 The results show that stakeholders have various influences on both governance and MFI 
performance. We found that donors and employees are better represented in NGOs, creditors 
in banks and customers in cooperatives. We further found that stakeholders are associated 
with larger internationally-initiated MFIs. In terms of board structure, we found that donors 
are associated with small boards and non-duality. Thus, the monitoring aspect seems to be 
important for donors. When donors interact with creditors, they also opt for small boards. 
Furthermore, we obtained evidence that donors and creditors positively affect MFIs’ social 
and financial performance. Employees, as resource providers, are associated with large 
boards, but are not beneficial for MFI performance. We also show that customers are 
associated with duality, lower MFI costs and better financial performance. Similar evidence is 
seen when customers interact with employees.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theory, literature and hypotheses. 
Section 3 presents an overview of the dataset, variables and models. Section 4 presents 
stakeholder demographics, which is followed by a discussion of the board structure results in 
section 5. Section 6 discusses the results relating to stakeholder influence on performance and 
section 7 concludes the paper.  
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2.0 THEORY AND LITERATURE 
2.1 Boards and Performance 
Several studies on corporate governance focus on the relationship between boards and 
organizational performance (Pugliesse and Wenstøp 2007; Johnson et al 1996). Much of the 
focus has been placed on how board composition, size and CEO/Chair duality affect board 
members’ roles and, ultimately, organizational performance (Elsayed, 2011; Larmou and 
Vafeas 2010). An underlying assumption of this research is that boards matter; they have the 
power to affect an organization’s decisions, strategies and performance (Judge and Zeithaml 
1992).  
 The role of boards in executing governance responsibilities has been divided into two 
conceptual categories: monitoring and resource provision (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). The 
monitoring role charges board members with responsibility for representing the interests of 
various stakeholders. Board members are expected to monitor the actions of managers, as 
agents, and ensure that they act accordingly (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Board members’ 
resource provision role involves advising the organization and linking it with key 
constituencies in its external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Because the external 
environment of an organization is beyond its direct control, it experiences uncertainty. The 
presence of board members, who represent critical contingencies, is presumed to provide the 
organization with access to valuable resources (Hillman et al 2009). Members with 
backgrounds or positions representing important external resources may help the organization 
to reduce the transaction costs associated with external interdependencies and enhance 
organizational performance. 
Board structure and composition are considered important factors influencing the 
performance of boards (Lehn et al 2009). Similar to Mersland and Strøm (2009), we 
examined board structure in terms of board size and CEO duality. According to the agency 
theory, large boards are inefficient. They are not good monitors because of the problems that 
can arise from large groups, such as social loafing, free riding and higher coordination costs. 
Jensen, (2010) for example argues that "When boards get beyond seven or eight people, they 
are less likely to function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control". Largeness can 
inhibit a board's ability to initiate strategic actions. Judge and Zeithaml (1992) report that 
larger boards are less likely to become involved in strategic decision making. Yermack (1996) 
demonstrated that small boards are associated with better performance. He concludes that any 
benefits that may be associated with large boards will be overwhelmed by poor decision-
making processes. In contrast, the resource dependence theory suggests that organizations 
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with large boards perform better (Hillman et al 2001; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). From this 
point of view, board size is a measure of an organization's ability to form environmental links 
so as to secure critical resources. With access to different areas of expertise, CEOs get better 
advice from large boards. A larger board may offer an exceptional level of high-quality advice 
to a CEO, leading to better performance.  
CEO duality occurs when one person is both the CEO and the board chair of the 
organization (Rechner and Dalton 1991; McNulty et al 2011). The organizational literature 
supports the idea of duality in terms of power and unity of command (McNulty et al 2011). 
To effectively manage, it is necessary for a decision maker to have clear authority over his/her 
subordinates (Finkelstein and D’aven 1994). CEO duality helps to avoid confusion among 
employees as to who is the boss, which facilitates effective decision making. Non-duality 
creates multiple authority relations that promote role conflict among managers and 
employees. Agency theorists posit that duality can entrench a CEO, leading to failed internal 
control systems, and a board's inability to monitor effectively (Mallette and Fowler 1992). 
Also, CEO duality represents a conflict of interests, in which a CEO who is responsible for 
the strategic management of an organization is also in a position to evaluate the effectiveness 
of that strategy (Finkelstein and D’aven 1994). These arguments suggest that some board 
members will not advocate CEO duality because doing so increases the potential for less 
effective monitoring, which may endanger organizational performance. 
A few studies in the microfinance literature have examined the relationship between board 
structure and MFI performance. Hartarska (2005) investigated the relationship between 
governance and the performance of MFIs in Eastern Europe. Among other governance 
mechanisms, she examined the impact of board size on the MFIs’ performance. Her results 
indicate that MFIs with smaller boards perform better. Mersland and Strøm (2009) examined 
the effect of MFI board size and CEO duality on MFI performance. Contrary to Hartarska 
(2005), they did not find any evidence that performance improves with smaller boards. Nor do 
they find any evidence of the positive effect of CEO duality on performance. The authors 
conclude that it is hard to say whether MFIs are better governed when the CEO is also the 
board chair. 
 
2.2 Board Composition and the presence of Stakeholders on Boards 
When included on boards, it is suggested that stakeholders have a monitoring role and provide 
resources to CEOs and organizations (Hillman et al 2009; Luoma and Goodstein 1999). 
Despite the fact that organizations mainly put stakeholders on boards as a way of showing 
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how important they are, the organizations also benefit (Charreaux and Desbrieres 2001). 
Stakeholders enable organizations to access various resources, including providing links with 
other stakeholders. The stakeholder theory posits that including stakeholder representatives on 
boards is a “formal mechanism that acknowledges the importance of their relationship with 
and interests in the organization” (Mitchell et al 1997). That is, by including stakeholders on 
boards, organizations are signaling their commitment to stakeholders in a visible way 
(Freeman 1984). Since different stakeholders have different interests, their inclusion on 
boards may affect board structure and organizational performance differently.  
Several studies have examined the influence of stakeholders on boards. Luoma and 
Goodstein (1999) studied the relationship between organizational influences and the addition 
of stakeholders to boards in the US. Their results show that regulated and larger organizations 
have more stakeholders on their boards than unregulated and smaller organizations. Their 
study provides important insights into the process by which board plurality is increased 
through the addition of stakeholders. Hartarska (2005) investigated the effects of the inclusion 
on MFI boards of three types of stakeholder - donors, employees and customers - on the 
social and financial performance of MFIs. Her findings show that boards with employees 
result in a lower level of performance, boards with donors have better social performance, and 
those with customer representation have better financial performance. Hartarska and Mersland 
(2012) studied which governance measures promote efficiency in reaching the poor. Their 
results show that MFIs with employees on their boards are less efficient. They also provide 
evidence that the presence of donors on boards is inefficient, while that of creditors is 
beneficial.  
Together, these studies provide evidence that stakeholders are important for boards and 
the performance of MFIs. However, none of these studies examined the relationship between 
stakeholders and board structure (size and duality). Since a few studies found that 
stakeholders affect organizational performance, we argue that this influence may be enacted 
through the effect of stakeholders on board structure. We now develop hypotheses to examine 
the relationship between stakeholders (donors, employees, customers and creditors), on the 
one hand, and board structure and MFI performance, on the other. 
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3.0 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Donors 
Donors are important actors through whom MFIs meet their dual objective. Schreiner (2002) 
argues that donors are like genetic engineers, speeding up the evolution of MFIs. The 
literature further shows that donors are good at providing funds, measuring progress and 
spreading good practice through technical assistance (CGAP, 2004). As funders, donors need 
to monitor managers in order to ensure their funds are spent appropriately (Alonso et al 2009). 
This means they would opt for a board structure that provides room for monitoring, that is, a 
small board and non-duality. In terms of performance, we infer that donors are more 
interested in social performance, since reaching the poor is part of their mission. Hartarska 
(2005) found that the presence of donors on boards improves social performance. Other 
arguments posit that donors fund and assist MFIs, which are likely to be financially 
sustainable (Rosenberg 2009). Furthermore, donors’ objectives are to increase outreach to the 
poor. Thus, we expect to find that donors are associated with small and non-duality boards 
and we expect donors to positively influence MFIs’ financial and social performance.  
 
3.2 Employees 
The corporate literature argues that employees are good at providing inside information to the 
board (Osterloh and Frey 2005). In MFIs, employees, particularly credit officers, are the 
cornerstone of their operations (Mori 2010; Battilana and Dorado 2010). Employees on 
boards may bring relevant information because they are better informed about the issues and 
problems concerning the MFI, sometimes better than the CEOs. However, because of 
employees’ past experience and different interests, they may bring biased information, which 
could mislead the board when making decisions. In addition, the corporate literature suggests 
that employees on boards may not be good monitors of CEOs because they fear their bosses 
(Wagner et al 1998). Employees on boards could also influence whether the CEO is also the 
chair, since working for one boss would simplify their lives (Finkelstein and D’aven 1994). 
Hartarska and Mersland (2012) show evidence of a negative association between MFI boards 
with employees and performance. From these findings, it seems that employees are a good 
source of information for boards but monitor CEOs less closely than other stakeholders. Thus, 
we expect employees to be associated with large duality boards. In terms of their information 
and monitoring roles, we do not hypothesize about their effect on performance.  
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3.3 Customers 
Customers of MFIs are generally poor people with little education. Thus, one may claim that 
their representation on boards may not be influential since they cannot contribute effectively 
to technical discussions. However, microfinance customers know what they want and possess 
enough knowledge to make certain decisions (Pischke 2002). Furthermore, MFIs are 
increasingly operating as market- (customer-) driven and not only product-driven 
organizations (Woller 2002). With increased competition, customer dropout and multi-
borrowing, customer orientation is becoming increasingly important for MFIs. Woller (2002), 
for example, suggests that the key to achieving outreach and sustainability is the extent to 
which MFIs adopt a market-oriented culture. Mersland and Strøm (2009) argue that 
customers help by providing better information thereby improving performance. Hartarska 
(2005) also found that customers on boards improve financial performance. According to the 
resource dependence theory, a board should be large in order to benefit from its members’ 
resources, and so we expect customers to be associated with large boards. To our knowledge, 
no literature argues in favour of an association between customers and duality and, therefore, 
we cannot stipulate their influence in this regard. We do however expect customer 
representation on boards to positively contribute to performance, in terms of the number of 
customers and sustainability. 
 
3.4 Creditors 
MFIs are increasingly shifting from donor to debt funding, and creditors represent an 
important stakeholder in the industry. In some cases, creditors become board members. The 
corporate literature shows that creditors on boards have two implications for organizations, 
through loans and accessibility of information (Agarwal and Elston 2001). As providers of 
loans, creditors monitor the allocation of loans to the organization. Their representation on 
boards also provides a strong channel of information to both parties. For example, the 
organization may benefit by knowing where and how to access finance (Byrd and Mizruchi 
2003). However, creditors on boards may cause a potential conflict of interest in relation to 
the financing decisions of the organization (Kroszner 2001). For example, the creditor may 
influence the management to avoid taking on certain projects because they could affect the 
organization’s ability to repay the creditor. Hartarska and Mersland (2012) found that 
creditors are beneficial for MFI performance. The authors argue that, through monitoring, 
creditors can positively affect performance. Thus we expect MFIs with creditors on their 
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boards to have small boards and non-duality and, based on the agency theory, better 
performance. 
3.5 Employees & Customers 
The marketing literature groups customers into two dimensions: internal and external (Lukas 
and Maignan 1996). It suggests that internal customers are employees of organizations, while 
external ones are those buying products/services from organizations (Bowen 1996). We 
borrow this notion to look at the interaction effects of having both employees and external 
customers on boards. Both possess valuable information for the MFI and the board. The 
nature of MFI activities requires employees to work closely with external customers 
(Batillana and Dorado 2010). We predict that, when both are represented on boards, the 
boards will be larger and more resourceful, which will lead to better MFI performance.  
 
3.6 Donors & Creditors 
Donors and creditors share the characteristic of being providers of funds for MFIs. The 
difference is that donors give funding in the form of grants, while creditors give loans. 
Despite this difference, they both wish to see the MFI monitored and the funds used wisely. 
Creditors need to recover their loans while donors wish to see their grants used properly 
(CGAP 2009). Interaction between donors and creditors seems to be important because of this 
shared characteristic. They both want the MFI to perform well. Therefore, we predict that 
boards with both creditors and donors represented will be small, have non-duality and good 
performance. Table 1 summarizes all of the hypotheses. 
 
Table1: Stakeholders and hypotheses 
Stakeholders A.    Board structure B.    Performance 
 Board 
size 
CEO Duality Social Financial 
1. Any stakeholder +/- + / - + + 
2. Donors - - +  + 
3. Employees + + +/- +/- 
4. Customers + ? + + 
5. Creditors - - + + 
6. Employees & Customers + ? + + 
7. Donors & Creditors - - + + 
 
  
135 
 
4.0 DATA AND METHODS 
4.1 Data 
The data were obtained from secondary public sources. The dataset was compiled from rating 
reports available at www.ratingfund2.org. These rating reports have been collected by major 
microfinance rating agencies (MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil and M-Cril) and 
contain information from 2001 to 2008. Each of the rating agencies is approved to rate and 
assess MFIs according to the Rating Fund of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP), which is a branch of the World Bank. Information included in the dataset comprises 
governance and board variables, financial statements and risk management of MFIs. The 
dataset contains 379 MFIs from 73 countries worldwide. Since board-related issues are 
reported qualitatively, we also read the reports and identified whether any stakeholders were 
sitting on the respective boards. When no information was available we reported a blank.  
The dataset is structured such that annual observations of performance variables are 
available for a maximum of five consecutive years. However, governance and organizational 
variables are reported only once. Following Mersland and Strøm (2009), we assumed that all 
variables are constant over the whole period since these are variables which do not change 
frequently. Because of geographical and governance differences between countries, we 
separately collected information on legal regimes, based on LaPorta et al (1997;2008) and 
obtained from the World fact book at www.nationmaster.com. The MFIs in the dataset are a 
mixture of NGOs, cooperatives and banks. Table 2 provides the distribution of MFIs by type 
and geographical location (country).  
Since our data were not self-reported, we found it reasonable to assume that the sample 
selection bias was minimal and that the sample consisted of several random samples of the 
governance and performance of MFIs. However, we recognize that not all MFIs are 
represented in this dataset. Large numbers of small financial cooperatives and NGOs, for 
example, are not included. However, we think this dataset helps provide a global picture of 
what is happening generally in terms of stakeholder representation and its influence on 
governance and the performance of MFIs. 
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Table2: MFI by country and type 
Name of the Country Type of MFI Total 
 NGOs Cooperatives Banks  
     
Albania 0 0 3 3  
Argentina 0 0 1 1  
Armenia 2 0 1 3  
Benin 4 2 2 8  
Bolivia 13 0 2 15  
Bosnia 11 0 0 11  
Brazil 11 1 1 13  
Bulgaria 0 1 1 2  
Burkina Faso 0 3 1 4  
Cambodia 1 0 11 12  
Chile 0 1 1 2  
Colombia 6 0 0 6  
Dominican Republic 3 0 1 4  
Ecuador 8 8 0 16  
Egypt 5 0 0 5  
El Salvado 2 0 2 4  
Ethiopia 0 0 10 10  
Georgia 6 0 0 6  
Guatemala 5 0 0 5  
Haiti 2 0 0 2  
Honduras 5 2 1 8  
India 23 4 4 31  
Indonesia 1 0 1 2  
Jordan 0 0 3 3  
Kazakhstan 0 0 4 4  
Kenya 3 0 6 9  
Kyrgyzstan 1 1 1 3  
Madagascar 0 1 1 2  
Mali 2 1 0 3  
Mexico 9 1 6 16  
Moldova 0 0 2 2  
Morocco 6 0 0 6  
Nicaragua 9 1 2 12  
Pakistan 1 0 0 1  
Paraguay 0 0 1 1  
Peru 14 3 12 29  
Philippines 6 1 0 7  
Roumania 0 0 1 1  
Russia 4 10 1 15  
Senegal 0 9 1 10  
South Africa 1 0 2 3  
Sri Lanka 1 0 0 1  
Tanzania 3 0 1 4  
Togo 1 2 0 3  
Trinidad & Tobago 0 0 1 1  
Tunisia 1 0 0 1  
Uganda 4 0 6 10  
Montenegro 1 0 1 2  
Cameroun 0 1 4 5  
Guinee 0 0 1 1  
East Timor 0 0 1 1  
Bangladesh 1 1 0 2  
Nepal 2 0 3 5  
Vietnam 1 0 0 1  
Azerbaijan 0 0 6 6  
Mongolia 0 0 2 2  
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Nigeria 2 0 1 3  
Mozambique 0 0 1 1  
Tajikistan 5 0 2 7  
Croatia 1 0 0 1  
Chad 0 1 0 1  
Rwanda 0 1 3 4  
Zambia 0 0 1 1  
China 1 0 0 1  
Serbia 1 0 0 1  
Ghana 3 0 0 3  
Malawi 0 0 1 1  
Gambia 1 0 0 1  
Kosovo 1 0 3 4  
Congo Braz. 1 0 0 1  
Burundi 0 1 0 1  
Niger 0 1 1 2  
DRC-Kinshasa 0 1 0 1  
 
Total   73 
 
195 
 
59 
 
125 
 
379 
 
 
4.2 Model and Variables 
We used two models to estimate board structure and performance, respectively. Model 1 
looks at board structure and has two dependent variables: board size, measured as the 
logarithm of the number of board members and CEO duality, which is a binary variable (=1 if 
the CEO is also the board chair or 0 otherwise). Because of the dual objective of MFIs, we 
also developed a performance model (Model 2) whose dependent variables are social and 
financial performance. Several performance variables are proposed in the microfinance 
literature (Rosenberg 2009) but, in accordance with our hypotheses, we concentrated on those 
variables we considered to be of most interest to stakeholders. The financial performance 
variables used are portfolio yield, measured as the inflation-adjusted ratio of interest and 
revenue to the MFI’s loan portfolio, and financial self-sustainability, measured as the ratio of 
subsidy-adjusted financial revenue to total expenses. The social performance variables are the 
number of customers, measured as the logarithm of the total number of customers served by 
the MFI, and looks at the breadth of outreach of the MFI. And average loan, measured as the 
logarithm of the average loan each borrower receives, and is concerned with the depth of the 
outreach, a measurement of customers’ poverty level (Schreiner 2002).   
The presence of stakeholders on boards was measured as a series of binary variables, 
denoting whether there is a donor (yes=1), customer (yes=1); employee (yes=1) or creditor 
(yes=1) on the board. We also had a binary variable for whether there is any-stakeholder on 
the board (yes=1) and, to deal with interactions between stakeholders, we had binary variables 
denoting whether the board has both an employee & customer (yes=1) and both donor & 
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creditor (yes=1). To control for variations among and within MFIs, countries and regions, we 
included a number of control variables (Mersland et al 2011). MFI control variables are size, 
measured in terms of the logarithm of assets possessed by the MFI, age, measured as the 
number of years in operation, regulation by central bank authorities (yes=1), legal status, 
denoting whether the MFI is an independent legal organization (yes=1) or just a branch of 
another organization (=0), ownership type (binary variables denoting whether or not the 
organization is an NGO, bank or cooperative, respectively) and whether the MFI was 
internationally initiated (yes=1).  
Among the country and region-specific variables included is competition. This variable 
was constructed from the MFI’s information provided to the rating agencies, and from the 
agencies’ independent judgment of the MFI’s competitive situation relative to other MFIs in 
the country. The higher the score on a scale of one to seven, the stronger the competition. 
Also included are regional binaries for countries in Latin America, Asia, Africa south of the 
Sahara, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. As far as we know, we are also the first to 
include LaPorta et al’s (1997; 2008) legal regimes variable (company laws), which denote 
countries that follow French law, English law, Socialist and German law in the list of 
countries’ governance variables. The models are given by the following equations:   
 
Model 1:  Board structure= f(stakeholders + MFI control variables + country control 
variables+ regional dummies + legal regimes + time dummies) 
 
Model 2: Performance= f(stakeholders + MFI control variables + country control 
variables +regional dummies + legal regimes + time dummies) 
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4.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 3 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. In terms of board 
structure, the average board size of an MFI is seven members and CEO duality exists in 17% 
of the MFIs. The inflation-adjusted portfolio yield is 33%. Financial sustainability is a 
widely-used proxy for long-term organizational sustainability, and the average value of 95% 
shows that, on average, these MFIs are not financially sustainable after adjusting for subsidies 
and other MFI-specific factors obtained from the rating agency.  
On average, the MFIs have 14,978 customers, with a minimum of 24 and a maximum of 
513,000. This shows that some of the MFIs have greater outreach than others and this may be 
attributed to their experience in the market. The average loan size of USD 751 reflects the 
“micro” aspect of microfinance. 30% of the MFIs have a stakeholder of some kind on their 
board. 9% have donors, 8% have employees, 18% have customers, and creditors are the least 
represented, appearing on only 5% of the MFIs’ boards. Few of the boards have both 
customers and employees (7%) and few have both donors and creditors (5%).  
The MFIs vary in size, with average assets of USD 6 million (Ln 14.58), while the average 
time in operation is 10.51 years. These size and age statistics show that most of the MFIs are 
small and young, which is the reason for the low stakeholder representation, as stakeholders 
tend to increase with the growth of the industry (Luoma and Goodstein 1999). Most of the 
MFIs (91%) have been established with their own legal status and 27% are regulated, 
indicating that regulation and transformation is becoming popular in the microfinance 
industry (Arun 2005).  
NGOs make up 51% of the whole dataset, banks form 32% and 17% of the MFIs are 
cooperatives. International influence is strong in the industry, with 38% of the MFIs having 
been started by international organizations. Average competition pressure is 4.3 which is 
above the 3.5 middle point of a sevenpoint scale. French legal regimes are leading by 59%, 
followed by English regimes 25%, socialism 13% and German regimes 3%. 29% of the MFIs 
are in Latin America, 25% in Asia, 24% in Africa south of the Sahara, 18% in Eastern Europe 
and 4% in the Middle East 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Board Structure      
Board size  2673 7.23 3.58 2.00 23.00 
Ln Board size 2672 1.87 0.46 0.67 3.14 
CEO Duality 2654 0.17 0.59 0.00 1.00 
 
Performance 
     
Inflation-adjusted Portfolio Yield  1020 0.33 0.21 -1.46 1.22 
Financial Sustainability 701 0.95 0.30 0.10 2.21 
Customers  990 14978 34517 24.00 513000 
Ln Customers 990 8.61 1.43 3.17 13.15 
Average Loan  1166 751 1322 1.00 24589 
Ln Average Loan 1166 5.90 1.22 0.04 10.11 
 
Independent variables 
     
Any-stakeholder 2428 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Donors 2335 0.09 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Employees 2349 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Customers 2296 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Creditors 2328 0.05 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Employees & customer 2032 0.07 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Donors & Creditor 2032 0.05 0.27 0.00 1.00 
 
MB Controls 
     
Size - Ln assets 1228 14.58 1.78 0.43 19.33 
Age 2957 10.51 8.14 1.00 85.00 
Legal status 2918 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Regulation 2921 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
NGO 2032 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Bank 2032 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Cooperatives 2032 0.17 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Internationally-initiated  2948 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 
 
Country and Regional controls 
     
Competition 2756 4.29 1.56 1.00 7.00 
French countries 2032 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 
English countries 2032 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Socialist countries 2032 0.13 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Germany countries 2032 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Region Latin America 2032 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Asia 2032 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Region Africa South 2032 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Region EECA 2032 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Region MENA 2032 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
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5.0 STAKEHOLDERS’ DEMOGRAPHICS 
5.1 Where are stakeholders represented? 
Table 4 shows that 22.9% of the stakeholders sitting on the boards of MFIs are donors, of 
whom 13.3% sit on NGO boards. This is to be expected since most donors support NGOs 
with not-for-profit objectives and are interested in being on boards in order to monitor the use 
of their funds (Alonso et al 2009). Interestingly, no donors sit on cooperative boards. This is 
at odds with the fact that the United Nations General Assembly declared the year 2012 as 
“The International Year of Cooperatives”. Why then are cooperatives not popular among 
microfinance donors?  
21.3% of the stakeholders sitting on boards are employees and more of these sit on NGO 
boards than on other types of MFI. Since employees provide inside information, NGOs can 
benefit from this. It is argued that the cost of having employees on boards is that they are not 
good monitors since it is difficult to monitor one’s boss (Osterloh and Frey 2005). Having 
both donors and employees on the boards of NGOs may be beneficial because donors monitor 
and employees provide information. We found that customers are most present on the boards 
of cooperatives and also the most well represented of all the stakeholder types. This is not 
surprising given that cooperatives are customer-owned MFIs. However, we also found that 
customers are represented on the boards of NGOs and banks, which indicates their 
importance. Creditors are the least represented on MFI boards and generally they sit on 
banks’ boards. Taken together, we argue that stakeholder representation is a result of MFI 
type. 
 
 Table 4: Stakeholders in different types of MFIs 
 % NGO  % Coop  % Bank  Total % 
Donors  13.30 0.00  9.60 22.90 
Employees  9.20 4.40  7.70  21.30 
Customers  6.70  36.50  3.20  46.40 
Creditors 2.90  0 .00 6.50  9.40 
 
Total 
 
32.10 
 
40.90 
 
27.00 
 
100.00 
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5.2 Are MFIs with stakeholders different? 
Does stakeholder representation influence board structure and MFI performance? Table 5 
provides t-test results for boards having at least one stakeholder and those without any.  
 
Table 5: Differences between boards with and without stakeholders 
 Mean-With Stk.  Mean-Without Stk.  t-test diff  
Board Structure    
Board size 8.70 6.90 1.80*  
Duality 0.15 0.16  0.01  
 
   
MB Performance    
Adjusted portfolio yield.  0.26 0.35  0.09*  
Financial self-sustainability 1.00 0.90 0.10* 
Number of customers  15738.00  13929.00  1808 .00 
Average Loan  1003.00  752.00  251*  
* denote significance at 0.01 levels. 
 
Boards with stakeholders are larger than boards without them. This confirms the previous 
literature, which argues that board size grows with the number of stakeholders (Hillman et al 
2001). Portfolio yield is used as a proxy for MFIs’ interest income in relation to their loan 
portfolio and it shows that MFIs with stakeholders on their boards charge less than their 
counterparts. This could indicate that stakeholders push for low interest rates, but since this is 
only a univariate it may also be the result of these MFIs being of a larger size. We also found 
evidence of significant differences as regards financial sustainability, in that MFIs with 
stakeholders on their boards are more likely to be sustainable. In fact, MFIs with stakeholders 
on their boards have higher average loan sizes, which is better for sustainability but worse for 
social performance. This result indicates that there is a trade-off between servicing the poor 
and ensuring good financial results (Hermes et al 2011). In unreported results, we ran a t-test 
for each type of stakeholder and obtained similar results to those shown in Table 5. These 
preliminary analyses illustrate that stakeholders make a difference to MFIs, both in terms of 
board structure and performance.  
We now look at the relationship between six MFI characteristics (size, age, regulation, 
legal status, MFI type and internationally-initiated) and stakeholder representation. The 
reasons for examining these characteristics are as follows. The corporate literature suggests 
that, as organizations become older and larger, the need for stakeholder inclusion increases, 
since this improves their access to resources (Luoma and Goodstein 1999). Furthermore, the 
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microfinance industry experiences a great deal of international influence (Mersland et al 
2011), which may be because of the inclusion of stakeholders on boards. Lastly, there has 
been a move for MFIs globally to transform and become regulated by central banking 
authorities (Hartarska and Nadolnyak 2007) and this has an impact on who sits on boards. We 
tested these relationships using the probit regression method in which the dependent variables 
are the stakeholder binaries defined earlier. The results are shown in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6: Stakeholders and MFI characteristics 
Variable Any-stakeholder Donor Employee Customer Creditor 
Size 0.05** 0.022 0.06 0.12** 0.11 
Age -0.01 -0.06* 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 
Regulation -0.20 0.12 -0.09 -0.45** -0.73* 
Legal status 0.53** -0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.03 
NGO -2.11 5.36 -0.16 -3.09 4.67 
Bank -2.13 5.16 -0.11 -3.15 5.39 
Int. Initiative 0.43* 0.87* 0.29* 0.30** 0.24 
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.16 0.12 0.47 0.14 
Probit regressions-regional and time dummies are included. *, **denote statistical 
significance at 0.01 and 0.05. 
 
Large MFIs are more likely to include stakeholders on their boards than smaller ones. These 
stakeholders seem to be mainly customers, since only customers are significantly associated 
with large MFIs. We also found that younger MFIs have donors on their boards. This justifies 
Schreiner’s (2002) notion that donors are like genetic engineers controlling the evolution of 
MFIs. They sit on boards when MFIs are young, and later leave them to operate 
independently. Contrary to Luoma and Goodstein (1999), we found evidence that regulations 
do not attract stakeholders on to boards, which is probably because regulators often do not 
allow members without technical banking knowledge to be included on MFI boards. 
MFIs with their own legal status have more stakeholders on their boards. It is remarkable 
that the characteristic of being internationally-initiated is both statistically and economically 
significantly related to most types of stakeholders. Mersland et al (2011) show a positive 
relationship between international initiatives and MFIs’ social performance. We therefore 
argue that internationally-initiated MFIs have better performance, caused by, among other 
things, having stakeholders on their boards.  
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6.0 STAKEHOLDERS AND BOARD STRUCTURE 
Do stakeholders influence MFI board structure? Organizations need board structures that 
allow their boards to be efficient in fulfilling their roles (Linck et al 2008). Here we ran 
regressions between board structure variables, as dependent variables, and stakeholders on 
boards, as independent variables. We did so by including each stakeholder variable in the 
regression, and running pooled OLS regressions for board size and probit regressions for CEO 
duality. Table 7 gives the results, with panel A showing those relating to board size and panel 
B those to CEO duality. 
Generally, the results show that stakeholders matter when it comes to which structure the 
board adopts. Panel A shows that donors are associated with small boards, which supports the 
argument that they require a high level of monitoring. As hypothesized, the presence of 
employees on boards is significantly associated with larger boards. Since large boards are a 
source of resources, and employees possess unique information, we argue that participation in 
their board is beneficial. We also show evidence that funders, both donors & creditors, are 
associated with small boards. This implies that funders prefer small boards because it allows 
them to carry out better CEO monitoring (Yermack 1996).  
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Table 7: Stakeholders and board structure 
 Panel A: Ln Board Size 
Independent  variable  
Any stakeholder 0.043       
Donor  -
0.109*** 
     
Employee   0.192*     
Customer    -0.044    
Creditor     0.051   
Employee & Customer      0.052  
Donor & Creditor       -0.088** 
 
Control Variables 
       
Size 0.018* 0.018* 0.017* 0.019* 0.019* 0.028* 0.029* 
Age -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Legal status -0.203* -0.235* -0.192* -0.241* -0.237* -0.214* -0.209* 
Regulation 0.044 0.053 0.043 0.061 0.062 0.092 0.088 
Int. Initiative 0.091* 0.139* 0.095* 0.122 0.116* 0.097* 0.106* 
NGO 0.018 -0.036 0.001 -0.056 -0.018 0.068 0.041 
Bank -0.217* -0.260* -0.247* -0.285* -0.262* -0.177* -0.206* 
Competition -0.065* -0.062* -0.072* -0.064* -0.069* -0.060* 
 
-0.062* 
Obs. 854 788 827 812 817 1012 1012 
R2 0.271 0.299 0.283 0.278 0.277 0.242 0.244 
  
 
Panel B:    CEO duality 
 
Independent variable 
 
Any stakeholder 0.299***       
Donor  -0.836*      
Employee   -0.316     
Customer    0.472***    
Creditor     1.419*   
Employee & Customer      1.011*  
Donor & Creditor       -0.026 
 
Control Variables 
       
Size 0.207* 0.231* 0.206* 0.194* 0.217* 0.206* 0.205* 
Age -0.049* -0.567* -0.037* -0.051* -0.052* -0.035* -0.037* 
Legal status 0.223 0.233 -0.060 0.215 0.179 -0.166 -0.059 
Regulation -0.488* -0.431** -0.482* -0.457** -0.351** -0.470* -0.481* 
Int. Initiative -0.537* -0.447* -0.652* -0.459* -0.544* -0.744* -0.648* 
NGO -0.164 -0.165 -0.381 0.112 -0.244 0.412*** -0.377 
Bank 0.005 -0.174 -0.208 0.245 -0.260 0.638** -0.205 
Competition -0.005 -0.035 -0.042 0.007 0.001 -0.041 
 
-0.043 
Obs. 793 765 945 753 761 945 945 
Pseudo R2 0.139 0.147 0.121 0.131 0.153 0.154 0.121 
OLS regressions - Legal regimes, Regional and Time dummies are included. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05and 0.1 levels. 
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Panel B shows that, generally, stakeholders are positively associated with CEO duality. This 
has two implications. First, it is possible that the CEO invites stakeholders on to the board so 
that they will remain loyal to him or her and select him or her to chair the board as well. Or, it 
is possible that stakeholders opt for duality because they want to avoid dealing with multiple 
sources of authority and responsibilities (Finkelstein and D’aven 1994). We found that donors 
are significantly associated with non-duality. This relates to the agency argument that the 
CEO is the donors’ agent and so they want to monitor him or her.  
Surprisingly, customers and creditors are both associated positively with duality. 
Customers, we argue, want their interests to be heard, planned for and implemented by one 
person so as to avoid multiple responsibilities. However, we expected creditors, as funders, to 
opt for non-duality. This positive association could be the result of creditors wanting to hold 
just one person responsible for their loans. However, this finding might also be a result of the 
few observations we have of creditors sitting on boards. Regarding interactions among 
stakeholders, we found a positive association between duality and the presence of both 
employees and customers on a board. As internal and external customers, respectively, the 
results suggest that they opt for duality in order to have one central authority and ease of 
operation under one boss (Rechner and Dalton 1991).  
The MFI control variables show significant results in both panels. Larger MFIs have 
larger boards as evidenced previously (Adams and Ferreira 2009) and are associated with 
duality. MFIs with independent legal status prefer small boards. This is not surprising since, 
when MFIs are subsidiaries of other organizations, they belong to larger, multi-purpose NGOs 
or large banks, and this leads to large boards. We also saw that MFIs with international 
initiators have large boards and non-duality. This was expected given that international actors 
are probably more familiar with governance codes, which recommend non-duality. Regulated 
MFIs are associated with non-duality, which is often a legal and regulatory requirement for 
such institutions. For more checks, we ran a board structure model with board gender 
diversity but the results were not interesting because of the few observations we have of this 
variable. We therefore choose not to report them.  
Taken together, we found that stakeholders matter for the type of board structure put in 
place by MFIs. This influence may cause MFIs to have different levels of performance. This 
is examined in the next section.  
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7.0 STAKEHOLDERS AND PERFORMANCE 
Does the presence of stakeholders on boards affect MFI performance? Before we ran this 
model, we needed to check for endogeneity. It is possible that, instead of stakeholders 
influencing performance, it is performance that leads stakeholders to sit on boards. Another 
endogeneity concern was that we might have omitted some unobservable variable that affects 
both stakeholders and performance variables (Adams and Ferreira 2009). For example, some 
MFIs may be more progressive than others, and thus have more stakeholders and better 
performance than others. This effect could lead to spurious correlations among variables, and 
so we had to control for it (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Mersland and Støm 2011). We 
addressed these problems by means of instrumental variables (Wooldridge 2006).  
In Section 4 we gave evidence that the number of stakeholders sitting on boards is greater 
in internationally-initiated MFIs. Also, MFIs are normally established either as part of a 
multi-purpose NGO or with their own legal status in a given country. This has implications 
for who sits on the board. If the MFI has its own legal status, it has more power to choose 
which stakeholders can sit on its board than when it is a branch of another organization. 
Finally, MFIs come in various types: NGOs, cooperatives and banks. As previously 
evidenced, MFI type has implications for stakeholder representation. Thus, we used 
internationally-initiated, legal status and MFI type as instruments. We conducted a Durbin-
Wu Hausman test (Hausman 1978) and observed that there were endogeneity problems 
(unreported results). We then ran a two-stage linear regression (2SLS), including three 
instruments and other control variables, for each stakeholder variable individually. Table 8 
reports the results of financial performance.  
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Table 8: Stakeholders and financial performance 
Panel A:          Inflation-adjusted Portfolio Yield 
Independent variable  
Any stakeholder -0.155*       
Donor  0.453*      
Employee   2.003     
Customer    -0.125*    
Creditor     0.875 
  
Employee & Customer     
 
-0.157* 
 
Donor & Creditor     
  
0.492* 
 
Control variables 
       
Size - Ln (Assets) -0.005 -0.009 -0.023 -0.008 -0.010 -0.000 -0.003 
Age -0.004* -0.005* -0.009** -0.005* -0.051* 0.005* -0.005* 
Regulation -0.041* -0.043** -0.019 -0.049** -0.021 -0.048* -0.037** 
Competition -0.008* -0.003 -0.018 -0.007 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 
 
Instruments 
 
Internationally-initiated; Legal status; MFI type 
Obs. 790 760 766 745 759 862 862 
R2 0.109 0.129 0.111 0.119 0.108 0.141 0.104 
 
 
Panel B: Financial Sustainability 
Independent variable  
Any stakeholder 0.093**       
Donor  0.273**      
Employee   -0.288     
Customer    0.134***    
Creditor     -1.258   
Employee & Customer      0.039  
Donor & Creditor       0.120** 
 
Control variables 
       
Size - Ln (Assets) 0.022** 0.030* 0.034* 0.035* 0.037* 0.037* 0.045* 
Age -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004** -0.004** -0.004*** 
Regulation 0.044 0.037 0.062*** 0.019 0.035 0.062** 0.069 
Competition 0.027* 0.030* 0.029* 0.036* 0.024*** 0.027* 0.016 
 
Instruments 
 
Internationally-initiated; Legal status; MFI type 
Obs. 560 542 544 530 541 636 636 
 R2 0.138 0.162 0.139 0.137 0.088 0.129 0.108 
SLS regression - Legal regimes, Regional and Time dummies are included in all regressions. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1levels. 
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Panel A shows the results for the adjusted portfolio yield. Generally, stakeholders on a board 
are associated with low interest returns. We show evidence that the presence of any 
stakeholder, customers, and both employees and customers are all negatively associated with 
portfolio yield. This means that customers fight for lower interest rates. However, we show 
evidence that donors and creditors push for higher yields. This means that funders want to see 
MFIs get higher returns so that, in the first case, donors can eventually withdraw their 
support, and in the second, so that creditors can be repaid.  
Panel B shows that stakeholders on boards are associated with greater financial sustainability. 
This means that when stakeholders sit on boards, they monitor and give the resources that are 
necessary for MFIs to be sustainable. We found positive significance results in the case of the 
presence of any stakeholder, donors, customers and of both donors and creditors.  
These results give support to several hypotheses. The presence of any type of stakeholder 
on a board is partially supported, since positively they provide financial sustainability but a 
negative portfolio yield. Contrary to Hartarska and Mersland (2012), we found that MFIs had 
better financial performance when donors were on their boards. Following Rosenberg (2009), 
we argue that donors like to fund, assist and advise MFIs that show a credible track record in 
terms of financial performance. This enables donors to withdraw their support at a later stage, 
as suggested by Schreiner (2002).  
Similar to the findings of Hartarska (2005), our results provide support for the presence of 
an association between customers on boards and financial performance. Though customers 
bring negative yields, they are positively associated with financial sustainability. A similar 
result is found when both employees and customers are on the board. This means that 
customers push for lower interest rates but not to such a level that prevents the MFI from 
being sustainable. From pushing for low interest levels, it means that customers on boards 
also induce lower costs for MFIs. The results also support the notion that, in MFIs, employees 
and customers work closely together (Mori, 2010; Battilana and Dorado 2010). Furthermore, 
we found support for the influence of funders - donors and creditors - on boards. They are 
both associated with better financial performance.  
These results indicate that stakeholders push down MFI costs, and to further check this we 
ran additional regressions (not reported) to see how stakeholders influence costs. We found 
that stakeholder presence has negative associations with operational costs, specifically in the 
case of any type of stakeholder, customers and both employees and customers. Thus the 
presence of stakeholders on boards leads to lower MFI costs.   
  
150 
 
Table 9 shows the results on social performance. Panel A shows the results on the 
relationship between the presence of stakeholders and the number of customers (the breadth 
of outreach). Here, we found that donors are associated with a higher number of customers 
and therefore better social performance. The relationship is also significant when both donors 
and creditors are on the same board. As funders, it could be that this type of stakeholder 
monitors and advises in a way that leads to more customers. Alternatively, by having greater 
inside information, these funders may provide additional funding, allowing the MFI to serve 
more customers. Interestingly, but not surprisingly, we found that boards that include 
customers (who represent existing customers) are associated with fewer customers. This 
means that customers serving on boards monopolize the service and so fewer people are 
served.   
Panel B provides the results relating to average loan size. A smaller loan means better 
social performance as poor customers normally take out small loans (Hermes et al 2011). We 
found a positive association between the presence of any type of stakeholder and average loan 
size. However, the presence of donors, creditors and both donors and creditors on the same 
board are all associated with smaller loans, while customers and both employees and 
customers on the same board are associated with larger loans. Again, we found support for the 
positive effect of donors on social performance. Most donors have a social mission of serving 
the poor and so, when they are on a board, they try to monitor and advise the organization in 
such a way that meets their objectives.  
Creditors are shown to be socially beneficial and associated with smaller loans. This is 
surprising, as it may appear that creditors would prefer the organizations to provide larger and 
more profitable loans. However, since most microfinance creditors also have a social mission, 
they are likely to push for greater outreach to the poor (Rhyne 2005). We also showed that 
customer representation is associated with larger loans. The results are similar when both 
employees and customers are represented on the same board. It appears that the presence of 
customers on boards leads to worse social performance by encouraging MFIs to concentrate 
on giving larger loans to fewer, less poor customers. 
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Table 9: Stakeholders and Social performance 
 Panel A:      Ln Customers 
Independent variable  
Any stakeholder 0.246       
Donor  3.646*      
Employee   0.252     
Customer    -0.299***    
Creditor     0.948   
Employee & Customer      -0.078  
Donor & Creditor       2.983* 
 
Control variables 
       
Size - Ln (Assets) 0.459* 0.434* 0.559* 0.463* 0.454* 0.505* 0.491* 
Age 0.015* 0.034* 0.014 -0.023* 0.023* 0.013** 0.021* 
Regulation -0.226** -0.282** 0.089 0.225** -0.231** -0.085 -0.109 
Competition 0.041 0.080** 0.005 0.017 0.045 0.003 0.037 
 
Instruments 
 
Internationally-initiated; Legal status; MFI type 
Obs. 741 724 716 706 720 691 692 
Wald X2 38.46* 21.59* 46.56* 38.83* 38.37* 47.11* 29.24* 
Pseudo R2 0.488 0.108 0.534 0.505 0.492 0.496 0.178 
 
 
 
Panel B:        Ln Average loan 
Independent variable  
Any stakeholder 0.984*       
Donor  -4.558*      
Employee   -6.827     
Customer    1.115*    
Creditor     -3.864**   
Employee & Customer      1.172*  
Donor & Creditor       -4.677* 
 
Control variables 
       
Size - Ln (Assets) 0.161* 0.189* 0.208* 0.159* 0.177* 0.166* 0.198* 
Age -0.001 -0.009 -0.012 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
Regulation 0.419* 0.357* 0.357** 0.433* 0.350* 0.388* 0.285* 
Competition 0.086* 0.004 0.105** 0.106* 0.036 0.109* 0.028 
 
Instruments  
 
Internationally-initiated; Legal status; MFI type 
Obs. 852 819 827 805 818 744 744 
R2 0.354 0.276 0.182 0.456 0.139 0.377 0.277 
SLS regression-Legal regime, Regional and Time dummies are included in all regressions. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
152 
 
For the control variables, Tables 8 and 9 show that large MFIs are associated with poorer 
social and better financial performance. Since large MFIs can source more funding, they are 
able to reach more customers, offer larger loans, make greater profits and become more 
financially sustainable. We also observed that regulated MFIs offer larger loans and serve 
fewer customers than unregulated ones. This is consistent with the literature that suggests 
that, as MFIs transform, they begin to work more with fewer and less poor customers in order 
to adhere to regulatory requirements (Hartarska and Nadolnyak 2007). 
In summary, these results show that stakeholders are beneficial for MFIs and for those 
stakeholders represented on the boards (Labie and Mersland 2011). Donors bring better social 
and financial performance. The results of having customers on boards are that costs are lower 
and sustainability is more likely but social performance is poorer. We did not find evidence 
that the presence of employees on boards affects performance, but when both employees and 
customers are on the same board they push for low costs and interest rates and advocate larger 
loans. This is good for employees, since low interest rates brings in more customers and 
larger loans, which are more profitable for the MFI and provide a better income for 
employees. When creditors sit alone on boards, they are not all that beneficial to MFIs. 
However, when they serve on the same board as donors, they are beneficial, which leads to 
better financial and social performance. It appears that, as funders, they can work better 
together than when each operates individually.  
 
 
8.0 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This paper responds to the call for research to gain a deeper understanding of stakeholders in 
MFIs (Labie and Mersland 2011). Using a global dataset, we have shown the relationship 
between stakeholders and MFI characteristics (size, age, regulation, legal status, MFI type and 
international initiation), board structure (size and CEO duality) and performance (financial 
and social). We used a mixture of techniques in the analysis. For MFI characteristics and 
board structure variables, we used OLS regressions and probit regressions. To tackle 
endogeneity concerns, we used a 2SLS regression with instrumental variables to analyze the 
relationship between stakeholders and performance.  
 We found that stakeholders are represented differently in different MFI types. Donors and 
employees are more on the boards of NGOs, creditors on those of banks and customers on 
those of cooperatives. We further found that stakeholders are associated with larger and 
internationally-initiated MFIs.  Stakeholders show their interest by having an influence in 
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different ways on board structure and performance. Donors are strict in monitoring (Yermack 
1996) and we found that they are associated with small boards, non-duality and better 
performance. Similar findings were obtained when boards contain both donors and creditors. 
Employees, as resource providers, were found to be associated with large boards. Customers 
are associated with duality, better financial performance but poorer social performance. 
Similar evidence is seen when customers interact with employees on boards.  
It is interesting that donors and creditors are associated with better performance in all 
cases. This implies that funders are beneficial to MFIs, as advocated by policy papers (CGAP 
2009; Rhyne, 2005). The practical implication of this is that donors and creditors should take 
a more active role in their partnership with MFIs. Our finding that few donors, and 
particularly creditors, sit on MFI boards should motivate a reorientation among microfinance 
funders. They should sit on MFI boards more often. Donors and creditors should not just 
provide funds, but they should also monitor and provide other resources. Particularly because 
the number of MFI creditors is rapidly increasing in the industry (www.mixmarket.org), there 
is a need for more research on their role in and influence on MFIs.  
Despite the fact that customers cause the social performance of MFIs to be poorer, they 
are beneficial in terms of pushing for low costs, while at the same time enabling MFIs to be 
sustainable. Most MFIs have high operational costs, which means that customers can be 
beneficial to campaigns to reduce costs. However, the finding that the presence of customers 
on boards leads to poorer social performance should be the subject of new research. To what 
extent are existing MFI customers hindering further outreach by microfinance services? 
A limitation of our study is that only four types of stakeholder are included. Future 
research could examine more types, specifically those not sitting on boards. How, for 
example, do rating agencies and local communities (Mersland, 2011) influence MFIs? 
Finally, the findings that cooperative MFIs do not have donors on their boards and that 
customers sitting on the boards of cooperative MFIs have a negative influence on their social 
performance merit further study, especially since 2012 is the UN’s Year of Cooperatives.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix One: Checklist of Questions on Board and MFI demography 
 
Section 1: Board Demography 
 
1. How many members are sitting on the board?  ……………..members 
2. Please indicate the following for the board members  
Board member Found
er Y/N 
Gende
r 
(M/F) 
Education 
Secondary 
bachelor, 
masters 
Age- 
Year 
born 
Experience in 
this and other 
boards 
Y/N…which 
Nationalit
y 
Votin
g 
right 
Y/N 
Committe
e member 
Y/N 
Donor representative         
Investors 
(shareholders) 
        
Founders         
Employees          
MFI Top managers         
Customer 
representative 
        
Government official         
Banker (creditors)         
Academicians         
Others (please specify) 
 
        
 
3. Who is the chairperson of the board?  _______________________  (Male/Female) 
4. Is the Chairperson also the Director/CEO of your MFI?    Yes /No  
5. Is the Chairperson also the founder of your MFI?    Yes /No   
6. Does the board have any committees?     Yes / No 
7. If yes, what are they? ________________________________________ 
8. When are board members elected (the number shows after how many years)(please tick) 
One Two Three four  five More than 5 (indicate) 
      
 
9. On average, how often does the board meet in a year? ………………………….. 
10. The average length of board meeting is   ____________hours 
11. How many board members are usually present at the meeting? ___________members 
12. Does the board have any rules and procedures? No (  ) Yes (  ) if yes which ones 
_____________________________________ 
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Section 2: Background of the Organization 
 
1. Name of the MFI    ______________________ 
2. When was the organization established (year) ______________ 
 
3. Location of MFI’s head office (City/town)   ___________ 
 
4. What is the legal status of the organization (please circle) 
a) NGO  b) Commercial bank  c) Community bank d) Cooperative 
a) Private Company  f) Company ltd.  by guarantee  
g)    Other (specify) ____________ 
 
5.  If you have owners, please list them in the following table 
Owners  % 
  
  
  
  
 
6. How many employees does the organization have ?  (as of December 2009) ________________ 
 
7. Is the MFI regulated by the banking authorities ? Yes_____ No______ if no, does it plan to transform 
and become regulated? Yes____ no______ 
 
8. What is the organization’s main market or customers ?(please circle) 
a) Women only 
b) More women, less men 
c) More men, less women 
d) Equal women and men 
9. On average, what percentage of each gender (male /female) does the MFI have as 
customers?___________ 
 
10. How many branches (sales points) does the MFI have?  ___________ 
 
11. Where does the MFI mainly serve? (please circle) 
a) Rural only 
b) More rural, less urban 
c) More urban, less rural 
d) Equal rural and urban 
 
 
12. What is the dominant credit methodology? (please circle) 
a) Group lending only 
b) Individual lending only 
c) More group lending, less individual lending 
d) More individual lending, less group lending 
e) Other (specify) 
 
13. Is the MFI a member of any international network /organization? 
Please list the international networks 
_________________ 
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Section 3: Respondent profile 
 
1. Name of the respondent ___________    Gender: M/F 
2. Position of the respondent __________ 
 
3. Do you have any remarks with respect to the board or to this survey that could be relevant for both 
sides? Please state them: 
 
Request for useful Documents  
i. Audited financial statements  
ii. Different company reports/documents if available  
iii. Board members profile (CVs) 
iv. Company brochures, fliers etc.  
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your cooperation 
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Appendix Two: Interview Guide  
BOARD CHARACTERISTICS IN MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS (MFIs): EAST AFRICAN 
CONTEXT 
Interview with Board Members 
The aim of this interview is to seek your views and collect data on the characteristics and processes of MFI 
boards in East Africa. I would therefore like to ask you to spend approximately 30 minutes to discuss with me 
various issues regarding the MFI board which you sit on. I would like to assure you that the information you 
give me will remain strictly confidential and will be used for academic purposes only. 
 
Background information: 
i. Name of the respondent (board member): _______;gender: _____________ 
ii. Of which MFI are you a member?: ___________ 
iii. How many years have you been a board member in this MFI? ____________ 
iv. Do you sit on other MFI boards? ___________ if yes, which MFIs  __________ 
v. Were you appointed because your capacity or because of your institutional affiliation? 
 
Roles and Responsibilities: 
i. Could you explain your role as a board member of this MFI? 
ii. Why did you accept this position? 
iii. Do you sit on any board committees?  If yes, which committee? 
iv. What do you do in that committee? 
v. How often does the board meet per year? 
vi. How often does the committee meet per year? 
vii. How long (hours) do meetings (board and committee) take on average? 
 
Information and decision processes: 
i. What type of information do you receive prior to board meetings? Who avails you the information? 
ii. Do you contact other board members before meetings? If yes, why; if no, why not? 
iii. What subjects do you normally discuss in board meetings? 
iv. During meetings, do you discuss matters regarding the mission of the MFI? 
a. Matters relating to social and financial sustainability (targeting the poorest vs. getting profits) 
b. Is it possible that some members have a strong interest in serving the poor and women, while 
others have a strong interest in getting high profits? 
i. How do you handle these differences or disagreements? 
v. Since you are a regulated MFI (or planning to transform), as a board member, do you think regulation is 
good for your MFI? Why yes, why?  If no, why not? 
a. In board meetings, do you discuss matters relating to the benefits and costs of regulation to 
your MFI?  
vi. How are stakeholders (such as employees, donors, government) involved in the decisions you make as a 
board? 
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vii. How are stakeholders’ interests captured in board decision making? 
 
Trust, Cooperation and Reputation: 
i. In your opinion, would you say that, generally speaking, you are willing to accept decisions made by 
top managers of the MFI? Why yes or why not? 
ii. According to you how important is social interaction with other board members? 
iii. What is your opinion with respect to the knowledge and experience of the members of the top 
management team? 
iv. Does the top management team contact you (in person, by phone or through email) outside board 
meetings, and if so, what do you discuss? 
v. How does the MFI benefit from your participation in the board? 
vi. Do you have any other comments or questions? 
 
 
Thank you for your cooperation 
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Appendix Three: Interviews  
1. Interview Approach 
In order to get an understanding of the characteristics of MFI board members, the researcher conducted semi-
structured interviews with 30 board members from 20 MFIs in the three countries. A set of interview questions 
(appendix 2) was developed. The interviews focused on how the respondents came to be board members, what 
motivates them to stay as board members, their background, how their background informs or influences their 
contribution to the MFIs, what they perceive their roles are, whether they have written terms of reference 
(TORs), whether they are guided by some form of board manual or policy and whether they feel that they have 
an influence on key decisions and the performance of the organization. We also inquired into how decisions are 
made regarding outreach to the poor and financial objectives, which kind of board members are most influential 
in such decisions and how differences between members are resolved. 
Interview data was analyzed using inductive techniques in which the transcribed responses were coded, 
based on theory, interview responses and type of questions. The exercise continued during and after data 
collection and focused on identifying patterns, differences, similarities and apparent links in the data. We further 
clustered information that addressed primary questions such as what, why, who, how and when. This clustering 
allowed us to identify emergent themes and similar characteristics of some members without introducing 
premature analytical bias.  
 
2. Respondents’ Demographics 
 
a. Age 
Years Respondents 
18-35 4 
35-55 12 
Over 55 14 
Total 30 
 
 
 
  
164 
 
b. Education 
Degree Respondents 
Below Bachelor 6 
Bachelor 16 
Masters and above 8 
Total 30 
 
 
 
c. Expertise  
Expertise Board members 
Microfinance/Banking/Economics 14 
Entrepreneurship/Development 4 
HRM/Marketing 2 
Investment/Resource mobilization 1 
Law and Legal 2 
Other 7 
Total 30 
 
 
d. Gender  
 Respondents 
Male 19 
Female 11 
Total 30 
 
 
e. Founders  
 Respondents 
Founders 11 
Non founders 19 
Total 30 
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3. Examples of responses 
 
 Interview responses 
Independent members As a leader in my community, people listen to me when I talk to them. 
Being on this board enables me to advise the CEO on which strategies 
they can use to get close to poor people and work well with them. I 
know my people, and I can talk to them about how microfinance 
services can benefit them. In this way, I feel through my network, I am 
able to contribute to the outreach of this MFI even though I am not an 
insider. (Interview, June, 2010) 
 
 
 
International I have worked in several local and international organizations for more 
than forty years. After my retirement, I thought I had something 
unique to share with others but I could not figure out what that was. 
Then I was approached to work with an international NGO and advise 
MFIs. It then clicked in my mind: “this is what I want to do for the rest 
of my life―advising MFIs in helping poor people get financial 
services”. From then up to now, I have volunteered to sit on the boards 
of MFIs which have this social mission and I advise them on how to 
fulfil this mission sustainably. (Interview, April, 2010) 
 
Female and founder I am the founder CEO of this MFI and a woman. With my background, 
I know what other women need. Being on a board with other skilled 
women makes me feel that we are able to contribute what our female 
customers want. Our MFI is 100% for female customers so the board 
members ought to be female. That is why we are among the most 
developed MFIs in this country. (Interview, April, 2010) 
 
Founder Poor people have the same needs as others. Their challenge is getting 
access to what they need. We founded this MFI in order to serve them. 
We provide them with various services such as loans, training and 
insurance. We plan to continue expanding our services to them as long 
as they tell us they need these services. (Interview, June, 2010) 
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I give thanks to the God of heaven, for his steadfast love endures forever 
Psalms 136:26 
 
